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ABSTRACT 
One of the most important aspects of monetary policy is an understanding of the transmission 
process: the mechanism through which the monetary policy actions of the Central Bank 
impact on aggregate demand and prices by influencing the investment and consumption 
decisions of households and firms. Thus, commercial banks are regarded as conveyers of 
monetary policy shocks and are expected to adjust retail interest rates in response to policy 
shocks one-to-one. In practice, commercial banks adjust their retail rates in response to 
changes in monetary policy with a lag of several months and this delay is often viewed as an 
impediment on the ability of the Central Bank to steer the economy. Several reasons, such as 
credit rationing and adverse selection, switching costs, risk sharing, consumer irrationality, 
structure of the financial system, menu costs and asymmetric information are some of the 
causes advanced for commercial banks retail rates being sticky. In spite of the important role 
of pass-through analysis in the monetary policy transmission process, it has received very 
little attention in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in Cameroon and Nigeria, which have 
implemented a series of reforms. To this end, this study gives a comparative analysis of 
interest rate pass-through in Nigeria and Cameroon using retail rates (lending and deposit) 
and a discount rate (policy rate) from January 1990 to December 2010 for Nigeria and from 
January 1990 to June 2008 for Cameroon. The study examines the magnitude and speed of 
retail rate adjustments to changes in the Central Bank policy rate as well as examining the 
possibility of symmetric and asymmetric pass-through in both countries. In addition, the 
study also investigates whether there is pass-through of monetary policy from one country to 
the other.  
The empirical analysis employs four different types of co-integration techniques to test the 
presence of a long run co-integrating relationship between retail and the policy rates in order 
to ensure that the relationship detected is robust. Three sets of analyses are carried out in the 
study. Following Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), the study employed a co-integration 
technique, firstly, to analyse pass-through for the entire sample, secondly, to analyse 
symmetric and asymmetric pass-through using a ten year rolling window analysis in an error 
correction framework. Finally, the policy rates were swapped around to investigate if there 
are transmissions of impulses from one country to the other. 
Overall, evidence from the entire sample and rolling window analysis suggests that monetary 
policy in Cameroon is less effective. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the Banque Des 
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Etats De L’Afrique Centrale (BEAC) is unable to sterilise the excess liquidity of the banking 
sector in Cameroon. The long run pass-through of 0.72 and 0.71 for the entire sample, and the 
average long run pass-through for the rolling window of 0.78 and 0.76 for the lending and 
deposit rates, suggest that monetary policy is highly effective in Nigeria compared to 
Cameroon. 
The empirical evidence confirmed asymmetric adjustment in six rolling windows in the 
lending rate in Nigeria. Three rolling windows indicated that the direction of rigidity is 
downward, supporting Scholnick’s (1996) collusive pricing arrangement between banks, and 
the other three suggested that the lending rate is rigid in the upward direction, corroborating 
Scholnick’s (1996) customer reaction hypothesis. The deposit rate in Cameroon was also 
found to adjust asymmetrically and the direction of rigidity is downward, supporting Hannan 
and Berger’s (1991) customer reaction hypothesis. The investigation of impulse transmission 
between the two countries revealed that only the policy rate in Nigeria exerts some influence 
on the deposit rate in Cameroon. Policy recommendations are also discussed.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
One of the pre-conditions for contemporary monetary policy decision making is a good 
understanding of the transmission mechanism, that is, the mechanism that transmits the 
actions of the Central Bank to the real sector and thus permits the Central Bank to fine-tune 
the economy in the required direction (Gigineishvili, 2011:3). This process occurs through 
channels and constitutes what is known as the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
(MPTM). 
According to Samba and Yan (2010:31), MPTM describes the ways in which the monetary 
policy actions of the Central Bank impact on aggregate demand and prices by influencing 
investment and consumption decisions in the economy. It is interesting to note that the 
MPTM does not operate in isolation. The monetary policy stances of the Central Bank are 
transmitted through various links called channels of monetary policy transmission such as 
interest rates, bank lending, balance sheet, asset prices, exchange rates and the expectation 
channels. The monetary policy transmission process is complex and involves a number of 
stages. Faure (2006:9) summarised this process into six stages: First, a change in the Central 
Bank’s lending rate is transmitted to the private bank-to-bank interbank market. Second, the 
private bank-to-bank interbank market transmits the change to other market interest rates. 
Third, changes in market interest rates are transmitted to asset prices, exchange rates and 
expectations. Fourth, these changes in asset prices, exchange rates and expectations are then 
transmitted to aggregate demand. Fifth, changes in aggregate demand are transmitted to 
money supply. Sixth, changes in money supply are finally transmitted to prices. It should be 
noted that the scope of this study is limited to the first and second stages of the transmission 
process which are relevant for the traditional interest rate channel. 
A key aspect of the MPTM is the “pass-through” which describes the magnitude and speed at 
which the monetary policy decisions of the Central Bank influence target variables such as 
inflation, consumption and the level of investment. In addition, the process whereby 
commercial banks adjust their lending and deposit rates in response to changes in policy 
controlled interest rates of the Central Bank is known as interest rate pass-through (IRPT). 
Thus, the effectiveness of the monetary policy depends on the speed and magnitude with 
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which changes in the policy controlled interest rate are transmitted to retail rates (lending and 
deposit rates) of commercial banks (Aziakpono et al., 2007:1). If pass-through is sluggish or 
too small to be noticed, the effectiveness of monetary policy will be compromised as the 
desired goal of monetary policy may not be achieved regardless of the size or magnitude of 
the change in the policy controlled interest rate (Aziakpono et al., 2007:2). Similarly, a 
speedier and complete pass-through of changes in the policy interest rates to retail interest 
rates increases the effectiveness of monetary policy and hence the stability of the general 
price level. A symmetric and complete pass-through will indicate a well-functioning, efficient 
and competitive financial system, whereas an incomplete and asymmetric pass-through 
signifies market imperfections and inefficiencies (Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010:3).  
Empirical studies on interest rate pass-through have proposed several reasons for the 
variation in the speed and magnitude of interest rate pass-through across countries over time. 
These reasons vary from country to country and include the structure of the financial system, 
which is made up of the degree of competition and bank concentration, the ownership 
structure of the banks, the degree of financial market openness and development (Cottarelli 
and Kourelis, 1994), risk sharing (Fried and Howitt, 1980; Lowe and Rohling, 1992), 
switching cost (Fried and Howitt, 1980; Ausubel, 1991), menu cost (Rotemberg and Saloner, 
1987; Hannan and Berger, 1991; Hofmann and Mizen, 2004), asymmetric information 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981),  and adverse selection effect (Lowe and Rohling, 1992). 
Early literature on interest rate adjustment emerged in the 1990s following the works of 
Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) which focused on the impact of 
market concentration on the adjustment of prices in the market for consumer bank deposits in 
the United States of America. With the successful launch of the European Union and the 
introduction of a single currency, the euro, in 1999, pass-through analysis has attracted much 
attention particularly in the Euro Area (see for instance, De Bondt, 2002, 2005; Sander and 
Kleimeier, 2002, 2004, 2006b; Hulsewig et al., 2009; Kwapil and Scharler, 2010; and 
Marotta, 2009). Generally, these studies found considerable differences in the degree of retail 
interest rates adjustment to policy controlled rates in both the short-run and long-run. 
It should be noted that most of the empirical studies on interest rate pass-through focused on 
developed and emerging economies of America, Europe and Asia. As far as Sub-Saharan 
Africa is concerned, empirical studies examining the degree of responsiveness of commercial 
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banks retail interest rates to changes in the policy controlled interest rate of the Central Bank 
are scant. The few exceptions include Jankee (2005); Acheampong (2005); Sander and 
Kleimeier (2006a); Aziakpono et al. (2007); Aziakpono and Wilson (2010); Sanusi (2010) 
and Samba and Yan (2010). 
Despite the importance of pass-through analysis in the monetary policy transmission process 
in the economy, empirical studies investigating the dynamic adjustments of interest rates in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is lacking specifically on Cameroon and Nigeria that have implemented a 
series of financial liberalization programmes. The few attempts that have been made in these 
countries include Samba and Yan (2010) and Sanusi (2010) for the Economic Community of 
Central African States (CEMAC1) and Nigeria respectively. Samba and Yan (2010) provided 
general overview of the degree of pass-through in the CEMAC region but failed to account 
for country specific pass-through in the region. On the other hand, the Sanusi (2010) study 
used a very short period (2002M1 – 2010M4). Empirical results from such as a short period 
may be subject to estimation biases. This study gives a specific country analysis as well as 
used a longer time period to close the gap. As far as empirical research is concerned, no 
comparative study of this nature has been done between Cameroon and Nigeria. Thus, the 
study is the first of its kind and aims to increase empirical literature in this area of research.  
1.2  GOALS OF THE RESEARCH 
This study is aimed at conducting a comparative analysis of the degree of interest rate pass-
through in Cameroon and Nigeria. To achieve this, the following objectives will be pursued: 
 To examine the speed and magnitude of adjustment of retail interest rates to changes 
in policy interest rates in both countries since the implementation of the World Bank 
sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the 1980s. 
 To determine whether there is symmetry or asymmetry in the interest rate pass-
through between the two countries. 
                                                             
1 CEMAC is a custom and monetary union among six former French Central African countries created in 1994 
and includes Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, and 
Gabon. 
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 To examine whether there is pass-through of monetary impulses from Cameroon to 
Nigeria and from Nigeria to Cameroon.  
1.3 MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY 
The study considers Cameroon and Nigeria for the comparative analysis in view of the fact 
that the two countries represent the two largest economies in Central and West Africa 
respectively. These countries share some commonalities in the forms of trade, common 
border and political history2. Furthermore, they are oil producing countries and belong to 
different economic groupings in Africa: the West Africa Monetary Zone (WAMZ) and 
CEMAC respectively. Further, both countries implemented the World Bank SAP around the 
same period (mid1980s) and operate different exchange rate systems. 
1.4  METHODS  
The empirical analysis will utilise monthly time series data sourced from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)/International Financial Statistics (IFS) from 1990M01 – 2010M12 for 
Nigeria and 1990M1 to 2008M6 for Cameroon. Retail rates used are lending and deposit 
rates, whereas the discount rates of both countries represent the policy rate of the Central 
Bank. More details will be given in Chapter Four. 
To investigate the magnitude and speed of adjustment of commercial banks’ response to 
changes in the policy rate, the study will employ co-integration techniques and the 
asymmetric error correction model used by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994). This technique has 
been used by several researchers3 to study pass-through in the Euro Area and also in Africa. 
The technique has the advantage of testing for the difference in interest rate adjustment when 
rates are above and below their equilibrium levels as well as to determine how long it takes 
for the interest rates to adjust fully to changes in the policy rate (Aziakpono et al., 2007:8).  
To analyse the impact of the various financial and monetary reforms4 highlighting the role of 
the policy rate and the response of retail rates to changes in policy rate over time, a ten years 
                                                             
2 Southern Cameroon (Anglophone Cameroon)  was part of Nigeria until reunification in the early 1960s.  
3 Toolsema et al. (2002); De Bondt (2002, 2005); Sander and Kleimeier (2004) and Aziakpono and Wilson 
(2010). 
4 SAP started in 1988 for Cameroon and 1986 for Nigeria. 
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rolling window analysis will be conducted. According to Aziakpono and Wilson (2010:17) 
the importance of rolling window analysis lies in its ability to trace the dynamic development 
in pass-through over time. This is vital because other developments in the financial system 
and the economy as a whole apart from changes in monetary policy can also affect the pass-
through. The rolling window regression technique will then be used to measure the speed of 
pass-through in each country after various reforms to ascertain the progress made so far and 
to compare the effectiveness of monetary policy in each country. Finally, the study will swap 
the policy rates around to investigate if there are transmissions of monetary policy shocks 
from one country to the other. 
1.5 OUTLINE 
The study will be divided into six chapters. Chapter One introduces the study, as well as the 
objectives and motivation of the study. Chapter Two will review the theoretical and empirical 
literature on interest rates rigidities and pass-through in developed, emerging and developing 
countries. Chapter Three presents an overview of the financial system and monetary policy 
framework in the two countries. In addition, an analysis of the financial structure variables 
will be conducted to establish the framework for the empirical estimation. Chapter Four 
describes the methodology, discusses the data, and describes the econometric techniques used 
in estimating the parameters. Chapter Five presents and discusses the results. Finally, Chapter 
Six summarises the study, recommends policies and suggest areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical and empirical literature related to interest rate pass-
through (IRPT) in developed, emerging and developing economies. The aim of the theoretical 
literature is to discuss the theories and/or determinants of IRPT. The chapter will also discuss 
monetary policy and the process of the monetary policy transmission mechanism (MPTM). 
The reminder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses monetary policy 
and the processes of monetary policy transmission mechanism (MPTM). Section 2.3 focuses 
on IRPT and deals with its theories. Section 2.4 examines factors affecting IRPT. Section 2.5 
reviews the empirical literature from developed, emerging and developing economies and 
finally, Section 2.6 summarises and draws conclusions. 
2.2. THE PROCESSES OF THE MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION 
MECHANISM 
Monetary policy describes the set of laws and actions implemented by the Central Bank to 
facilitate the achievement of its primary goal of price stability. Thus economic theory 
considers monetary policy as a key instrument that governments can use to stimulate the 
economy (Karagiannis et al., 2010:9). Monetary policy actions of the Central Bank begin in 
the banking system when the monetary authorities adjust the supply and/ or availability of 
commercial bank reserves in an effort to manipulate the short term interest rate. For example, 
the Federal Reserve Bank decides on an appropriate level of the overnight interbank federal 
funds rate and monitors this rate by manipulating the supply and/or availability of bank 
reserves. Monetary policy is then executed by increasing or decreasing the planned federal 
funds rate5. These actions are then passed through to the real economy such that changes in 
the planned federal funds rate affect retail rates (lending and deposit) which in turn alters the 
spending behaviour of consumers and businesses (Sellon, 2002:6-7). The main instrument 
used by most Central Banks around the world is the official short term interest rate but other 
tools of monetary policy also exist, such as open market operations where the monetary 
authorities can use Treasury Bills to mop up or inject liquidity into the system. Central Bank 
                                                             
5 Different terminologies are used in different countries, such as discount rate, monetary policy rate, minimum 
rediscount rate, repo rate, federal funds rate and official interest rate. 
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altering of the official short term interest rate is based on the assumption that, ceteris paribus, 
these changes will in turn impact on other short term rates determined by deposit taking as 
well as non-deposit taking financial institutions. Therefore, changes in the short-term interest 
rate are the first step in the transmission of monetary policy and are expected to affect 
consumption as well as investment spending of households and firms through the retail rates 
determined by deposit taking and non-deposit taking financial institutions (Charoenseang and 
Manakit, 2007:144-145; Wang and Lee, 2009:1270). The process whereby changes in the 
monetary policy stance affect consumption, investment, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
other variables in the economy is known as the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
(MPTM). See Section 1.1. 
Consequently, monetary policy is seen as a powerful tool at the disposal of the monetary 
authorities but it can also have unwanted consequences on the economy if not implemented 
well. Mishkin (1995:4) emphasises that “to be successful in conducting monetary policy, the 
monetary authorities must have a correct judgment of the timing and effect of their policies 
on the economy, hence necessitating a good knowledge of the mechanisms through which 
monetary policy affects the economy”. For instance, when the Central Bank pursues a 
loosening or tightening monetary policy stance, the question at hand is how exactly will this 
policy change affect real economic variables such as GDP, consumption and investment? To 
get this right a thorough evaluation of the various channels through which monetary policy 
affect the economy is not only necessary in its own right but it will also help policy makers to 
know how much to adjust the policy tools. Without this clear knowledge, policy makers may 
risk adjusting the policy tool too little or too much, and in some cases too early or too late, 
thereby increasing economic uncertainty which undermines the credibility of the Central 
Bank.  
As discussed in Section 1.1 the MPTM operates through several channels and involves six 
stages (Faure, 2006:9). However, this analysis will be limited to the first two stages of the 
transmission mechanism which is relevant for the traditional interest rate channel. 
Nevertheless, a short overview of the various monetary policy transmission channels will be 
given.  
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2.2.1 The traditional interest rate channel  
As mentioned above, monetary policy actions of the Central Bank are transmitted to the real 
economy through several channels. Amongst these channels economists usually identify the 
interest rate channel as the traditional one and the focus of the study will be on this. The 
popularity of the interest rate channel has increased recently with the adoption of inflation 
targeting as a monetary policy framework for which the interest rate is the main instrument. 
Thus, the banking sector and interest rates have a major role to play in determining how 
changes in monetary policy affect the real economy. The first stage of monetary policy 
transmission starts in the banking sector with a change in the supply of bank reserves by the 
Central Bank with the intention to influence the short term interest rates. These changes in 
short term interest rates are subsequently passed on to long term rates which in turn influence 
businesses and consumers to react depending on whether the change in bank reserves is an 
increase or a decrease (Sellon, 2002:5-6). 
The interest rate is the core channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism and it is 
deeply rooted in the Keynesian IS-LM framework. The IS-LM has been and is still the basic 
framework for the teaching of macroeconomics and demonstrates how monetary policy 
stances (expansionary or contractionary) affect aggregate demand (AD) as well as aggregate 
supply (AS) in the economy. Mishkin (1996:2) provides a schematic representation of this 
channel which can be illustrated as: 
Loosening monetary policy: M    ir     I     Y .      (1) 
That is, a loosening monetary policy (M ) will trigger a decline in the real interest rate (ir  ) 
because of the negative relationship between money supply and interest rate, thereby making 
financing costs for households and firms cheaper. This increases the level of investment 
spending (I ) and aggregate output (Y ) will increase as well. However, the degrees to 
which the monetary shocks are transmitted as well as the effectiveness of the interest rates 
channel depend on the financial structure (to be discussed later). 
According to Mishkin (1996:2) one important attribute of the interest rate channel is its stress 
on the real interest rate as opposed to the nominal interest rate with regard to consumption 
and investment decisions of firms. Besides, consumption and investment decisions are based 
on real long term rather than on short term interest rates. So why will short term changes in 
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nominal interest rate affect the real short and long term rates? The reason is that, given price 
stickiness, a loosening of monetary policy provoked by the Central Bank will cause the 
nominal short term interest rate to fall as well as the short term real rate and this also holds in 
a world of rational expectations. Thus, the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of 
interest rate states that “the long term interest rate is an average of the future expected short 
term interest rate” implying that a fall in the real short term interest rate will trigger a 
corresponding decline in the long term real interest rate (Mishkin, 1996:3). This decline in 
long term real interest rate will then be translated into increased expenditure on fixed 
investment, residential houses and durable consumer goods as well as raising total output. 
Furthermore, Mishkin (1996:3) argues that since it is the real interest rate that influences 
spending rather than nominal interest rates, this implies that monetary policy can still be used 
to stimulate the economy even if nominal interest rates are set at zero during a deflationary 
period. For example, if nominal interest rates are fixed at zero, an expansionary monetary 
policy (M ) will be able to increase the expected price level (Pe) as well as the expected 
inflation ( e ) which is then translated into a fall in the real interest rate ( ri ) even when the 
nominal interest rate is held at zero, thereby boosting spending through the interest rate 
channel. This is shown schematically as: 
Expansionary monetary policy: M   ⇒ Pe ↑ ⇒ πe ↑ ⇒ ir ↓ ⇒ I ↑ ⇒ Y ↑.   (2) 
2.2.2 Bank lending channel 
This channel is based on the important role of banks in the economy, particularly in 
intermediation as well as in mobilising savings and channelling of resources into productive 
sectors of the economy. Furthermore, banks have the expertise and are well grounded to 
manage the problems of information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders particularly 
when it comes to small medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) where information 
differential is prominent (Mishkin, 1996:7). Also, the bank lending channel seems to be the 
relevant channel for developing and emerging economies with underdeveloped financial 
markets because other sources of finance are scarce and in some cases may not even exist. 
Consequently, investors find it difficult to easily replace bank loans thereby forcing them to 
reduce the amount of investment expenditure. However, the success of the bank lending 
channel depends on the condition that banks do not protect their loan portfolio from monetary 
policy shocks and borrowers may not be able to completely protect their real expenditure 
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from changes in bank credit availability (Ramlogan, 2004:436). As Mishkin (1996:7) points 
out, a contractionary monetary policy will decrease bank reserves thus reducing the amount 
of bank loans. This increases the amount of collateral and reduces loan availability to small 
firms, causing a decline in aggregate spending in the economy. This can be represented as: 
Tightening policy M ↓ ⇒ bank deposits ↓ ⇒ bank loans ↓ ⇒ I ↓ ⇒ Y ↓.   (3) 
2.2.3 Balance sheet channel 
The balance sheet channel is also known as the “net worth channel” of business firms. The 
balance sheet channel seems to be inactive, due to the problems of asymmetric information 
and moral hazard that restrict a firm’s ability to access external finance, particularly in the 
event of a tightening monetary policy which causes deterioration in the net worth of firms 
and credit worthiness (Ramlogan, 2004:436). According to Mishkin (1995:8) monetary 
policy can affect the balance sheet of firms in several ways. For instance, a contractionary 
policy (M ↓) will decrease equity prices (Pe ↓) triggering a fall in the net worth of firms, and 
as a consequence, investment expenditure (I ↓) and total demand (Y ↓) will fall because 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems have increased. This gives a schematic balance 
sheet of monetary transmission as: 
Contractionary policy M ↓ ⇒ Pe ↓ ⇒ adverse selection ↑ & moral hazard ↑⇒ lending ↓ ⇒ I 
↓ ⇒ Y ↓.           (4) 
Also a contractionary policy will increase interest rates leading to a weakening in the balance 
sheet of firms because the cash flows of firms has fallen thus giving rise to another schematic 
balance sheet channel as: 
Contractionary policy M ↓ ⇒ cash flow ↓ ⇒ adverse selection ↑ & moral hazard ↑ ⇒ 
lending ↓ ⇒ I ↓ ⇒ Y ↓.         (5) 
2.2.4 Asset prices channel 
Economists have identified two main channels of asset prices through which monetary policy 
can be transmitted: the Tobin q theory of investment and the wealth effect on consumption 
(Mishkin, 1996:6). According to Mishkin (1996:7) an expansionary monetary policy will 
raise the supply of money, making the public richer, and so they will try to decrease their 
liquidity holding through growing their expenses. The public therefore use this excess 
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liquidity on the capital market to purchase securities such as equities, thereby increasing their 
portfolios of equity holdings. This increases the demand for equities causing their prices to 
rise and making equity investment more attractive. The Keynesian view comes to the same 
conclusion, because a decrease in interest rates resulting from a loosening of monetary policy 
will make bonds less attractive than equities and lead to a rise in equity prices. In summary, 
an increase in equity prices (Pe↑) also increases q (q↑), which in turn leads to higher 
investment spending (I↑). Schematically represented as:  
M   ⇒ Pe ↑ ⇒ q ↑ ⇒ I ↑ ⇒ Y ↑.        (6) 
The wealth channel works through the effect on consumption and is derived from the Life 
Cycle Model (see Modigliani, 1971) where consumption expenditure is a function of the 
resources accumulated over lifetime and these resources consist of human capital, real capital 
and savings (Mishkin, 1996:7). An important element of household savings is equities and 
when their prices increase, the value of savings rises, thereby boosting the lifetime resources 
of households as well as increasing their consumption spending. Given an expansionary 
monetary policy, the wealth channel is given as: 
M   ⇒ Pe ↑ ⇒ wealth ↑ ⇒ consumption ↑ ⇒ Y ↑.      (7) 
2.2.5 Exchange rate channel 
The transmission of monetary policy through the exchange rate channel depends on the type 
of exchange rate regime in place. For instance, a flexible exchange rate transmits monetary 
shocks more easily to the real sector than a fixed exchange rate system because under a fixed 
exchange rate system, adjustments are done in the monetary sector to keep the exchange rate 
fixed. A schematic representation of an expansionary monetary policy through exchange rates 
can be given as: 
M   ⇒ ir ↓ ⇒ E ↓ ⇒ NX ↑ ⇒ Y ↑.        (8) 
That is, an expansionary monetary policy lowers domestic interest rates ( ir ↓) leading to a 
depreciation of the domestic currency (E ↓) thereby increasing net exports (NX ↑) as well as 
aggregate output (Y ↑) (Mishkin, 1996:5; Loayza and Hebbel, 2002:5) 
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2.2.6 Expectations channel 
The Expectations channel is based on public expectations about the future course of monetary 
policy and how it will affects inflation, investment, wage setting and growth. The 
transmission of monetary policy through the expectations channel is the most uncertain of all 
the channels because it is difficult to measure expectations and it depends on how the public 
interprets changes in monetary policy. For instance, a reduction in the policy rate will send a 
signal of higher future growth and if public expectations are formed well, this will boost 
investors’ confidence to invest and consume, leading to an increase in output (European 
Central Bank, 2000:47). 
2.3 INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH  
Interest rate pass-through (IRPT) measures the degree to which commercial banks alter their 
retail rates in response to changes in the Central Bank official interest rate both in the short 
and long run. Egert et al. (2007:210) suggest that the process of IRPT may be divided into 
two stages. The first stage can be used to determine how shocks in monetary policy are 
transmitted to short term money market rates, and stage two to show how dynamics in the 
money market rates affect retail rates of banks. They further argue that stage one is largely 
driven by the shape of the yield curve such that if the term structure remains stable, no matter 
the form, PT of the policy rate to market rates is expected to be proportional. On the other 
hand, any twists in the yield curve will definitely change the size as well as the magnitude of 
the PT. Intuitively, a full or complete PT occurs when changes in the official rate lead to a 
one-for-one change in commercial bank retail rates, and if bank rates do not adjust one-for-
one, PT is said to incomplete or sticky (Amarasekara, 2009:5).  
Interest rates stickiness in the banking industry has two distinction meanings. Cottarelli and 
Kourelis (1994:589) note that interest rates stickiness has been used in the first instance to 
describe the relative inelastic nature of bank rates regarding shifts in demand for bank credits 
and deposits. The second meaning relates to alterations in the money market rates, that is, 
commercial banks adjust their rates only marginally in the short run (short run stickiness) and 
perhaps also in the long run (long run stickiness) in reaction to a change in the official rate. 
The second meaning of interest rates stickiness will be used in this study. 
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2.3.1 Interest rate stickiness: Theories  
Given the direct effect that interest rates exercise on consumption and investment decisions 
of households and firms, economists and policy makers are increasingly searching for 
possible explanations for banks retail rates stickiness to changes in the official rate of the 
Central Bank. Alternatively, why do commercial banks not adjust retail rates one-for-one to 
changes in the policy-controlled interest rate of the Central Bank? Attempts to answer this 
question have led to the development of many theories, each providing a different 
explanation. Early such theories include the work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) that used 
credit rationing in markets with imperfect information to explain loan rate stickiness, and the 
collusive pricing arrangement and customer reaction hypothesis of Hannan and Berger 
(1991). 
However, Lowe and Rohling (1992:4-5) suggested that with the growing concern to find 
possible causes of price stickiness in financial markets, some of the theories that have been 
used to explain price stickiness in the goods and labour markets can equally be used to 
account for retail rates stickiness in financial markets. As such, they proposed four theoretical 
explanations for this phenomenon, based on equilibrium credit rationing, implicit risk 
sharing, switching costs and consumer irrationality. These are discussed in the next section.  
2.3.1.1 Equilibrium credit rationing and adverse selection  
Adverse selection is a common occurrence in the financial markets and occurs when one 
participant is unable to get accurate information about the other. For example, firms are 
assumed to have more knowledge about the riskiness of their investment projects whereas the 
banks (lenders) do not. This difference in information disclosure introduces problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. Consequently, banks do not necessarily increase their 
loan rates proportionately, even if the costs of funding increases, because increasing rates 
may attract risky borrowers. However, if banks respond to the increase in the cost of funds by 
increasing the loan rates, the expected return on all investment projects may decline, because 
firms and investors with the safest projects are likely to be the first to withdraw from the 
market. Thus, the mix of applicants seeking loans changes adversely (adverse selection). In 
addition, as loan rates increase, borrowers’ behaviour may change, inducing them to engage 
in more risky projects, thereby increasing the probability of default on loan repayment 
(increased moral hazard). If the probability of default is sufficiently high then the expected 
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receipts of a bank will fall with increases in loan rates. Confronted with such a dilemma, 
banks will choose not to increase their loan rates even when the cost of funds has increased, 
but may prefer to set their loan rates below the equilibrium market clearing rate and ration 
credit. Interest rates in this case will be sticky upward (Lowe and Rohling, 1992: 4; Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981:393). 
2.3.1.2 Switching costs 
Switching costs are the costs6 incurred by consumers as a consequence of moving from one 
supplier, brand or product to another. If these costs are high, consumers will prefer to stick to 
their existing suppliers. In the banking market one borrower is not the same as another; as 
such banks are concerned about the risk profile of individual borrowers. Consequently, it 
becomes necessary for banks to find more information about a particular borrower. This 
process of gathering information is not easy and involves additional costs to the banks which 
are usually passed onto borrowers in the form of an additional fee. To avoid these fees, 
borrowers will prefer not to switch from one bank to another. Lowe and Rohling (1992:6) 
also note that the regular search costs such as learning the different new loan rates and 
conditions, compiling documents, filling out applications and time involved in attending 
interviews with various lending agents are often more complicated in the banking than in the 
goods markets. This is because the bank needs to discover the risk factors associated with 
each borrower before issuing a loan. With this in mind borrowers will not like to change 
because the bank already have all the necessary documents during the first loan application 
and getting a second loan will be less complicated compared to applying for a loan with a 
new bank. This will make the level of lending rate rigid in a downward direction.  
2.3.1.3 Risk sharing 
The theory of risk sharing describes lending rate stickiness in a situation where the borrower 
is more risk averse than the shareholders of the bank. In such a situation the borrower and the 
lender (bank) can benefit from an understanding or an implicit contract regarding the amount 
they will be willing to trade, and at what price and under what condition in the future (Fried 
and Howitt, 1980:472). Committed in this way, banks and their customers can share the risks 
                                                             
6 Made up of exit fees, search costs, learning costs, cognitive effort,  equipment costs, installation and start-up 
costs, financial risk, psychological risk, and social risk. 
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concerning future uncertainty. Such an arrangement is similar to an insurance contract where 
the borrower who is risk averse pays an insurance premium to the bank (risk neutral) for a 
stable interest rate payment.  Hence, the bank will charge an interest rate that is less than its 
marginal cost of funds and will then be compensated for the additional risk by receiving a 
higher average rate than would be charged for a risk neutral borrower (Lowe and Rohling, 
1992:11). Borrowers treat the difference in the interest rate between a risk averse and risk 
neutral borrower as an insurance premium since borrowers are less likely to change to 
another bank because of switching costs. In addition, such an arrangement between banks and 
borrowers is typical in a retail banking environment as such banks aim to build and maintain 
close relationships with customers whereby long-time borrowers are likely to receive a stable 
interest rate in the future (Fried and Howitt, 1980:472). 
2.3.1.4 Consumer irrationality 
Ausubel (1991:70-71) notes that there is a group of consumers who borrow large sums 
repeatedly on the grounds that they will pay the outstanding amount on their credit card 
before the due date but fail to repay the full amount. These classes of consumers are less 
likely to go around comparing rates charged on credit cards and are therefore compelled to 
pay the high rates charged. In addition this group of borrowers are not sensitive to changes in 
interest rates and are the group of borrowers that banks prefer. A reduction in the rate charged 
on credit card accounts attracts only those who intend to borrow (high risk customers). 
Therefore, these reverse adverse selection problems make it difficult for banks to compete on 
credit card rates. As a result credit card rates are likely to be sticky in a downward direction 
(Lowe and Rohling, 1992:12).  Calem and Mester (1995:1336) suggest that credit card rate 
stickiness can be explained by deviations from perfect competition assumptions by credit 
card-holders because of search costs, switching costs and banks facing adverse selection 
problems if they reduced the interest rate. Furthermore, banks are likely to deny applications 
from households with huge credit balances as these households are more liable to experience 
payment difficulties. Calem et al. (2006) also argue that despite developments in 
technological advancement that may have decreased search costs and enhanced credit card 
selection capacities, the continuous presence of switching costs and adverse selection may 
continue to give market power to banks with strong customer relationships. 
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The above theoretical explanations relate to bank and customer specific reasons for retail 
rates stickiness and hence pay no allegiance to the structure of the financial system. Cottarelli 
and Kourelis (1994:587-588) note that the efficiency of monetary policy also depends very 
much on structural parameters of the economy over which the Central Bank has no direct 
influence. Empirical evidence has shown that the financial structure of an economy plays an 
important role on how monetary policy shocks are transmitted as well as on IRPT (Sellon, 
2002). Given this consideration, the next section discusses the structural parameters of the 
financial system and other related factors that seek to explain price stickiness in financial 
markets.  
2.4 FACTORS AFFECTING INTEREST RATE STICKINESS: SOME 
THEORETICAL VIEWS  
2.4.1 Structure of the financial system 
The structure of the financial system plays a major role in the transmission of monetary 
policy. These structural parameters constitute those aspects of the economy which cannot be 
directly controlled by the Central Bank and include: the degree of competition and bank 
concentration in the financial markets, the ownership structure of the financial markets, the 
level of development and openness of the financial market (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 
1994:588). The next section discusses these factors in greater detail. 
2.4.1.1 The degree of competition and bank concentration 
Competition within banks and with non-banks is needed for the effective transmission of 
monetary policy, because it reduces the non-profit maximising behaviour of banks and 
thereby leads to effective transmission of monetary policy. Furthermore Guntner (2010:1) 
argues, using the New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model in 
a monopolistic competitive framework, that the presence of competition within the banking 
market decreases the spread between the policy and the lending rates as well as increases 
IRPT of the monetary policy. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994:591) argue that the demand 
elasticity for loans is less elastic in markets where there is a smaller number of competitors, 
high barriers to entry or no other sources of finance such as commercial papers. 
Consequently, loan rates may tend to react slowly to dynamics in money market rates in the 
short run. 
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On the other hand, high banking concentration reduces IRPT because banks tend to adopt 
oligopolistic behaviour, causing interest rates to adjust asymmetrically. Asymmetric 
adjustment of retail rates can best be explained using the collusive pricing arrangement and 
customer reaction hypothesis (Hannan and Berger, 1991; Scholnick, 1996). The collusive 
pricing arrangement hypothesis argues that deposit rates will be rigid upwards following a 
cut in the official rate because an increase in the rate on deposits constitutes a cost to the 
banks in the form of an increased payment to depositors, whereas the lending rates will 
exhibit greater downward rigidity in reaction to a reduction in the official rate, because a 
reduction in the lending rate reduces the profit margin of banks (narrow margin between the 
lending and the deposit rates). Conversely, the customer reaction hypothesis suggests that 
deposit rates will be sticky downwards in the event of an increase in the official rate, for fear 
of customers’ withdrawal or transfer of deposits to non-bank financial institutions. On the 
other hand, the lending rates will show greater upward rigidity when the official interest rate 
increases because of negative customer reaction such as default on loan repayments. Severe 
(2011) built a model of profit-maximising banks and argues that market concentration in the 
banking sector may cause many undesirable effects. However, Cottarelli and Kourelis 
(1994:605) remind us that the theory of contestable markets suggests that bank concentration 
may not be a good proxy for the actual level of competition because firms in a concentrated 
market may behave competitively if there are threats of new entry. 
2.4.1.2 The ownership structure of the banks 
The ownership structure of the banking sector of an economy has a central role to play when 
it comes to the transmission of monetary policy as it can affect the rigidity of interest rates. In 
economies where state-owned banks dominate the financial markets, interest rates adjust with 
a delay due to political pressure or inefficiency. This is because state-owned banks claim to 
operate in the interest of the public, hence they are not out to maximise profits. Where banks 
demonstrate profit maximising behaviour, they are expected to adjust promptly to changes in 
interest rates and inefficiency in the market place is penalised by market forces. But when the 
market forces are weak, such as barriers to entry, absence of competition from non-bank 
intermediaries and constraints on international capital flows, inefficiency may not be 
penalised and interest rates will be sticky (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994:592, Aziakpono and 
Wilson, 2010:13). 
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2.4.1.3 The degree of financial market openness and development 
Increasing cross-border financial integration and innovations in the financial markets such as 
derivative instruments and securitisation has had a significant impact on the ways in which 
monetary policy impulses are transmitted through to the economy. According to BIS (2008:6) 
financial modernisation has given birth to new types of financial products as well as new 
instruments. For example, securitisation has produced new asset classes and opened up other 
sources of funding for retail and investment banks, as well as risks management techniques. 
These developments thus influenced the manner and relative efficacy of monetary policy 
instruments. The transmission of monetary policy shocks through the interest rate channel is 
expected to be sluggish when the domestic bond markets are underdeveloped and banks are 
the leading financial intermediaries of short term domestic credit and foreign currency 
denominated funds. As such, borrowers have no alternative sources of funding and the 
demand elasticity of loans tend to be inelastic (BIS, 2008:7). Alternatively, a well developed 
domestic bond market, money market, corporate debt securities and venture capital markets 
together with openness to international capital markets will result in a faster pass-through for 
those bank products directly competing with these markets. This means a close substitute for 
bank deposits and loans exists for households and firms such as short term money market 
instruments, long term governments bonds and unit trust funds. Therefore, banks stand the 
chance of losing a substantial amount of their deposits from households and firms if their 
retail rates are not competitive. The elasticity of deposits and loans will be elastic (Gropp et 
al., 2007:2). 
However, the extent to which domestic banks alter their retail rates to changes in the official 
interest rate of the Central Bank also depends on the scope to which banks rely on the 
accommodation facility of the Central Bank. Aziakpono and Wilson (2010:13) point out that 
when the financial system is sufficiently open and banks are able to access different sources 
of finance easily, banks’ reliance on the accommodation facility from the Central Bank will 
be reduced. Therefore, an opened financial system may react to changes in the official 
interest rate with more of a delay than when the financial market is not opened. 
2.4.2 Menu costs 
According to Rotemberg and Saloner (1987:918), menu costs are usually taken to include the 
costs of changing and circulating new price lists, printing, advertising, administrative costs 
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and communicating the change to other branches in a situation where a firm has a large 
network. In addition, menu costs also include the costs of upsetting customers by means of 
many price changes. For this reason, menu cost models predict that firms may adjust their 
prices in a situation of a nominal demand shock only when the benefits from adjusting are 
greater than the costs of staying out of equilibrium.  Moreover, since adjustment is expensive 
and time-consuming firms very often do not want to continually change their prices because 
this might have a negative impact on customer satisfaction, especially when the change is 
viewed as temporary by banks (Madsen and Yang, 1998:196).  
2.4.3 Excess liquidity of the banking system  
The banking sector’s holding of excess liquidity can have adverse effects on the ability of 
monetary policy to influence demand conditions and, therefore, to stabilise the economy. For 
instance, if banks are in possession of excess reserves at the Central Bank above the required 
limit, any attempt by the monetary authorities to increase liquidity through an expansionary 
monetary policy in order to stimulate aggregate demand will prove largely ineffective. In the 
same manner, it becomes difficult to regulate the supply of money using the required reserve 
ratio. The implication is that excess liquidity of the banking sector slows down the 
transmission of monetary policy shocks leading to sluggishness in the IRPT (Saxegaard, 
2006:4). According to Agenor and Aynaoui (2010:924) excess liquidity in the banking sector 
is caused by structural and cyclical factors such as an underdeveloped financial system, a 
high degree of risk aversion which may lead to high risk premia and low demand for credit, 
as well as high inflow of capital due to opening of the capital account. 
2.4.4 Asymmetric information 
Asymmetric information in financial markets is a result of market imperfections (incomplete 
information) which can have significant effects on monetary policy transmission. As 
discussed earlier, banks find it challenging because it becomes difficult to differentiate the 
relative riskiness of investment projects in a situation of information asymmetry when 
allocating credit. As such, lenders tend to price this into their loan contracts. Thus, the Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981)  model of credit rationing in markets with imperfect information shows that 
equilibrium in the loan market is characterised by credit rationing and that this equilibrium 
may not necessarily change due to changes in other interest rates. 
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2.4.5 Monetary policy regimes 
The degree and speed of adjustment of commercial bank retail interest rates to dynamics in 
the official interest rate also depend on the kind of monetary policy regime in operation.  For 
instance, under a monetary policy regime of direct control, interest rates tend to be rigid as 
adjustment in official rates may be motivated by political considerations (Aziakpono and 
Wilson, 2010:12). Meanwhile, under a liberalised monetary policy regime where interest 
rates and credit allocation are determined by market forces, banks will adjust faster to 
changes in the official interest rate because non-adjustment will be penalised by market 
forces. In addition, monetary policy regimes that rely more on transparency and increased 
accountability also reduce interest rate volatility since the market can easily predict monetary 
policy actions. This increases the degree of IRPT of the official rate to retail rates of the bank 
(Liu et al., 2008:510). 
2.4.6 Money market volatility, inflation and macroeconomic conditions 
The prevailing macroeconomic conditions are also likely to affect the way banks adjust their 
retail rates to changes in money market rates. Banks find it easier to transmit changes in 
money market rates to lending and deposit rates during favourable economic conditions 
characterised by rapid economic growth. Also during high inflationary period banks are quick 
to alter their retail rates to changes in money market rates because prices in the markets will 
be changed more frequently in a high inflation environment than in a low inflationary period 
(Egert and MacDonald, 2009:283). 
It is worth noting that the above factors and/or theories of price stickiness in financial 
markets are not exhaustive. There are other determinants and theories that can explain price 
stickiness and these vary across countries and over time, especially with the development of 
the financial markets. 
2.5 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.5.1 Introduction 
The concept of interest rate pass-through (IRPT) is quite new in empirical research and early 
studies emerged in the 1990s (Hannan and Berger 1991; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992 and 
Lowe and Rohling, 1992). Thereafter, interest in PT studies subsequently began to grow. 
However, the early studies only focused on asymmetries and price rigidities under an 
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oligopolistic market structure. The introduction and successful launch of a single monetary 
policy in the Euro Area in January 1999 shifted the focus of pass-through research.  Attention 
now tended to focus on how a single monetary policy would be conducted under a situation 
of heterogeneous financial structure. This led to a burst of interest in PT studies in the Euro 
Area and elsewhere. Some examples of PT studies in the Euro Area include Mojon (2000); 
Toolsema et al. (2002); De Bondt (2002, 2005); Sander and Kleimier (2002, 2004, 2006b); 
Sorensen and Werner (2006); Marotta (2009) and Leuvensteijn et al. (2008). Irrespective of 
the differences in approach, most of these studies found PT to be incomplete in the short run 
and almost complete in the long run. Furthermore, significant differences exist in the degree 
of PT across countries and across banking products, and there is no clear pattern of these 
differences across countries.  
2.5.2 Developed economies 
Hannan and Berger (1991) as well as Neumark and Sharpe (1992) conducted research which 
focused on the impact of market concentration on the adjustment of prices in the deposit 
market in the United States of America (USA) and this formed the basis for empirical 
research into IRPT. Employing a multinomial logit model and data from 1983 to 1986, they 
found evidence of asymmetry in the deposit rates in the USA, that is, deposit rates are more 
rigid upward than downward. On average there was a 62% chance of banks reduceing the 
deposit rates in response to a 29 basis points fall in policy rate compared to an average 39% 
chance of increasing deposit rates in reaction to the same size increase in the policy rate. 
Similar results were found by Neumark and Sharpe (1992) using a panel of 225 US banks, 
using partial adjustment and switching models. Consequently, Hannan and Berger (1991) 
developed the customer reaction and collusive pricing arrangement hypotheses7 to account 
for the observed asymmetry in deposit rates in the financial markets.  
However, the above studies focused more on customer and bank specific factors as major 
causes of interest rate rigidities in financial markets.  Dissatisfaction amongst economists and 
policy makers coupled with increasing concern to explore alternative explanations of price 
stickiness in financial markets led to renewed interest in PT research. One such landmark 
empirical study that changed the face of IRPT research was the seminal work of Cottarelli 
and Kourelis (1994) in which they relate the degree of IRPT to the structure of the financial 
                                                             
7 See Section 2.4.2 above. 
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system8. They analysed lending rates for 31 industrial and developing countries using co-
integration techniques and found that cross-country differences are more pronounced in the 
short than in the long run. Their results showed that long run PT for the lending rates is 
complete with an impact multiplier of 0.97 on average, which lies between 0.75 and 1.25. 
Moreover, after controlling for other effects, the financial structure emerged to have a strong 
influence in increasing the flexibility of the lending rates. The dynamics of the lending rates 
adjustment also depend on the type of the lending rates used. Thus, they note that to assess 
the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, attention should be given 
to the structure of the financial system as well. Cottarelli et al. (1995) also found similar 
results for the Italian banking system: they found that discrepancies in the lending rates 
inflexibility in the Italian banking system is as a result of differences in the degree of banking 
concentration measured by the Herfindahl index9.  
The Euro Zone studies such as Mojon (2000) and Schwarzbauer (2007) that examined the 
financial structure focused on its important role in the process of monetary policy 
transmission. Building on the framework of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Mojon (2000) 
examined how differences in the financial structure across the Euro Area can contribute to 
national asymmetry. He analysed data from 1979 to 1998, and employed an Error Correction 
Model (ECM). His empirical results covering a panel of 25 credit and 17 deposit markets 
showed that PT varies across countries and across markets. Overall PT for credit markets was 
higher, ranging from 0.53 to 0.68, compared to deposit markets, which ranged from 0.18 to 
0.43. Meanwhile Savings and Sight deposits exhibited the greatest degree of stickiness, 
ranging from 0 to 0.28. He noted that competition in the banking sector as measured by the 
Gual index10 has the tendency to force banks to raise deposit rates faster when the overnight 
money market rate11 increases and competition between banks also narrows the interest rate 
                                                             
8 See Section 2.4.1 above. 
9  The Herfindhal Index is a measurement of market concentration and is calculated as the sum of square market 
shares of banks. A value of less than 1000 indicates an unconcentrated market, between 1000 and 1800 signifies 
moderate concentration and a value above 1800 indicates high concentration. Concentrated markets are less 
competitive than unconcentrated markets (IMF, 2007:29). 
10 An index of deregulation measures taken by the European countries between 1980 and 1995 constructed by 
Gual (1999) as an indicator of the intensity of competition among banks. 
11 The overnight money market rate is used as the policy controlled interest rates because of its correlation to 
various bank credit and deposit rates (Mojon, 2000). 
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cycle of asymmetry PT. Schwarzbauer (2007) used time-varying analysis and also found that 
the ratio of bank deposits to GDP or market capitalisation to GDP and the term structure of 
interest rates have a statistical significant impact on monetary transmission process. 
Furthermore, Baugnet et al. (2007) found bank specific and market structural variables to 
have a significant impact on PT in Belgium. That is, more liquid banks tend to adjust their 
retail rates more slowly and incompletely in response to changes in money market rates 
compared to less liquid banks where the adjustment is quicker and almost complete.  
Other studies have documented that differences in PT in the Euro Area have converged and 
therefore the speed of adjustment to changes in overnight money market rates has become 
more homogeneous (Mojon, 2000; Toolsema et al., 2002; Schwarzbauer, 2007 and Sander 
and Kleimeier, 2004, 2006b). However, in spite of the relative convergence confirmed by all 
the studies, particularly after January 1999, considerable heterogeneity in the degree of PT 
across countries and across retail bank products still remains high within the region. For 
example, Toolsema et al. (2002) used fully-modified ordinary least squares and rolling 
windows analysis to account for heterogeneity across countries and to provide more insight 
of the convergence debate in the Euro Area from 1980 – 2000. They found complete PT for 
most but not all the countries, ranging from 0.71 – 1.03. The rolling window analysis 
suggests that there is evidence of convergence in the long run multipliers (from 0.48 to 1.10) 
and the speed of adjustment is relative stable over time in most countries except in the 
Netherlands. Sander and Kleimeier (2006b) compared PT for the CEECs12 and four core Euro 
Zone13 countries and found a homogeneous and complete lending rates PT for CEECs (0.91; 
1.07) compared to the core Euro Zone (0.6; 0.69) for short and long term corporate lending 
respectively. Egert et al. (2007) used dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) and 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models and found similar results between CEECs and 
core Euro Area. In addition, Sander and Kleimeier (2004) noted that differences in legal 
structure in the region will continue to undermine full convergence in the Euro Zone. 
Sander and Kleimeier (2002) examined the issue of asymmetric adjustment in the Euro Area 
using threshold ECM from 1985 to 1998. Their results revealed that the long run multipliers 
                                                             
12 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia (Central 
and Eastern European Countries). 
13 Germany, Finland, Ireland and Spain. 
24 
 
of the lending rates are close to one (from 0.87 to 1.170) in most but not for all countries and 
the speed of adjustment varies across countries. The authors argue that even though currency 
risk has been eliminated, the presence of asymmetric adjustment will continue to influence 
the way monetary policy is conducted within the Euro Area. Contrary to the Western Euro 
Area countries, the empirical evidence regarding monetary policy transmission in the South-
Eastern Europe14 (SEE) is mixed. Karagiannis et al. (2011) used the general-to-specific 
(GETS) approach with data from 1999 to 2007 to test the symmetry hypothesis. They found 
evidence of negative asymmetric15 adjustment in the lending and deposit rates in Bulgaria 
and Slovenia, whereas in Greece the results confirmed the presence of symmetric 
adjustment16. They argued that the observed asymmetry in the SEE can be explained by the 
differences in the level of competition, financial development and the degree of liberalisation 
of the financial markets in the SEE. 
Another issue that has taken centre stage in research in the Euro Area is the differences in 
pass-through across the various market segments. Some studies revealed that time deposits 
and loans to corporate enterprises adjust faster to changes in overnight money market rates 
whereas rates on savings account, overnight and current account deposits show the greatest 
degree of stickiness (Mojon, 2000; Fitzpatrick and Reilly, 2001; De Bondt, 2002; De Graeve 
et al., 2004, 2007; Sorensen and Werner, 2006; Horvath et al., 2004 and Liu et al., 2011). 
Despite differences in the econometric techniques, these studies all found immediate PT on 
savings account and current account deposits to be very low, ranging from 0.03 – 0.33. 
However, country specific analyses provide a clearer picture of the degree of PT in the 
various markets than Euro Area studies. On average PT for corporate loans both short and 
long term, mortgages and time deposits is faster and ranged from 0.63 – 1.01; 0.70 – 1.19 and 
0.44 – 0.84 respectively (see Table A1 in the appendix  for details). Sorensen and Werner 
(2006) argue that heterogeneity across market segments may be due to the differences in the 
level of competition and the characteristics of bank clients. For example, corporate 
enterprises may depend less on bank loans to finance their activities compared to small 
businesses and households. 
                                                             
14 Greece, Bulgaria and Slovenia. 
15 Banks tend to pass to depositors and borrowers only decreases in the original money market rate changes. 
16 Banks tend pass to depositors and borrowers equal increases and decreases in the original Central bank and 
money market rate changes. 
25 
 
Sorensen and Werner (2006:7) also point out that the interest rates used in some empirical 
studies are not harmonised as such some studies often detect heterogeneity in PT which might 
be as a result of statistical problems. The advent of the Euro and a single monetary policy has 
indeed induced structural breaks in PT in the Euro Area. Studies such as De Bondt (2002, 
2005) have shown that PT in the Euro Area has actually increased post January 1999 and the 
mean speed of adjustment has become quicker for all retail bank rates. Therefore, they argue, 
differences in PT in the Euro Area post 1999 may be as result of differences in credit risk 
consideration and the national banking systems trying to adapt to the common monetary 
policy. Thus, Marotta (2007, 2009) assumed multiple unknown breaks rather than artificially 
fixing the break in January 1999. He employed ARDL and used unharmonised (NRIR) and 
the new harmonised (MIR) interest rates series from 1993 to 2007. The estimated long run PT 
using NRIR data on average declined from 0.90 to 0.70, except for France, but the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium was instead faster, rising from 0.80 to about 0.100 within a quarter. 
Conversely, the long run PT estimated using MIR increased on average for small loans (0.90) 
and was almost complete (0.97) for large loans. Hence, MIR empirical evidence suggests a 
more predictable outcome of monetary policy in the Euro Area over time. 
Others such as De Bondt (2002; 2005) relate the high speed of adjustment in retail rates in the 
Euro Area post 1999 to increased competition, and a decrease in asymmetric and switching 
costs. Theory suggests that greater transparency in the way monetary policy is conducted as 
well as a well-communicated policy which can easily be predicted enhances the transmission 
of monetary policy shocks. Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) employed the “Boone indicator” to 
measure competition within the banking sector. They used a panel econometric technique and 
ECM to test the impact of banking competition as measured by the Boone indicator on long 
run PT from 1994 to 2006. Their results revealed that competition lowers the interest rate 
spreads of banks for three out of four loan products: mortgage loans (-0.03), consumer loans 
(-0.075) and short term loans to enterprises (-0.128) and has no significant effect on long 
term loans to enterprises. The above results indicate that mortgages are least affected by 
competition, while short term loans to enterprises are influenced the most. Liu et al. (2008) 
used a Phillip-Loretan estimator to examine the effect of policy transparency and the 
structure of the monetary transmission mechanism in New Zealand. Their evidence showed 
that the transparency of monetary policy has a positive effect on PT. Thus, they argue that 
increased transparency in the way monetary policy is conducted is associated with decreases 
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in interest rates volatility and hence the future short term interest rates become more certain, 
which in turn enhances the degree of PT of official rate to retail rates. 
Given the dominant position of the US in the world economy, financial markets usually react 
to changes in US monetary policy depending on the direction of the change. Whether market 
reaction is driven by expectations or actual fact is a matter of empirical concern. If financial 
markets are efficient, then these reactions should be minimal as the market must have 
anticipated the change and priced it properly before the change actually occurs.  Karagiannis 
et al. (2010) used the GETS with data from 1998 to 2003 to compare PT between the USA 
and the Euro Area. They found mixed results for the two banking systems regarding 
wholesale pass-through transmission and completeness: they found near complete PT for the 
deposit rate (0.97) and incomplete PT for the lending rate (0.42) rate in the Euro Area and 
incomplete long run PT (0.67 and 0.49) for deposit and lending rates in the USA. They also 
documented evidence of asymmetric adjustment in the retail rates in both banking markets 
except for loan rates in the Euro Area, and remarked that PT is sensitive to the choice of rate 
used as the policy interest rate. However, these results differ from those of Kwapil and 
Scharler (2010) who found a lower PT in the deposit markets for the Euro Area (ranging from 
0.32 – 0.57) and higher PT for the US deposit markets (0.74 – 1.08) depending on the 
econometric method used.  
Moazzami (1999) also found lending rates in the USA to be stickier (PT of 0.34) compared to 
Canada (PT of 0.66). Wang and Lee (2009) compared market volatility and interest rate PT 
between the USA and nine Asian countries using asymmetric threshold models and found 
complete long run PT only for USA deposit markets (0.99) and near complete for the lending 
rates (0.86). In the Asian countries, PT is incomplete in both markets (ranging from 0.103 to 
0.86 for the deposit rate and 0.23 to 0.63 for the lending rate). Their empirical results also 
confirmed upward adjustment rigidity in the deposit rates in five Asian countries17 and 
downward adjustment rigidity in lending rate in three Asian countries18. Although all these 
studies suggest different explanations for their findings, it is worth noting that the financial 
structures emerge consistently as a major cause for the heterogeneity in retail rates 
                                                             
17 Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan. 
18 Hong Kong, the Philippines and Taiwan. 
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adjustment. The next section reviews empirical evidence from emerging and developing 
economies.  
2.5.3 Emerging and developing economies 
The earliest study in emerging economies is the work of Scholnick (1996). Building on the 
framework of Hannan and Berger (1991) as well as Neumark and Sharpe (1992), Scholnick 
(1996) examined asymmetric adjustment in the lending and deposit rates in Singapore and 
Malaysia. He employed co-integration and ECM methodologies with data from 1983 to 1994 
and found incomplete short run PT ranging from 0.07 to 0.12 and 0.11 to 0.12 for the deposit 
and lending rates in both countries. He confirmed evidence of asymmetric adjustment in the 
deposit rates in both countries and also extended Hannan and Berger’s (1991) collusive 
pricing arrangement and customer reaction to relate to the lending rate discussed in Section 
2.4.2 above. He observed that banks in Singapore and Malaysia tend to adjust their deposit 
rates downward more quickly than upward, thus supporting the collusive pricing 
arrangement hypothesis of Hannan and Berger (1991). 
It is worth noting that PT studies in emerging and developing markets have no central theme. 
The PT studies in these two markets are not focused on a particular issue as was the case in 
the Euro Area. Studies that examined the dynamic adjustment of lending and deposit rates in 
general found incomplete short and long run PT in both markets. In addition, strong evidence 
of asymmetry existed in almost all of the studies reviewed. Khawaja and Khan (2008) used 
transfer functions and data from 1991 to 2009 to analyse lending and deposit rates in 
Pakistan. Their results revealed incomplete long run PT (0.43) for the lending rates and an 
even lower PT for deposit rates (0.16). They also confirmed evidence of asymmetric 
adjustment in both the lending and deposit markets. They argued that the marginal higher PT 
for lending rates was because of the pegging of the lending rates to the KIBOR and the low 
PT for the deposit rates was due to insensitivity of depositors to changes in interest rates. 
Furthermore, a greater part of households’ income is held in either in current or savings 
accounts and most of these current accounts earn no interest and very little interest is paid on 
savings accounts. Amarasekara (2009) applied a polynomial distributed lag (PDL) and found 
incomplete PT in Sri Lanka except for the prime lending rates which show an average long 
run PT of 0.51.  
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Nevertheless, Ozdemir (2009) and Aydin (2007) found complete PT for both lending and 
deposit rates in Turkey. Regardless of the estimation method used, both found that complete 
PT for the lending and deposit rates ranged from 1.05 – 1.59 except for corporate loans which 
had a slightly lower PT of 0.63. Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that retail rates in 
Turkey adjust symmetrically to increases and decreases in money market rates. See Table A1 
in the appendix for a complete list of the literature review. 
Chong (2010) used ECM with data from 1982 to 2007 to analyse the impact of deregulation 
on the efficacy of monetary policy and retail rates rigidity in Hong Kong. He found the long 
run PT for all deposit products in the regulated period to be incomplete, ranging from 0.53 to 
0.75, and tended to increase with maturity of the deposits. When a dummy variable was used 
to capture the effect of deregulation, the long run PT was found to be positive and significant 
across all the retail deposit rates, rising from 0.12 to 0.241. Evidence of asymmetric 
adjustment is confirmed in the deregulated period only for six months’ time deposits. The 
long run PT was complete in the deregulated period for three and six months’ time deposits 
but incomplete for one month, three months and one week time deposits.  Wang and Thi 
(2010) also found evidence of asymmetric adjustment for Hong Kong and Taiwan but their 
finding suggests upward rigidity in the deposit rates and downward rigidity in the lending 
rates for both Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, the differences in results could be due to the 
sensitivity of the type of econometric technique and the length of the datasets.  
A complete review of empirical literature on IRPT cannot be completed without a discussion 
of the BRIC19 economies, which are considered as one of the fastest growing emerging 
market economies. Karagiannis et al. (2009) used the GETS approach to analyse how the 
deposit and lending rates in the BRIC economies responded to changes in money market rates 
from 1998 to 2007. Their empirical results are mixed regarding monetary policy and pass-
through completeness. They found almost complete long run PT (0.96) for the deposit rate 
and incomplete long run PT (0.48) for the lending rate in Brazil. For Russia, the long run 
pass-through for the deposit and lending rates was incomplete (0.61and 0.40). Meanwhile in 
India, the long run PT for the lending rates overshoot by 1.21 and for China the long run PT 
was incomplete (0.53) for the lending rates but PT for the deposit rates was overshooting by 
1.42. Despite these differences they found evidence of negative asymmetry between Brazil, 
                                                             
19 The BRIC economies here exclude South Africa. That is, Brazil, China, India and  Russia. 
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India and Russia. In the case of China, their GETS econometric methodology failed to 
establish any meaningful results regarding the transmission process.  
As noted earlier, studies on PT in Sub-Saharan Africa has been scant. Jankee’s (2005) study 
on interest rate PT in Mauritius is amongst the earliest known studies in the region. He used 
an asymmetric error correction model to examine how changes in the interbank rate are 
transmitted to the retail lending and deposit rates of commercial banks in Mauritius from 
1988 to 2003.  He found incomplete long run pass-through for both the deposit and lending 
rates (about 0.413 and 0.242 respectively). Lending rates adjusted faster to negative shocks 
(about 0.803) than to positive shocks, hence lending rates adjust asymmetrically. On the other 
hand, the speed of adjustment for the deposit rates to changes in interbank rate was 0.641. 
Acheampong (2005) also found incomplete long pass-through in Ghana (0.55 for deposit 
rates and 0.69 for lending rates) using co-integration and ECM. In addition, his results 
confirmed evidence of symmetry in the lending and deposit rates to changes in money market 
rate. 
In the Southern Africa region, a few studies such as Aziakpono et al. (2007), Aziakpono and 
Wilson (2010) and Sander and Kleimier (2006a) have used PT analysis to investigate the 
response of retail rates to changes in the Central Bank rate. Aziakpono et al. (2007) used the 
asymmetric adjustment framework of Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe 
(1992) to examine how changes in the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) official rate are 
transmitted to market interest rates under different regimes. They analysed data from 1973 to 
2004 and found a higher long run pass-through for the lending rates (ranging from 0.90 to 
1.2) compared to the deposit rates (from 0.85 to 1.09). The short run speed of adjustment was 
also higher for the lending rates (from 0.28 to 1.15) compared to the deposit rates (0.76 to 
1.1). Their results suggest that the speed of adjustment is higher during more market oriented 
policy regimes than during less market oriented eras. They argue that market oriented policies 
are more effective in transmitting monetary policy impulses to the economy than less market 
oriented policies. Aziakpono and Wilson (2010) used a broader spectrum of interest rates and 
employed asymmetric ECM and rolling window analysis and found similar results for South 
Africa (see Table 1 in the appendix for more details). That is, PT was higher for the lending 
rates (from 0.59 – 0.86), particularly during a market oriented era. In addition, they found 
evidence of asymmetric adjustment in the lending and deposit rates in response to monetary 
policy shocks. 
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Sander and Kleimeier (2006a) adopted the unifying approach of Sander and Kleimeier (2004) 
to examine how national banks react to changes in monetary policy and also how national 
banks react to changes in South African monetary policy in the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU)20. Their findings showed that country differences are present but not 
dramatic. In addition, there is evidence of banking integration within the Common Monetary 
Union (CMA) with the Treasury-bill rate in South Africa playing a major role to influence 
national discount rate, national Treasury-bill rate and finally bank interest rates. The 
estimated long run PT for the deposit rates is incomplete across the SACU countries except 
for the deposit rates in South Africa that showed a full pass-through. Namibia had the lowest 
pass-through (0.58 with national T-bill rate and 0.49 with South Africa T-bill rate). They 
argue that the low pass-through in Namibia is an indication of imperfect competition in the 
banking market. Meanwhile the lending rates in the four countries were found to be 
homogeneous but not perfect. 
Attention is now shifted to Central and West Africa where this study is focused.  Studies on 
IRPT are limited, particularly for Cameroon. The only known study is that of Samba and Yan 
(2010) which focused on Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC) of 
which Cameroon is a member. They used ARDL models and data from 1990 to 2007, and 
found incomplete PT for the deposit rates (0.34) whereas the PT for the lending rates 
overshoots in reaction to changes in the policy rate (6.21). This means that the lending rate 
will change by more than 600 basis points in response to a 100 basis points change in the 
policy rate. They argued that rigidity in retail rates can be explained partly by 
underdevelopment of the financial system, the presence of excess reserves, lack of 
competition and the absence of an active stock exchange in the CEMAC region. 
In the case of Nigeria, PT studies are also limited and the known study is the work of Sanusi 
(2010) focusing on IRPT and the efficiency of monetary policy in Nigeria. Sanusi employed 
impulse response functions from a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model to derive 
the dynamic elasticities of PT of monetary policy rate and interbank interest rates to the 
lending and deposit rates. He analysed data from 2002 to 2010 and found incomplete and 
very low long run PT for both three and twelve months deposit rates (0.09) with a mean lag 
of between six to seven months for complete adjustment. On the other hand, the long run PT 
                                                             
20 SACU – Member countries are South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. 
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for the lending rates was incomplete and very low (0.01). Furthermore, accounting for the 
pre-consolidation period from 2002 – 2005 and post-consolidation from 2006 – 2010 
revealed that PT of changes in the monetary policy rate to retail rates fell after the banking 
sector consolidation (2006 – 2010), while PT of the monetary policy rate to money market 
rates increased substantially. He noted that financial sector reforms instituted by the Central 
Bank of Nigeria were effective to increase efficiency in the wholesale money market rates but 
failed to remove imperfections in the lending and deposit markets. This observation is 
consistent with Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994: 618) who remark that policies that support 
banking sector mergers such as those implemented by the European countries in the 1990s 
may be inconsistent with competition and hence low pass-through. 
2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The importance of IRPT lies in its ability to determine how effective changes in the action of 
the Central Bank affect real variables such as aggregate consumption, investment and 
economic growth. If monetary policy has to be effective, changes in the policy rate have to be 
fully passed through to retail rates of commercial banks, since interest rates play a pivotal 
role in the consumption and investment decisions of households and firms. Thus, banks are 
expected to be natural conveyer of the Central Bank actions to the economy, but theory 
suggests that very often pass-through occurs with a delay of several months to years. Factors 
such as risk sharing, menu costs, asymmetry information, switching costs, financial structure, 
and monetary policy regimes are amongst the reasons that prevent banks from being able to 
adjust their retail rates fully to changes in the Central Bank policy rate. 
Empirical evidence shows that PT varies across countries and across market segments. 
Corporate and mortgage loans have the highest PT both in the short and long run, and savings 
and current accounts had the lowest PT. All other markets showed incomplete short and long 
run PT and differences in financial structure across countries stand out as the major cause of 
heterogeneity in PT across countries especially in the Euro Area. However, there seems to be 
an increase in PT in the Euro Area since the launch of the Euro in 1999. Furthermore, some 
evidence of asymmetry in retail rates adjustment in developed, emerging and developing 
countries is documented and there is no consensus yet on the pattern of PT except with the 
deposit markets in the USA that has showed almost complete PT in the studies reviewed. 
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Finally, retail rates in the developing and emerging economies showed incomplete PT and a 
low level of financial development as well as competition within the banking sector account 
for most of the retail rate stickiness and asymmetric adjustment documented in these regions. 
The next chapter describes the financial systems of Cameroon and Nigeria. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS OF CAMEROON AND NIGERIA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main focus of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the financial systems of 
Cameroon and Nigeria and their monetary policy frameworks. Thereafter, the structural 
parameters of the financial system of each country will be examined in relation to how each 
is expected to influence pass-through, thereby establishing a priori expectations. The 
remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the financial system of 
Cameroon. Section 3.3 reviews the monetary policy framework of Cameroon. Section 3.4 
provides an overview of the financial system of Nigeria and Section 3.5 presents the 
monetary policy framework of Nigeria. Section 3.6 provides comparative statistics of the 
financial structure of Nigeria and Cameroon and finally, Section 3.7 summarises and 
concludes the chapter. 
3.2 CAMEROON’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM  
Cameroon, together with the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Republic of Congo 
(Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, form the Economic Community of Central 
African States (CEMAC). CEMAC makes up the custom and monetary union established in 
1994 with the main objectives of creating a common market based on the free movement of 
goods and services, capital and labour, as well as to harmonising business laws and economic 
policies. The CEMAC region uses a common currency known as the CFA21 franc which was 
originally pegged to the French franc but is now pegged to the euro at a fixed rate of CFA 
Franc 656 per euro. The currency is issued by a regional Central Bank known as Banque Des 
Etats De L’Afrique Centrale – Bank of Central African States (BEAC) – with headquarters in 
Yaoundé – Cameroon (Iossifov et al., 2009:6 and Saab and Vacher, 2007:4). 
The financial sector of Cameroon went through a severe crisis in the 1980s which was mainly 
caused by a difficult economic environment, poor management, government interference in 
the bank lending policies, a weak judicial system and poor supervisory framework. This led 
to financial distress which resulted in bank liquidations and solvency problems with spill-
                                                             
21 CFA means Franc de la Cooperation Financière en Afrique Centrale (Franc of Financial Cooperation in 
Central Africa) 
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over effects extended to microfinance institutions and development banks. The only way out 
of the financial distress was the adoption of the IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) in 1988. Although the country adopted the financial reforms in 1988, 
effective reforms only started in the 1990s and were focused mainly on liquidation, 
restructuring and privatisation as well as the reduction of state ownership of banks. These 
reforms led to a financial system that is more market oriented and open to competition (Khan, 
2010:25). 
Foreign banks dominate the financial landscape of Cameroon, holding more than two-thirds 
of total commercial bank assets which represent about 0.20 of GDP. The Cameroon banking 
sector has recently undergone some revival with the entrance of new banks such as the Union 
Bank of Africa from Nigeria, Oceanic Bank International from Nigeria owning a 75% share 
in Union Bank of Cameroon, and Banque Atlantique from Ivory Coast taking over Amity 
Bank. In total, there are 12 commercial banks operating in Cameroon and two governments 
specialised financial institutions; the Postal and Savings Bank (CAMPOST) and bank Credit 
Foncier (CFC) in charge of housing loans. From the 12 commercial banks in operation, only 
three are domestically owned: Commercial Bank of Cameroon, Afriland First Bank and 
National Financial Credit Bank (IMF, 2007:30 and Khan, 2010:28). 
There are basically three types of financial institutions in Cameroon: formal, semi-formal and 
informal. The formal financial institutions comprise the commercial banks and non-bank 
financial institutions such as insurance companies and the stock exchange that are fully 
regulated by the Central African Banking Commission (COBAC) (Khan, 2010:25). 
Within the formal financial sector there are the non-bank financial institutions such as 
insurance companies including the government owned Reinsurance Company, two pension 
funds, a social security fund and other specialised institutions offering lease services (IMF, 
2009:8-9). The money market was established in 1994 but remains poorly developed, while 
the bond market is almost non-existent except for government bonds that are issued from 
time to time to settle internal debt. The Douala Stock Exchange (DSX) was created in 1999 
and started operation in 2002. Since its establishment the DSX has been inactive despite 
several incentive measures to attract firms, and it has failed to attain the envisaged goal of 
mobilising savings to finance long term investment (Khan, 2010:29). According to IMF 
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(2007:30), only one company was listed on the DSX by the end of 2006 and trading has been 
minimal. 
The semi-formal financial institutions include microfinance institutions (MFIs), cooperatives, 
and credit unions. They are also subject to the regulatory framework of COBAC but are not 
required to meet the same strict prudential norms as commercial banks. For instance, 
regulation on the minimum capital adequacy ratio22 and large exposures are less restrictive 
for MFIs than for commercial banks (Khan, 2010:25). The number of MFIs in Cameroon 
increased tremendously after the 1989 reforms as some of the retrenched bankers set up credit 
and small savings institutions, and by end of 2006 there were about 490 MFIs in operation. 
Although they held less than 5% of the total financial assets by the end of 2005 they 
nevertheless played an important role in intermediation and responding to the need for credit 
by SMMEs and households not served by the commercial banks. Their deposits and credits 
are gradually rising relatively but they lack the capacity to finance long term investment 
(Khan, 2010:29-30). 
The informal financial institutions can be further divided into two groups: non-commercial 
and commercial informal financial sector. The non-commercial informal financial institutions 
are those whose activities revolve around relatives, friends or small scale group 
arrangements. That is, these are solidarity groups whose success depends on mutual trust 
whereby each member acts as surety for the loan repayment of a trusted or a family member. 
The commercial informal sectors, on the other hand, are those that conduct their businesses 
by collecting savings, they are moneylenders and traders and most of them are not known by 
the monetary authorities but they play a significant role in mobilising resources and 
intermediation because the services of commercial institutions do not reach the majority of 
the rural poor (Khan, 2010:25). 
3.3 THE MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK IN CAMEROON 
As noted earlier, Cameroon is a member of the CEMAC and as such does not have an 
independent monetary policy. Monetary policy in Cameroon and CEMAC as a whole is 
formulated and implemented by the supranational regional Central Bank (BEAC). The 
Central Bank is in charge of issuing the currency to the six member countries, pooling and 
                                                             
22 The minimum amount of capital required by COBAC to ensure banks and non-bank financial institutions have 
sufficient funds to meet their liabilities and other risk such as credit risk, market risk and operational risk. 
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managing foreign exchange reserves, and ensures that the payment system in the region is 
functioning well. Monetary policy is formulated by a monetary policy committee (MPC) 
which also manages the pooled foreign exchange reserves (Iossifov et al., 2009:13). The 
main objectives of BEAC are to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime with the euro and to 
maintain price stability. Nevertheless, BEAC faces a major challenge to achieve this task due 
to the heterogeneity in the structure of CEMAC economies particularly in relation to their 
over-dependence on oil exports and limited labour as well as capital mobility between 
countries (Saxegaard, 2006:16). 
In order to ease the realisation of its principal goal of exchange rate stability BEAC adopted 
two monetary targets: a low inflation rate (keeping inflation below 3% per annum in the 
region) and an adequate foreign currency cover of the monetary base. BEAC utilises country-
specific instruments ceilings on BEAC government credits, quantitative targets on BEAC 
refinancing of commercial banks and required reserves ratios in the implementation of 
monetary policy. In addition, due to differences between economies in the CEMAC region, 
the MPC sets differentiated required reserve ratios and quarterly targets on commercial banks 
refinancing by BEAC. This is to ensure it maintains enough net international reserve (NIR) 
coverage of base money in each CEMAC country within a desired range between 75% and 
100% (Iossifov et al., 2009:14 and Saxegaard, 2006:16). 
BEAC uses indirect instruments in its operations since the introduction of the money market 
in 1994. Liquidity in the banking system is controlled through refinancing by BEAC and is 
supplemented by the imposition of differentiated reserve requirements (BEAC, 2010). The 
refinancing policy of the Central Bank is the major method of intervention and works through 
the money market. It is implemented as advances on securities and takes two forms: 
influencing the quantities (target refinancing) and prices (interest rates). The action on 
quantities is aimed to stop the growth of monetary aggregates because BEAC is based on a 
monetary programming exercise, and action on interest rates is a new policy of the Central 
Bank. Thus advances are granted at an interest rate (the Interest Rate of Tenders – TIAO) 
determined by the MPC in accordance with the objectives of monetary policy (BEAC, 2010). 
Furthermore, BEAC uses negative bids to withdraw liquidity from the system. That is, a 
given rate is paid to commercial banks (interest rate on investment set by MPC) for the 
depositing of their free reserves at the Central Bank (Saxegaard, 2006:16). The greatest 
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problem hampering the effective implementation and the attainment of BEAC’s major 
objectives is the existence of excess liquidity in the CEMAC region. So far, the existing 
monetary policy instruments have been unable to reduce excess money growth leaving the 
bank no choice other than to rely in part on changes in the interest rates of its lending and 
deposit facilities to manage monetary outcomes. Excess liquidity of the banking sector is an 
indication of underdevelopment of the financial markets (Iossifov et al., 2009:14). 
3.4 THE NIGERIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
The Nigerian economy is the largest in West Africa and has the most developed banking 
system in West Africa. Banking operations in Nigeria started far back in the 1800s and the 
African Banking Corporation was the first bank to be opened in 1892. The Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN), the regulator of banking activities, started operation in 1959 following the 
enactment of the 1958 Central Bank Act (Allen et al., 2011:21). 
Nevertheless, the Nigerian financial sector in the 1970s was characterised by repressive 
financial policies, including interest rate controls, selective credit programmes and fixed 
exchange rate regimes, and indigenisation programmes aimed at nationalising all foreign 
owned banks in Nigeria (Ndako, 2010:6). 
However, these repressive and indigenisation policies were made with enormous challenges 
that led to the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986. The 1986 
SAP took the form of financial system reforms such as interest rate deregulation, institutional 
reforms, restructuring the operation of money and capital markets, non-deposit taking and 
investment houses (Ndako, 2010:6). The reforms removed the direct rationing of foreign 
exchange controls for the real sector, but the government retained a multiple exchange rate 
regime which created an avenue for arbitrage and rent seeking financial institutions with 
considerable access to foreign exchange auctions. This resulted in the easy entrance of new 
banks into the banking sector particularly those specialising in foreign exchange transactions 
such as merchant banks, thereby tripling the number of banks from 40 to 120 (Beck et al., 
2005:7). 
Financial sector reform in Nigeria was a continuous process from 1986 to 2004/2005 where 
the mother reform took place in 2004/2005 reducing 89 banks to 25 universal banks through 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). This number was further reduced to 24 banks following the 
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merger of Stanbic Bank Plc and IBTC Bank to form Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc by the end of 
December 2007 (Iganiga, 2010:65-66). Foreign ownership of Nigerian banks is very small: 
only four banks (Citigroup, Standard Chartered Bank of Nigeria, Stanbic IBTC and Ecobank 
Nigeria) out of the 24 banks operating in Nigeria are foreign owned (Allen et al., 2011:21). 
The financial sector of Nigeria can be categorised into three groups: financial intermediaries, 
capital markets and foreign investment. The financial intermediaries can further be divided 
into two segments: commercial banks including merchant banks and nonbank financial 
intermediaries (King, 2003:19). 
Commercial banks overwhelmingly dominate the financial system, accounting for about 90% 
of the financial system assets and roughly two-thirds of total private sector credit extension. 
Non-bank financial intermediaries can be grouped into non-deposit taking financial 
institutions (lenders) and institutional investors. The former mobilise savings and channel 
them into different activities of the economy. They include finance companies, mortgage 
institutions, microfinance institutions (MFIs) and development finance institutions (DFIs). 
The mortgage institutions provide funding for real estate developers while the DFIs provide 
long term funding to support economic growth. Institutional investors include pension funds, 
insurance companies and discount houses and bureaux de change (King, 2003:19-22 and 
World Bank, 2000:24). 
Nigeria is the only West African-Anglophone country with a secondary debt market and a 
bond index. The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) debt securities are issued with 
maturity of three to twenty years and can be accessed through the primary and secondary 
markets. Nigeria launched its sovereign bond index in December 2006, giving detailed 
information about prices of locally denominated fixed rate Federal Government Bonds (Allen 
et al., 2011:10). Nigeria also has a vibrant and well-developed money market which 
constitutes one of the most active segments of Nigerian financial markets. 
The Nigerian capital market (stock exchange) is the most liquid in West Africa. It was 
opened in 1960 as the Lagos Stock Exchange and by December 1977 it became known as 
“The Stock Exchange”. At the moment, there are 276 securities listed on The Exchange 
comprising 17 Government Stocks, 50 Industrial loans, and 209 Equity/Ordinary Share 
Companies, with a total market capitalisation total of 2.23 trillion naira. The buoyancy of the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange can probably be explained by the abolition of the 1995 Exchange 
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Control Act which opened the Nigerian Capital markets to foreign participation. Currently, 
there is no limit of foreign ownership of companies registered on the Exchange. As a result 
many listed companies have foreign and multinational affiliations ranging from the 
agricultural sector through to the manufacturing and services sector of the economy (Allen et 
al., 2011:23). 
Microfinance in Nigeria is organised on an informal setting. Basically there are two types of 
informal microfinance: firstly Moneylenders and Pawnbrokers, who extend credits usually at 
a very high interest rates compared to the formal financial sector and borrowers often 
surrender their land and assets as collateral. The second type is the informal saving and credit 
association (Esusu), also known as rotating saving and credit associations or RoSCAs, which 
are managed by different ethnic groups in the urban and rural areas and benefit only members 
of the group. Members of the association have a mandate to pay an agreed amount of money 
periodically and the collective funds are then partially or completely given to a member on 
rotational basis once the fund has reached a certain amount. The growth of the microfinance 
industry in Nigeria has been triggered by a large number of informal businesses and the 
reluctance of banks and other financial institutions to finance informal business activities. 
However, commercial banks and development finance institutions are major providers of 
capital for microfinance in Nigeria (Allen et al., 2011:23). 
3.5 MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK IN NIGERIA 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana and Guinea belong to the West Africa Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ) formed in 2000 with the plan to launch a single currency, the Eco, by 2015. The 
main aim of the WAMZ is to establish a strong and stable currency to rival the CFA franc.  
However, the CFA and Eco envisage merging, giving rise to a single currency for West and 
Central Africa along with the creation of common Central Bank (Allen et al., 2011:20). 
The WAMZ is yet to form a monetary union, meaning that each country in the zone for now 
formulates its monetary policy as well as having a Central Bank. Thus, monetary policy in 
Nigeria is coordinated by the CBN which also controls the financial policies of the Federal 
Government. The major objective of the CBN is to achieve price stability and to support the 
economic policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria. To facilitate the attainment of CBN 
objectives, the monetary policy committee (MPC) formulates monetary and credits policies; 
maintains adequate external reserves to defend the value of the naira; promote monetary and 
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price as well as financial stability, and provides economic and financial support to the Federal 
Government on behalf of the CBN (Allen et al., 2011:20 and CBN, 2010:5). 
The MPC meets once a month to deliberate on the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) depending 
on the global economic outlook.  In order to maintain the domestic value of the currency 
through short term interest rate stability, an operating target was introduced in 2006. The 
MPR therefore serves as an indication rate for interbank money market transactions and other 
interest rates in the money markets (Allen et al., 2010:36). The CBN uses Open Market 
Operations (OMO) as the main indirect instruments of monetary policy. OMOs are conducted 
through Treasury Bill auctions in the primary market and are complemented by other 
monetary policy instruments such as discount window operations which include standing 
lending and deposit facilities, repo and reserve repo operations and the use of cash reserve 
requirement (CRR). Furthermore, CBN also manages monetary policy through the sale and 
purchase of CBN bills in the primary market (CBN, 2010:1 and World Bank, 2000:35). 
3.6 FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF CAMEROON AND NIGERIA: 
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the extent to which monetary policy impulses are transmitted 
through to the real economy depends to a large degree on the structure of the financial 
system. Sellon (2002:5) argues that the impact of monetary policy on interest rates depends to 
a great extent on the parameters of the financial system. For example, recent changes in the 
structure of the United States financial markets and institutions may have changed the interest 
rate channel in the United States. Cottarelli and Kourelis’s (1994) study is amongst the 
earliest to quantify the relative importance of the financial structure in the process of 
monetary policy transmission and hence interest rate pass-through. 
To assist our understanding of the ways financial structure influences the functioning of 
financial markets, Beck et al. (2009) compiled a series of indicators that can be used as a 
measuring guide. However, it should be noted that only those relevant to this study will be 
examined and inferences will be made based on the observed trend. Against this background, 
the next section explores the various financial structures of Cameroon and Nigeria. In order 
to mitigate the weaknesses associated with using one indicator, the study uses more than one 
in each case in an attempt to reduce these limitations. 
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3.6.1 THE SIZE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
3.6.1.1 Liquid liabilities/GDP 
There are quite a number of indicators that can be used to measure the size of the financial 
system, as will be discussed later. The traditional measure is liquid liabilities to gross 
domestic product (GDP) which measures the liquidity of the financial system.  According to 
Beck et al. (2009:5) this measure sums currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities 
of banks and other financial intermediaries divided by GDP. This measure includes 
information of all banks, bank-like and non-bank financial intermediaries, and therefore can 
be taken to be the most comprehensive measure of financial intermediation and has been 
widely use in the finance and growth literature (see King and Levine, 1993). A high value 
signifies increased financial depth and a low value indicates a shallow or underdeveloped 
financial system and is expected to have a negative impact on domestic banks ability to 
supply credits (Graham, 1996:11). See Figure 3.1. 
FIGURE 3.1: LIQUID LIABILITIES / GDP IN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA 
 
Source: Author’s own estimates using the financial structure dataset of Beck et al. (2009). 
From Figure 3.1 above, it can be seen that there is some degree of similarity between 
financial depth in Cameroon and Nigeria. The two markets overall have shown low levels of 
financial development over the 20 year period with Cameroon reaching its highest level of 
about 20% in 2009 compared to about 29% for Nigeria. This low level of financial 
development is expected to negatively affect PT, especially in Cameroon where the 
development trend has been consistently below the Nigerian trend except for 1990 to 1992. 
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3.6.1.2 Financial system deposits/GDP 
A second indicator that can be use to measure the size of the financial system is the financial 
system deposits to GDP, which is equal to the ratio of all checking, savings and time deposits 
in the banking system and bank-like financial institutions to GDP. This ratio is a stock 
indicator of deposit resources available to the financial sector for its credit activities (Beck et 
al., 2009:6). Figure 3.2 shows that the two markets have experienced a positive trend since 
1996 with the Nigerian financial system deposits to GDP reaching about 25% in 2009 
compared to about 16% for Cameroon. A low and declining ratio suggest that the existing 
financial resources available may not be enough to support private sector activities. Beck et 
al. (2009:6) also point out that this ratio varies positively with a country’s income level, and 
as such low income countries will be expected to have a low ratio.  Therefore, a declining 
ratio is expected to have a negative impact on pass-through. 
FIGURE 3.2: FINANCIAL SYSTEM DEPOSITS/GDP IN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA 
 
Source: Author’s own estimates using the financial structure dataset of Beck et al. (2009). 
3.6.1.3 Bank deposits/GDP 
A third indicator measuring  the size of the financial system is bank deposits to GDP and is 
limited only to deposits of deposit monetary institutions (Beck et al., 2009:6). As shown in 
Figure 3.3, the banking sector deposits to GDP in Nigeria is consistently higher than that in 
Cameroon, implying that the size and depth of the banking sector in Nigeria is bigger and 
deeper than in Cameroon. If all bank deposits are transformed into lending, then the financial 
intermediation function of Cameroon banks through credit allocation to the private sector will 
be limited compared to Nigeria. Furthermore, the presence of an active capital market in 
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Nigeria is an indication of high levels of competition between banks and non-bank financial 
intermediaries. Thus, we expect adjustment in Nigeria to be faster than in Cameroon. 
FIGURE 3.3: BANK DEPOSITS/GDP IN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA 
 
Source: Author’s own estimates using the financial structure dataset of Beck et al. (2009). 
3.6.1.4 Private credit by deposit money banks23 and other financial institutions/GDP 
The above indicators focused on the liability side of financial institutions. However, it is also 
important to examine indicators on the asset side which capture the credit allocation function 
of financial intermediaries. One of such is private credit by deposit in money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP. This is equal to the total debt of the private sector to the banks 
and non-bank financial institutions divided by GDP, and varies with the level of economic 
development (Beck et al., 2009). 
FIGURE 3.4: PRIVATE CREDIT BY DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS/GDP IN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA 
 
                                                             
23 Deposit money banks include all financial institutions with liabilities in the form of deposits that can be 
transferred by cheques and/or used to make payments. 
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Source: Author’s own estimates using financial structure dataset of Beck et al. (2009). 
Figure 3.4 shows that this ratio has been falling for Cameroon, indicating a low level of 
intermediation, and has been trending below 10% since 1995. The ratio was trending between 
9% and 15% in Nigeria until 2006 when it rose to about 37%. This means financial 
intermediation in Nigeria has been improving relative to Cameroon due to the increasing role 
of non-bank financial institutions such as the stock exchange, money and bond markets. 
These institutions in Cameroon are yet to develop to the level they are in Nigeria. Thus, pass-
through is expected to be quicker in Nigeria than in Cameroon. 
3.6.1.5 Stock market capitalisation/GDP and stock market turnover ratio  
It is also important to determine the role that the equity market plays in the economy as an 
alternative source of finance to investors. A commonly used indicator is stock market 
capitalisation to GDP, which is the value of all listed shares divided by GDP. This measure 
shows the relative size of the stock exchange to the economy (Beck et al., 2009:7) and stock 
market turnover ratio which is the ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real 
market capitalisation. Due to the absence of an active stock exchange in Cameroon, the 
analysis focuses only on Nigeria. 
FIGURE 3.5: STOCK MARKET CAPITALISATION/GDP AND STOCK MARKET 
TURNOVER RATIO IN NIGERIA 
 
Source: Author’s own estimates using the financial structure dataset of Beck et al. (2009). 
Figure 3.5 shows the increasing role the Nigerian stock exchange has played as an alternative 
source of fund for investors. Stock market capitalisation has risen from about 5% in 1990 to 
about 37% of GDP by 2007. However, stock market turnover ratios (TVT) have been low 
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and only show a marginal increase after the 2004/2005 bank consolidation. We expect pass-
through to be higher in Nigeria as there will be competition between banks and non-bank 
financial intermediaries. Banks will tend to adjust their retail rates quicker in reaction to 
changes in the official rate of the Central Bank. 
The foregoing analysis focused on the financial institutions including non-bank financial 
intermediaries. Although the non-bank financial intermediaries play a crucial role in the 
financial market, commercial banks dominate the financial systems of Nigeria and Cameroon 
constituting about 90% and 56.6% of total financial assets respectively (see Sections 3.2 and 
3.4 above). To this end, it will make economic sense to refocus our attention on indicators 
that capture the role of the banking sector. 
3.6.2 THE SIZE AND DEPTH OF THE BANKING SYSTEM 
3.6.2.1 Deposits money bank assets/GDP 
Banks are seen to play a major role in mobilising and channelling savings into productive use 
of the economy and also in transmitting monetary policy impulses to the real economy.  To 
examine this important role of bank intermediation services, the study used two indicators: 
deposits money bank assets to GDP and bank credits to bank deposits. According to Beck et 
al. (2009:8-9), these indicators give evidence of the significant role that banks perform 
relative to the size of the real economy. 
FIGURE 3.6:  DEPOSITS MONEY BANK ASSETS/GDP IN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA 
 
Source: Author’s own estimates using the financial structure dataset of Beck et al. (2009). 
Figure 3.6 reveals some interesting historical facts about Cameroon’s performance in the 
1990s. Deposits money bank assets to GDP dropped from about 36% in 1990 to about 10% in 
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2009, reflecting banking sector restructuring, liquidations and privatisation in the 1990s, and 
have remained low (about 10%) up to 2010. Thus, the reforms of the 1990s are yet to yield 
real fruits in Cameroon to increase the role of the banking sector in intermediation services. 
Conversely, the ratio has been showing a positive trend in Nigeria since the 1990s, reaching 
about 45% by 2009 and indicating that the financial reforms instituted by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria have had a positive impact on financial intermediation. This means that the assets of 
commercial banks have been growing over time, which can than be translated into private 
sector credits, thus increasing the role of banks in transmitting monetary policy impulses to 
the real economy. 
3.6.2.2 Banks credits/bank deposits and private credit by deposit money banks/GDP 
We can also use bank credits/bank deposits which equal the ratio of claims on the private 
sector to deposits in deposit money banks (Commercial banks). This indicator determines the 
degree to which the savings of the economy are channelled into private sector credits by the 
banking sector and varies with the level of economic development. Hence, economies with 
underdeveloped financial markets not only mobilise and attract fewer funds but also channel 
a smaller proportion of the mobilised deposits into loans to the private sector (Beck et al., 
2009:9). 
FIGURE 3.7: BANK CREDITS/BANK DEPOSITS IN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA 
 
Source: Author’s own estimates using the financial structure dataset of Beck et al. (2009). 
It is evident from Figure 3.7 that financial intermediation in Cameroon has been falling since 
1990 up to now. Cameroon banks have been attracting fewer and fewer credits and 
channelling only a small amount of these credits into private sector loans, as confirmed by the 
continuous decline of the ratio. Linking this to the private sector credits to GDP (see Figure 
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3.8) shows that private sector credits have been less than 10% since 1995. This is consistent 
with IMF (2007:33) findings that private sector credits to GDP in Cameroon are about 9% 
and to date, the value continues to fall and is estimated to be less than 9% as shown in Figure 
3.8. 
FIGURE 3.8: PRIVATE CREDIT BY DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS/GDP IN CAMEROON AND 
NIGERIA 
 
Source: Author’s own estimates using the financial structure dataset of Beck et al. (2009). 
On the other hand, bank credits to deposits in Nigeria have been improving over time with a 
significant improvement of above 200% post 2004/2005 bank consolidation (Figure 3.7) 
which is also translated into increased private sector credits as illustrated by the positive trend 
of Figure 3.8. The declining bank credits to bank deposits and private sector credits to GDP 
in Cameroon is partially explained by the fact that Cameroon commercial banks lend only to 
a few creditworthy companies. Small Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) and 
households find it difficult to access credits from banks because they do not keep account of 
their activities and the lack of credit bureaus on consumer credits to assist banks with the 
credit risk of borrowers’ further constrain credit availability (Khan, 2010:36). Relating this to 
economic development it will make economic sense to suggest that development in 
Cameroon has been on a decline as indicated by a fall in the private sector credits to GDP. 
Conversely, intermediation in Nigeria has been rising, indicating improvement in economic 
development as banks are able to channel the mobilised deposits into private sector credits 
thereby increasing economic output. Therefore, higher pass-through is expected for Nigeria 
than in Cameroon. 
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3.6.3 EFFICIENCY, COMPETITION AND CONCENTRATION OF THE 
BANKING SYSTEM 
Competition in a financial market can be regarded as the degree to which financial markets 
are contestable and consumers have a wide variety of financial services to choose from, while 
efficiency measures the ability of financial markets to deliver high quality products and 
services at the lowest possible cost. Consequently, competition and efficiency complement 
each other because competition in the banking sector increases efficiency in financial 
institutions, lowers costs to clients and improves the quality as well as increasing the range of 
financial services provided (World Bank and IMF, 2005:18). 
3.6.3.1 Bank overhead costs/total assets  
According to Beck et al. (2009:9), efficiency can be measured using bank overhead costs 
which are equal to the accounting value of bank overhead costs as a share of its total assets. 
Figure 3.9 shows bank overhead costs/total assets of Cameroon and Nigeria. 
FIGURE 3.9: BANK OVERHEAD COSTS/TOTAL ASSETS IN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA 
 
Source: Author’s own estimates using the financial structure dataset of Beck et al. (2009). 
A higher value indicates low levels of efficiency and vice versa. From Figure 3.9, it can be 
seen that Cameroon banks were more efficient than Nigerian banks from 1994 up to 2009 but 
after 2004 the level of efficiency in Nigerian banking sector improved, reflecting the banking 
sector consolidation of 2004/2005. However, efficiency in the two markets has been 
improving significantly as shown by the continuous decline in the bank overhead costs to 
total assets overtime. 
 
 
49 
 
3.6.3.2  The interest rates spread 
However, efficiency can also be measured in terms of interest rates spread (Lending minus 
deposit rates) as shown in Figure 3.10. 
FIGURE 3.10:  THE INTEREST RATES SPREAD IN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA 
 
Source: Author’s own estimates using data from IMF/IFS. 
The high spreads of between 9% and 17% in Cameroon suggest that commercial banks pay 
very little for deposits and charge a higher interest rate for loans (Figure 3.10). Available 
evidence shows that SMMEs suffered from a credit squeeze due to limited credit history 
and/or paid higher interest rates than large corporations. For instance, on average loan cost is 
about 11% for large enterprises, 16.5% for SMMEs and 20.5% for households which 
indicates market segmentation and a low level of competition within Cameroon banks (IMF, 
2007:35). Conversely, Nigerian banks seem to be more efficient in pricing their loans and 
deposits as evidenced by the narrower spread of between 3% and 11%. This is probably due 
to the increasing role of non-bank financial intermediaries such as the Nigerian stock 
exchange in intermediation.  Economic theory also suggests that where an alternative source 
of funding is available, the elasticity of deposits and loans tends to be greater and commercial 
banks will adjust their retail rates more quickly to changes in monetary policy. As such, pass-
through is expected to be faster in Nigeria than in Cameroon. Nevertheless, the World Bank 
and IMF (2005:19) noted that interest rates spread may sometimes remain high irrespective 
of improved efficiency in the banking system because banks need to make provision for loan 
losses or to charge a risk premium for lending to high-risk borrowers. 
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3.6.3.3 Bank concentration 
The level of competition can also be measured using bank concentration ratios and bank 
ownership structure. Bank concentration refers here to the assets of the three biggest banks as 
a share of assets of all commercial banks (World Bank and IMF, 2005:19): see Figure 3.11. 
FIGURE 3.11: BANK CONCENTRATION LEVELS IN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA 
 
Source: Author’s own estimates using the financial structure dataset of Beck et al. (2009). 
The degree of bank concentration has been falling in both countries, implying that some 
degree of competition exists in the two markets. Nevertheless, while the concentration level 
fell in Nigeria over time up to 1998, it has since then maintained a constant level until 2009. 
In Cameroon, bank concentration also fell up to 2005 but suddenly rose after 2005.  
However, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) point out that bank concentration may not be a good 
measure of competition as concentrated markets may tend to behave competitively if there 
are threats to entry. Hence, one would expect Cameroon commercial banks to behave 
competitively since the banking sector is dominated by foreign banks (see Section 3.2). In 
addition, government ownership of banks in Cameroon reduced dramatically after the 1990s 
bank restructuring. According to IMF (2007:28) government shareholding at the end of 2005 
was 35% in one bank and less than 30% in two other banks. Thus we expect competition 
within the banking sector to improve over time in Cameroon, particularly with attempts to 
galvanise the Douala Stock exchange in recent years. As a whole the concentration levels in 
the two markets are relatively low, with the level of bank concentration in Nigeria being 
much lower than in Cameroon.  
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3.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
An overview of the financial systems of Nigeria and Cameroon revealed that commercial 
banks dominate the financial landscape of the two markets. Nevertheless, foreign banks make 
up a greater proportion of commercial banks in Cameroon (nine foreign and three domestic 
banks) compared to Nigeria where there are only four foreign banks out of twenty-four 
commercial banks in operation. Non-bank financial institutions such as capital markets and 
development financial institutions also play a role in mobilising resources and providing long 
term finance, thereby increasing competition and efficiency in the banking industry. 
Unfortunately, this role is limited only to Nigeria as these institutions are inactive and 
underdeveloped in Cameroon. Meanwhile, semi-formal and informal financial institutions 
such as MFIs and moneylenders as well as solidarity groups operate in the two markets and 
play a major role in meeting the needs of those not served by the commercial banks. 
However, their financial capacity is limited because they cannot finance long term investment 
projects. 
Cameroon does not have an independent monetary policy framework because it belongs to 
the CEMAC region. Hence, its monetary policy is coordinated by the supranational regional 
Central Bank (BEAC) whose main objectives are to maintain a pegged exchange rate 
between the CFA franc and the euro and to maintain price stability. Nigeria has an 
independent monetary policy framework coordinated by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
but belongs to WAMZ which is expected to launch a monetary union and a single currency 
by 2015. The major objectives of CBN are price stability and support of the economic policy 
of the Federal Government of Nigeria, and MPCs in the two countries has been charged with 
the task of formulating policies to achieve these goals. 
However, there are some differences in the way monetary policy is conducted in the two 
countries. Due to differences in the economies in the CEMAC region, MPC uses 
differentiated reserve requirements and a quarterly target on commercial banks refinancing 
by BEAC in the execution of monetary policy. BEAC uses indirect instruments in its 
operations where liquidity in the banking system is controlled through refinancing by BEAC 
and is complemented by the imposition of differentiated reserve requirements. Excess 
liquidity in the system is withdrawn by using negative bids. Nevertheless, BEAC faces a 
major challenge in the realisation of its goal because of excess liquidity in the CEMAC 
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region arising from oil revenues. In contrast, the CBN uses the short term interest rate to 
stabilise the value of the domestic currency and OMO is used as the main indirect instrument 
of monetary policy which is conducted through an auction of Treasury Bills in the primary 
market. As a result of active money markets, monetary policy in Nigeria is expected to be 
more effective than in Cameroon and monetary shocks will be transmitted quicker and hence 
there will be faster pass-through. 
A comparative analysis of the financial structure of Nigeria and Cameroon clearly shows that 
financial sector development in terms of the size, depth, competition and efficiency in the 
Nigerian banking system outperformed that of the Cameroon banking sector. Although 
foreign banks dominate the financial sector of Cameroon, the absence of an active capital 
market means that firms and households in Cameroon have no reliable alternative sources of 
finance. In addition, the range of financial services offered can be limited and may be 
confined to savings accounts which are insensitive to interest rates changes and earn a very 
low rate of return. Overall, evidence from trend analysis suggests that pass-through is 
expected to be higher in Nigeria than in Cameroon. 
The next chapter presents the methodology and the empirical framework. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the steps involved in the empirical analyses to be used in Chapter Five. 
The rationale is to conduct a comparative analysis of the degree of interest rates adjustment in 
Cameroon and Nigeria, that is, the extent to which commercial banks in both countries adjust 
their retail rates (lending and deposit) in response to changes in the Central Bank rate. In 
addition, the study will also examine whether monetary policy impulses in Nigeria are 
passed-through to Cameroon and vice versa. This task will be accomplished by employing 
the Engle and Granger (1987) co-integration technique as well as a rolling window analysis 
in a symmetric and asymmetric error correction framework. Attention will be placed on the 
magnitude, speed and the likelihood of asymmetry adjustment in the pass-through of the 
Central Bank rate to the retail rates in both countries. 
4.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.2.1 Definitions of data and sources 
The empirical analysis uses monthly time series data sourced from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)/International Financial Statistics (IFS) from January 1990 to December 2010 for 
Nigeria and from January 1990 to June 2008 for Cameroon. The choice to start from 1990 is 
motivated by the fact that this period represents a post financial reform era for both countries 
(1988 for Cameroon and 1986 for Nigeria). The lending and deposit rates represent the retail 
rates and the discount rates represent the Central Bank policy rates for both countries. The 
empirical analysis will consist of three sets. The first analysis will cover the whole sample 
period. The second set employs a rolling window analysis with sample of ten years each (120 
observations) starting from 1990M1 to 1999M12. The next window will begin from 1991M1 
– 2000M12; 1992M1 – 2001M12 until 2001M1 – 2010M12. In total, there will be twelve 
rolling windows for Nigeria and ten for Cameroon with the last rolling window of Cameroon 
having 114 observations.  Finally, the last set of analysis will swap the policy rates around to 
examine if there is pass-through of monetary shocks from Cameroon to Nigeria and vice 
versa. The use of the rolling window analysis is because of its ability to trace dynamics in PT 
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over time as well as its power to capture other important developments in the real economy 
that can equally influence PT (Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010:17). 
Before the proper empirical analysis it will be necessary to graph the various interest rates 
series (retail lending and deposit rates and the Central Bank policy rates (CPR), which in this 
case are the discount rates) and observe their trends over time. This is shown in Figures 4.1 
and 4.2 below. From Figure 4.1, it is evident that the lending and policy rates in Cameroon 
are trending far apart from each other, that is, the lending rate is not tracking movements in 
the policy rate of the Central Bank. Hence, the lending rate may not be co-integrated with the 
policy rate. Conversely, the deposit and policy rates move closely together and even tend to 
converge around 2005, thus one would expect the two rates to be co-integrated. Furthermore, 
the interest rate spread in Cameroon is very high because of high loan rates and low rates 
paid on deposits. This is as a result of a fixed limit on the lending rate of 15% (excluding risk 
premium) and a minimum rate on deposits of 4.25% set by BEAC. However, the fixed 
constraint on the lending rate was abolished in July 2008 and the minimum deposit rate 
reduced from 4.25% to 3.25% (Khan, 2010:26; Saxegaard, 2006:16). This means that banks 
can charge 15% plus a risk premium for loans but only pay 3.25% on deposits, giving a 
double digit spread. 
FIGURE 4.1: LENDING, DEPOSIT AND POLICY RATES  TRENDS FOR CAMEROON  
 
Source: Author’s own estimates using data from IMF/IFS. 
With regard to Nigeria, it can be seen from Figure 4.2 that the lending and deposit rates 
tracked movements in the policy rate very closely and are expected to be co-integrated and 
the spread is small compared to Cameroon. The narrow spread in Nigeria seems to indicate a 
high level of competition between banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. 
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 FIGURE 4.2: LENDING, DEPOSIT AND POLICY RATES RATES TRENDS FOR NIGERIA 
 
Source: Author’s own estimates using data from IMF/IFS. 
4.3 ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
4.3.1 Tests for co- integration 
The concept of co-integration is based on the pioneer work of Engle and Granger (1987). The 
notion of co-integration means movement of variables together. Brooks (2008:336) notes that 
many financial variables are non-stationary but tend to move together over time, implying 
that there exist some influences on the series, such as market forces, that tie the two series to 
some long run relationship. In all, a set of variables is said to be co-integrated if a linear 
combination of them is stationary. Hence, the presence of co-integration between two 
variables will suggest the existence of a long run relationship and the absence of co-
integration will suggest no long run relationship between the two variables. As such, the 
reason of testing for co-integration is to verify if such a relationship exists and, if it does, how 
many co-integrating vectors are present in the relationship. As a starting point, the 
relationship between two series such as interest rates is commonly specified as: 
ttt xy   10          (4.1) 
where ty  indicates the endogenously determined retail rates (lending and deposit) of 
commercial banks, tx  represents the exogenously determined Central Bank policy rate or 
official interest rate (discount rate in the case of this study), 0  and 1  denote the intercept 
and slope coefficient or long run parameters respectively, and t is the stochastic error term 
(Aziakpono et al., 2007:8). 
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Equation 4.1 is the starting point in any interest rate pass-through (IRPT) analysis and can be 
used to estimate the short run error correction model as well as the long run co-integrating 
vector. But before the estimation process, the properties of the series have to be investigated 
as required for any study employing time series data. We begin by determining the order of 
integration of the retail rates, that is, by testing whether the interest series are stationary or 
non-stationary. Brooks (2008:318) defines a stationary series “as one with a constant mean, 
constant variance and constant autocovariances for each given lag”. Therefore the importance 
of stationarity or unit root tests is to examine the order of integration of a series as well as to 
avoid spurious or meaningless regression, that is, regression that has significant coefficients 
and high R2 but which in a real sense is valueless (Brooks, 2008:319). Hence, stationarity and 
unit root tests are conducted to determine if a series is integrated of order zero I(0), order one 
I(1) or higher orders. Therefore, if the lending, deposit and discount rates are integrated of 
order I(1), Brooks (2008:336) notes that a linear combination of them will produce residuals 
that are integrated of order zero, I(0). This signifies the presence of a long run equilibrium 
relationship between the series and therefore lending, deposit and discount rates are said to be 
co-integrated. 
Stationarity tests can be conducted using graphical analysis such as autocorrelation functions 
(ACF). However, the ACF method is an informal test and is based on a “rule of thumb” 
which says that the researcher should compute the ACF up to one-third to one-quarter of the 
length of sample period (Gujarati and Porter, 2009:753). To overcome this limitation, the 
study employs the conventional Augmented Dicker-Fuller (ADF) test (testing the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity against the alternative of stationarity). The ADF is then 
supplemented by the Kwaitkowski, Philips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test (for the null of 
stationarity versus non-stationarity) to examine the properties of the series24. The advantage 
of using the KPSS test to supplement the ADF test is that the KPSS test does not suffer from 
small sample problems as does the ADF and since the study will be using rolling windows 
analysis of smaller sample sizes, the KPSS test is best suited to mitigate the low power of the 
ADF test (Burger, 2008:11). 
If the interest rate series are found to be stationary at level, then the relationship between 
Central Bank policy rate (CPR) and retail rates (RR) specified as  Equation 4.1 above will be 
                                                             
24 See Brooks (2008:327-331) for further discussion on ADF and KPSS tests. 
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estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Alternatively, if the interest rate series are not 
stationary at level, but are stationary at first difference, a co-integration test will be performed 
to determine whether or not the policy rate and retail rates are co-integrated. Once we know 
the order of integration of the interest series, the next procedure will be to test for co-
integration between the interest rate series. 
In order to check the robustness of the co-integration relationships between them, the study 
uses four different co-integration tests: the Johansen maximum likelihood approach (JJ), the 
Engle-Granger Approach (EG), the Co-integrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) test 
and the Error Correction-base test 25(ECM-base). 
The Engle-Granger test is based on two steps: first, estimate the main equation such as 
Equation 4.1 above, generate the residuals and save them. Second, test the residuals for unit 
roots at level and none, and if the residuals are stationary at level I(0), it implies there is co-
integration. Otherwise, there is no co-integration if residuals are I(1). The CRDW test checks 
the value of the Durbin-Watson (DW) of the main model and if the value is lower than 0.511, 
0.38 and 0.32 at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively for a sample of about 100, then there is no co-
integration. Hence the DW is expected to be higher for co-integration to exist (Gujarati, 
2003:824). The Error Correction Model (ECM) will be used in two ways: as a mechanism to 
check for adjustment back to equilibrium following a short run disturbance and as a test for 
co-integration. As a test, the ECM for each and every sample will be run assuming co-
integration and then the assumption will be confirmed or rejected based on the statistical 
significance of the ECM coefficient. That is, the test statistics (t-stats) must be significant at 
the 1%, 5% or 10% level. Finally, the Johansen maximum likelihood test is based on 
estimating an unrestricted vector autoregressive (VAR) model and testing for co-integration 
based on the trace and max-Eigen statistic. If the t-statistics are greater than the critical value 
from Johansen’s tables, then the null hypothesis that there are r co-integrating vectors is 
rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis that there are r + 1 for trace  or more than r for 
max (Brooks, 2008:339-352) where r is equal to the number of co-integrating vectors. 
However, the interest here is just to check for the presence or absence of co-integration and 
not the number of co-integrating relationships. 
                                                             
25 See Brooks (2008:339-340) and Gujarati and Porter (2009:763) for more information about these tests. 
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If the CPR and the RRs are found not to be co-integrated, then Equation 4.1 will be estimated 
at first difference to avoid spurious regression. Conversely, if the CPR and RRs are found to 
be co-integrated, the EG technique will be used and then an error correction model (ECM) 
will be estimated to investigate the degree of PT as well as how long it takes for the retail 
rates to adjust to changes in the Central Bank policy rate (Aziakpono, 2010:20). 
However, Kremers et al. (1992:1) note that when co-integration is present, the Error 
Correction-base test become more powerful than the Engle-Granger test because the former 
makes use of all available information more efficiently. Therefore, following trends in 
literature such as Aziakpono and Wilson (2010), where the above four methods differ, the 
result from the Error Correction-base test will be considered. 
4.3.2 Empirical pass-through analysis 
It is worth noting that pass-through analysis  is based on the seminal work of Cottarelli and 
Kourelis (1994) which later attracted others to use pass-through analysis in studies (see for 
instance Weth, 2002; Aydin, 2007; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004, 2006a, 2006b; Aziakpono et 
al., 2007 and Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010). According to Sander and Kleimeier 
(2006a:216), interest rate pass-through is an effective methodology to examine the process of 
monetary policy transmission  because of its potential to capture how quickly and how 
completely changes in monetary policy are transmitted to the deposit and lending rates of 
commercial banks. Thus, following Sander and Kleimeier (2004, 2006a), the empirical model 
based on co-integration methodologies can be specified as: 
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where RRt denotes the retail rates of commercial banks (lending or deposit), CPRt represents 
the Central Bank policy rate (in this case discount rates), k* and n
* indicate the optimal lag 
lengths determined using the AIC criterion, allowing for a maximum of four lags (Sander and 
Kleimeier, 2006a:218), β0 represents the intercept or the credit risk premium in the case of 
the lending rate (Marotta, 2009:192), β1 denotes the impact multiplier and µt is the error term. 
The impact multiplier β1 measures the immediate adjustment in the retail rates within the 
current month in response to changes in the policy rate. If the value of β1< 1 it indicates 
sluggish adjustment (which is also known as interest rate stickiness) and if β1 = 1, then the 
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immediate PT is complete and monetary policy is said to be very effective (Sander and 
Kleimeier, 2004:465).  Reasons for interest rate stickiness were discussed in Section 2.3.1. 
Conversely, the long run PT parameters can be estimated if there is a co-integration 
relationship between the retail rates (RRt) and discount rates (CPRt). If the co-integration 
tests detect the presence of a long run stable relationship, then the long run parameters can be 
estimated from: 
ttt CPRRR   10         (4.3) 
where θ0 and θ1 denote the long run intercept and slope coefficients respectively.  If θ1 = 1, it 
indicates complete pass-through, while θ1 < 1 means incomplete pass-through, and if θ1 > 1, 
the long run pass-through overshoots. This situation in the lending markets is interpreted as a 
state where banks increase their lending rates as a counterbalance for the low probability of 
loan repayments rather than reducing loan supply (De Bondt, 2005:45). It is interesting to 
note that Equation 4.2 specified above is applicable for the interest rates series that are 
stationary at levels I(0) but if the interest rates series are found to be non-stationary, I(1), then 
the empirical pass-through model of Equation 4.2 is estimated at first difference to avoid 
spurious regression as given below (Sander and Kleimeier, 2004:464): 
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where Δ represents the first difference operator of lending and deposit rates, k* and n* are 
number of lag lengths, β0 and β1 are again the short run intercept and slope coefficients 
respectively and εt is the disturbance term. If Equation 4.4 is estimated at first difference the 
problem of spurious regression is avoided but information about the long run relationship will 
be lost. However, Sander and Kleimeier (2004:464) note that this information can be 
recovered if the retail rates (RR) and the Central Bank policy rate (CPR) are co-integrated, 
that is, the long run is estimated directly from Equation 4.3 provided that co-integration is 
present between the series.  Alternatively, following Kwapil and Scharler (2010:243), the 
long run pass-through can also be calculated from Equation 4.4 as: 
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where βRR, i is the coefficient of the retail rates (lending or deposit), and β1 denotes the 
coefficient of the policy rate. As noted earlier, θ = 1 implies full pass-through, otherwise 
there is incomplete pass-through. 
4.3.3 Equilibrium error correction model (ECM) 
Intuitively, an error correction model means that a fraction of the disequilibrium from one 
period is adjusted in the next period. Hence, Engle and Granger (1987:255) note that “an 
error correction model for a two variable system would relate the change in one variable to 
past equilibrium errors as well as to past changes in both variables”. Thus, the Granger 
Representation theorem states that “if two variables; say retail rates and Central Bank policy 
rates are co-integrated, then their relationship can be expressed as an equilibrium error 
correction model” (Gujarati and Porter, 2009:764). The simple logic behind this theorem is 
that we cannot talk of adjustment back to the long run equilibrium (error correction) in the 
event of short run disturbance if there is no long run relationship existing between the interest 
rates series. If such a relationship is found, then Equation 4.4 above is augmented with lag 
values of the error term εt as shown below: 
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where Δ denotes the first difference operator, βECT represents the coefficient of the error 
correction term (ECTt-1) and measures the speed of adjustment back to equilibrium. The 
coefficient should be statistically significant and negative, indicating that there are market 
forces at work to reinstate long run equilibrium following a short run disturbance (Aziakpono 
et al., 2007:9). The other parameters are as defined above. Once the short run and speed 
adjustment coefficients have been estimated from Equation 4.6 the next step will be to know 
how long it takes for the retail rates to return to long run equilibrium. This process is known 
as the mean adjustment lag (MAL).  The next section explores this issue further. 
4.3.4  Mean adjustment lag: symmetric and asymmetric error correction framework 
According to Doornik and Henry (1994, in Scholnick, 1996:489), the mean adjustment lag 
can be calculated from Equation 4.6 above as: 
ECTML  /)1( 1          (4.7) 
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However, Scholnick (1996:489) criticised Equation 4.7 on the basis that the model assumes 
that the mean adjustment lag is symmetrical when the lending or deposit rates are beyond or 
less than their equilibrium level.  Thus, Scholnick (1996:490) suggested that the right 
approach to examine asymmetric adjustment is to divide the residuals (denoted as EC in this 
case) taken from the co-integration regression into EC+ and EC-, representing the error term 
when the residuals are above and below their equilibrium levels respectively. That is: 
EC+ = EC,  if  EC > μ        
EC+ = 0,  if EC < μ  and      (4.8)  
EC- = EC,  if EC < μ        
EC- = 0,  if EC > μ       (4.9) 
where μ denotes the mean of the residuals (EC). The asymmetric specification in equations 
4.8 and 4.9 are then incorporated as separate dummy variables into Equation 4.6 (error 
correction model) to derive the short run asymmetric dynamic equation as: 
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where δ1 and δ2 indicate the coefficients of the error correction terms when the lending and/or 
deposit rates are beyond or below their equilibrium respectively. Hence from Equation 4.10, 
the mean adjustment lag is defined as: 
11 /)1( 
ML          (4.11) 
21 /)1( 
ML          (4.12) 
Equation 4.11 applies when the asymmetric adjustment lag in the lending/and or deposit rate 
is greater than the equilibrium mean, and Equation 4.12 denotes a situation when the 
asymmetric adjustment lag in the lending /and or deposit is lower than the equilibrium mean. 
Asymmetric adjustment is then tested using the Wald test with )1(2  distribution proposed 
by Scholnick (1996:490) by imposing the restriction that δ1 = δ2 and if δ1 = δ2 we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of no asymmetry. Otherwise, we reject the null and conclude that there is 
evidence of asymmetry adjustment. 
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the empirical issues involved in the estimation and interpretation of 
interest rate pass-through coefficients. The first step in the empirical analysis of IRPT is to 
specify the basic model and verify the properties or the order of integration (whether the 
series is stationary at levels or at first difference) of the times series using the conventional 
ADF and KPSS techniques. The importance of testing for stationarity is to avoid the 
problems of spurious regression. Once the order of integration has been established, the study 
utilises four different methods to test the presence of co-integration relationships between the 
interest rates series. However, in cases where the four disagree in terms of the co-integration, 
the result from the error correction base test is considered, because it uses all available 
information more efficiently in the determination of co-integration than the Engle-Granger 
test. 
Furthermore, the study analyses IRPT using a rolling window analysis in a symmetric and 
asymmetric error correction framework in order to examine whether the financial reforms 
instituted by Nigeria and Cameroon since the 1990s have improved the PT of monetary 
shocks to the real economy. Finally, a Wald test is used to investigate whether adjustment of 
retail rates to changes in Central Bank rate is symmetric or asymmetric.  The next chapter 
applies this framework in Cameroon and Nigeria using monthly data in order to achieve the 
objectives of the study outlined in Chapter One. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the presentation and discussion of results of the interest pass-through 
analysis described in Chapter Four. Section 5.2 presents the Unit root results and Section 5.3 
presents results of the co-integration tests. Section 5.4 discusses the analyses of interest rate 
pass-through results and Section 5.5 summarises and concludes the chapter. Summary results 
are presented in the Appendix.  
5.2 UNIT ROOT TESTS 
The starting point of an empirical analysis of this nature usually begins with the investigation 
of the properties of the time series. That is, a test of whether the interest rate series are 
stationary at level or at first difference using Augmented Dicker-Fuller (ADF) and 
Kwaitkowski, Philips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) tests.  The study conducted unit root tests 
for the entire sample period as well as for the sub-sample rolling windows for both countries.  
Results from the entire sample are presented in Table A2 in the appendix. The ADF test 
suggests that the null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationarity) could not be rejected, meaning 
the lending, discount and deposit rates are non-stationary at level. These results were verified 
further by the KPSS test where the null hypothesis of statonarity at level was rejected. 
Nevertheless, the KPSS test failed to reject the null hypothesis of stationarity at first 
difference, indicating that the interest series are stationary at first difference, that is, the series 
are integrated of order I(1) for both countries.  
For the rolling windows analysis, the results are presented in Table A3 and A4 in the 
appendix. The ADF test failed to reject the null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationarity) at 
level in all twelve windows for Nigeria. The KPSS further validated these results by rejecting 
the null hypothesis of stationarity at level. However, the ADF test rejected the null hypothesis 
of non-stationarity at first difference, meaning the interest rates series are all stationary at first 
difference signifying integration of order I(1). In contrast, the ADF test rejected the null 
hypothesis of unit root at level for rolling windows five and eight for the discount and deposit 
rates in Cameroon. These results were also confirmed by the KPSS test where the null 
hypothesis of stationarity could not be rejected at level, suggesting the discount and deposit 
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rates were I(0). Conversely, the ADF test rejected the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at 
first difference for the other remaining rolling windows and the KPSS test also failed to reject 
the null hypothesis of stationarity at first difference. Thus, apart from rolling windows five 
and eight, the rest of the rolling windows are stationary at first difference, I(1).  
5.3 TESTS FOR CO INTEGRATION 
As noted in Chapter Four, the study used four different co-integration test techniques to 
ensure the relationship detected is robust. A summary of these tests are presented in Table 
5.1. The study conducted a co-integration test for the entire sample as well as for each rolling 
window for both countries. For Nigeria, only the JJ test failed to reject the null hypothesis of 
no co-integration between the lending and policy rates, and again the JJ and CRDW tests 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration between the deposit and policy rates. 
The ECM-base and EG tests rejected the null in both cases, confirming the presence of a long 
and stable relationship between the policy and retail rates.  On the other hand, all the four 
techniques failed to reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration between the lending and 
policy rates in Cameroon. This is consistent with the evidence from Figure 4.1 in Section 
4.2.1. However, three out of the four techniques rejected the null hypothesis of no co-
integration between the policy and deposit rates, indicating a stable long run relationship 
between the policy and the deposit rates.  
TABLE 5.1: SUMMARY OF CO-INTEGRATION FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE FOR 
NIGERIA AND CAMEROON 
  Sample period Co-integration tests   
  From To JJ EG CRDW ECM-base Conclusion 
Nigeria               
Lending Rate 1990M1 2010M12 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit Rate 1990M1 2010M12 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Cameroon               
Lending Rate 1990M1 2008M6 No No No No No 
Deposit Rate 1990M1 2008M6 Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
NB. JJ-Johansen test; EG-Engle-Granger test, CRDW -   Co integration Regression Durbin Watson test and 
ECM-Error Correction Based test. NB Section 4.3.1of Chapter Four describes the above methods in great detail. 
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Analyses of the rolling window for Nigeria revealed the presence of co-integration across all 
the twelve rolling windows for the lending and deposit rates (see Table 5.2). For the lending 
rate, the JJ failed to reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration in seven out of the twelve 
windows and CRDW in five, whereas the EG and ECM-base tests rejected the null 
hypothesis of no co-integration in all twelve windows. Hence, there is strong evidence in 
favour of a long and stable relationship between the lending and policy rates in each rolling 
window.  For the deposit rate, the JJ and CRDW failed to reject the null hypothesis of no co-
integration between the deposit and policy rates in twelve and six windows respectively. 
Again, the EG and ECM-base tests rejected the null hypothesis of no co-integration in all 
twelve windows. As noted in Chapter Four, where the four techniques differ, the ECM-base 
test result overrides the others.  Consequently, the presence of a strong long and stable 
relationship between the deposit and policy rates was confirmed in all twelve rolling 
windows. 
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TABLE 5.2: ROLLING WINDOWS CO-INTEGRATION TEST RESULTS – NIGERIA 
Rolling windows for Nigeria           
  Rolling windows Co integration tests     
Interest rates From To JJ EG CRDW ECM CONCLUSION 
Lending rate 1990 1999 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1991 2000 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1992 2001 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1993 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1994 2003 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1995 2004 Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1996 2005 Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1997 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1998 2007 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1999 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lending rate 2000 2009 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lending rate 2001 2010 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1990 1999 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1991 2000 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1992 2001 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1993 2002 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1994 2003 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1995 2004 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1996 2005 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1997 2006 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1998 2007 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1999 2008 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 2000 2009 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 2001 2010 No Yes No Yes Yes 
 
The co-integration test for rolling windows for Cameroon presents some interesting results. 
Surprisingly, there is co-integration between the lending and policy rates in nine out of the 
ten rolling windows (see Table 5.3 below). The CRDW and JJ test failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of no co-integration in ten and eight out of ten windows respectively, whereas the 
EG and ECM-base tests failed to reject the null hypothesis only in one out of ten windows. In 
all, nine windows detected co-integration between the lending and policy rates.  Conversely, 
the JJ, EG, CRDW and ECM-base tests failed to reject the null hypothesis of no co-
integration between the deposit and policy rates in four, three and two out of the ten rolling 
windows respectively. Hence, eight windows confirmed co-integration between the deposit 
and policy rates. 
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TABLE 5.3: ROLLING WINDOWS CO-INTEGRATION TEST RESULTS – CAMEROON. 
Rolling windows for Cameroon   
  Rolling windows Co integration tests     
Interest rates From To JJ EG CRDW ECM CONCLUSION 
Lending rate 1990 1999 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1991 2000 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1992 2001 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1993 2002 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1994 2003 Yes No No No No 
Lending rate 1995 2004 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1996 2005 Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1997 2006 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1998 2007 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Lending rate 1999 2008 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1990 1999 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1991 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1992 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1993 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1994 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1995 2004 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1996 2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit rate 1997 2006 No Yes No Yes Yes  
Deposit rate 1998 2007 No No No No No 
Deposit rate 1999 2008 No No No No No 
NB: See Section 4.3.1 of Chapter Four for full description and how the decisions on co-
integration are made.  
5.4 ANALYSES OF INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH RESULTS 
This study estimates the parameters of pass-through using a sample of 21 years and 18 years 
for Nigeria and Cameroon respectively. Due to data constraints for the lending rate in 
Cameroon that was available only up to June 2008, the data for the deposit and discount rates 
was reduced to June 2008 to match the period for the lending rate. This means the sample 
period for Cameroon runs from 1990M1 to 2008M06 and from 1990M1 to 2010M12 for 
Nigeria.  This gives twelve rolling windows for Nigeria and ten for Cameroon of ten years 
(120 observations) with the last window for Cameroon having 114 observations. The study 
employed three different types of analyses. First, it estimates interest rate pass-through for the 
entire sample for both countries. Secondly, the parameters of interest rate pass-through were 
estimated using a ten-year rolling window taking into account the possibility of symmetric 
and asymmetric adjustment in both the lending and deposit rates for both countries. Finally, 
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the study changed the policy rates around to investigate the possibility of monetary policy 
shock transmission from Nigeria to Cameroon and vice versa. The next section presents and 
discusses these results. 
5.4.1 ANALYSES OF THE ENTIRE SAMPLE 
5.4.1.1 Short and long run pass-through analyses 
The short run pass-through (immediate pass-through), also known as the impact multipliers, 
measures the immediate reaction of commercial banks to a change in the policy rate of the 
Central Bank. The immediate pass-through conveys important information to monetary 
authorities as it determines how much of the change in policy rate is transmitted by 
commercial banks to the real economy. Therefore, the short run pass-through gives an 
indication of the effectiveness of monetary policy. As stated in Section 4.3.2, a short run 
coefficient of one or close to one means that pass-through is faster or rapid  and hence 
monetary policy is said be effective, and less than one means otherwise. In addition, an 
extreme case may occur when the short run coefficient is more than one. In such a situation, 
we say that the short run pass-through “overshoots”.  
The estimated coefficients for the lending and deposit rates (Table A5 in the appendix) show 
that the immediate pass-through is faster for the lending rate (0.71) than for the deposit rate 
(0.50) for Nigeria. However, despite the higher pass-through for the lending rate, overall 
pass-through is sluggish in the short run. For the long run pass-through, the estimated 
coefficients are almost similar (0.72 and 0.70 for lending and deposit rates respectively). This 
again means long run pass-through is sluggish or incomplete. The error correction 
mechanism (ECTt-1) shows that about 13% of disequilibria in the credit market are corrected 
every month, whereas only 8% of disequilibria in the deposit market are adjusted per month. 
In addition, evidence from Wald test (Table A6 in the appendix) indicates that the pass-
through mechanism for the lending and deposit rates is symmetric for Nigeria. 
With regard to Cameroon, only the short run pass-through was estimated because all the 
techniques failed to detect any long run relationship between the lending and policy rates (see 
Table 5.1). The estimated short run pass-through for the lending rate is quite high (about 
0.70), which is similar to that of Nigeria but is incomplete or rigid (see Table A6 in the 
appendix). The government interference by fixing the lending rate at 15% excluding the risk 
69 
 
premium charged by banks and minimum deposit rate of 4.25% and subsequently reduced to 
3.25% can distort the relationship. Such interventions are forms of financial repression and 
the prevailing lending and deposit rates may not be a true reflection of the market conditions 
(the forces of demand and supply). Secondly, the movement from the fixed peg exchange rate 
with the French Franc to a new fixed peg to the euro currency in January 1999 may have 
caused a break in the data at this period (see Iossifov et al., 2009; Saab and Vacher, 2007; 
Khan, 2010 and Saxegaard, 2006). However, testing for structural breaks in the data is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
Conversely, the short run pass-through for the deposit rate is very rigid at about 0.27 and the 
long run is incomplete at 0.55. This means that commercial banks pass on only 27% of any 
change in the Central Bank policy rate to the deposit rate in the short run and about 55% in 
the long run. The error correction model (ECTt-1) indicates that about 11% of short 
disequilibrium in the deposit market is adjusted per month (Table A5 in the appendix). The 
Wald test for asymmetric adjustment reported in Table A6 in the appendix suggests that the 
pass-through mechanism in the deposit market is asymmetric and adjustment is rigid in a 
downward direction. This corroborates Hannan and Berger’s (1991) customer reaction 
hypothesis. That is, if commercial banks perceive negative reaction to come from depositors 
because of a reduction in the rates paid on deposits, then they will be slow to reduce rates 
paid on deposits in response to an increase in the policy rate. A second objective of the study 
was to investigate the possibility of symmetric and asymmetric adjustment using asymmetric 
error correction framework in a rolling window analyses. The next section presents results of 
these analyses, starting with the short run pass-through of the rolling windows.  
5.4.2 ANALYSES OF ROLLING WINDOWS 
5.4.2.1 Short run pass-through of rolling windows 
This study conducts a rolling window analysis of ten years interval (120 observations) with 
windows running from 1990M1 to 1999M12 for both countries. Results from both countries 
are reported in Tables A7 and A8 in the appendix. Figure 5.1 illustrates graphical plots of the 
estimated immediate pass-through (impact multipliers) for the lending markets in Nigeria and 
Cameroon. The vertical axes of Figures 5.1 and 5.2 represent the short run pass-through 
coefficients of the lending and deposit rates respectively and the horizontal axes represents 
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the rolling windows periods. The short run coefficients are extracted from Tables A7 and A8 
respectively. 
 FIGURE 5.1: SHORT RUN PASS-THROUGH – LENDING RATE 
 
Source: Author’s Estimation  
A positive slope means that the short run pass-through is high and thus monetary policy is 
said to be effective, and vice versa with a declining slope. However, a value greater than one 
means the short run “overshoots”. Figure 5.1 shows that the immediate pass-through in the 
lending market in Nigeria was quite high for four rolling windows (0.87, 0.82, 0.80 and 0.96) 
but subsequently dropped from 0.96 in rolling window  four to 0.13 in rolling window five 
and reached the lowest value of 0.05 in the last rolling window (2001-2010). A likely 
explanation for this low immediate pass-through observed in the lending market in Nigeria 
starting from rolling window five can be attributed to the bank distress and failures that 
started in 1994 to 1998 and up to 2004 which eventually led to the consolidation of banks in 
2004/2005 (Cowryasset, 2009:8). This reduced the number of commercial banks from 89 to 
25 through mergers and acquisitions. The full effect of this reform is captured by rolling 
windows eleven and twelve (2000-2009 and 2001-2010) with short run pass-through of 0.07 
and 0.05 respectively. These results are consistent with Cottarelli and Kourelis’s (1994: 618) 
observation that financial reforms that encourage bank mergers and acquisitions may reduce 
competition and result in low pass-through. Sanusi (2010:13) also documented very low pass-
through elasticities of the lending and deposit rates after post consolidation but noted a 
substantial increase in pass-through of monetary policy to the money market rates post 
consolidation period. However, empirical evidence indicated that the banking sector 
consolidation has rejuvenated the Nigerian banking sector as it attracted over $1 billion in 
71 
 
foreign investment and credit to the private sector rose to about 72% annualised within 
twelve and the first four months in 2007 respectively (Cowryasset, 2009:10). 
Conversely, the short run pass-through for the lending rate in Cameroon is very low: on 
average 0.56 for the first six windows and overshoots in the last four windows (that is, 1996-
2005, 1997-2006,1998-2007 and 1999-2008) to 1.39, 1.92, 2.01 and 2.48 respectively. This 
can be intepreted as an over-reaction by commercial banks in response to a change in the 
policy rate by the Central Bank. The overshooting in Cameroon could be as a result of BEAC 
intervention in the lending market and also due to the underdeveloped nature of the financial 
sector in Cameroon (see Khan, 2010 and Saxegaard, 2006). Comparatively, the short run 
pass-through is higher in Nigeria than in Cameroon from rolling windows one to four and in 
Cameroon, the immediate pass-through is higher than in Nigeria only for rolling windows 
five and six (excluding the overshoot windows). 
As for the short run pass-through of the deposit rate in both countries, a pattern can be 
observed from Figure 5.2. The short run pass-through in Nigeria is higher than in Cameroon 
from rolling window one to four (1990-1999, 1991–2000, 1992-2001 and 1993-2002). On the 
other hand, short run pass-through  in Cameroon exceeds that in Nigeria from the fifth to the 
tenth rolling window. Overall, evidence from the graphical plot suggests that short run pass-
through is rigid in the two markets but trended in the same direction over time. 
FIGURE 5.2 : SHORT RUN PASS-THROUGH – DEPOSIT RATE 
 
Source: Author’s Estimation. 
5.4.2.2 Long run pass-through of rolling windows 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate visual plots of the estimated long run pass-through for the 
lending and deposit rates for Nigeria and Cameroon respectively. The vertical axis now 
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measures the long run pass-through for the lending and deposit rates and the horizontal axis 
represents the rolling window sub-periods. Again the long run coefficients are taken from 
Tables A7 and A8 respectively. It is evident from Figure 5.3 that long run pass-through for 
the lending rate in Nigera is complete in the first three rolling windows (1.01, 0.97, 0.95) and 
near complete in window four (0.94). However, pass-through declined to 0.64 in window five 
and continued untill the last rolling window recording the lowest long run pass-through of 
about 0.52. A closer look at the magnitude of the long run pass-through in the pre-
consolidation (first five rolling windows) and post-consolidation (from sixth to twelfth 
window) era of the Nigerian banking sector revealed that on average, pass-through declined 
from 0.90 before consolidation to about 0.70 after the consolidation. Here, we observed the 
long run effect of the 1994 to 1998 bank distress and failures as well as the banking sector 
consolidation of 2004/2005. This results are consistent with Sanusi (2010) who made a  
similar observation using a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model. 
FIGURE 5.3: LONG RUN PASS-THROUGH – LENDING RATE 
 
Source: Author’s Estimation 
Conversely, long run pass-through for Cameroon has been negative for the first four rolling 
windows (-0.72, -0.73, -0.67 and -0.47). This period corresponds to the early 1990 to 1995 
financial reforms that focused on liquidation, restructuring and privatisation of state-owned 
banks (1995 to 1997) and the third phase initiated in 2004 targeting mostly non-bank 
financial institutions. This period is characterised by bank insolvency and high non-
performing loans. As a result, by the end of 2005, five of Cameroon’s leading commercial 
banks were technically insolvent with more than half of their loans to the private sector 
declared non-performing (IMF, 2007:32). Thus, if non-performing loans can be used as a 
proxy for the degree of risk in the credit market, then large amounts of non-performing loans 
73 
 
will be associated with high risk premiums demanded by commercial banks (Gigineishvili, 
2011:16 and De Bondt 2005:45). This will ultimately be transmitted into high lending rates 
leading to overshoots, as observed in the case of Cameroon. Overall, the long run pass-
through in the lending market in Cameroon is difficult to interpret, suggesting that the 
lending rate is not tracking moments in the Central Bank policy rate (see Figure 4.1 of 
Section 4.2.1), that is, from negative pass-throughs to overshoots except for rolling window 
five (1995-2004). The gap (1994-2003) indicates the window where no co-integration was 
found. Samba and Yan (2010) also found overshoots in the lending rate of about 621% in the 
CEMAC region of which Cameroon is a member. Baugnet et al. (2007:19) also experienced 
difficulties interpreting their results because the long run pass-through for consumer loans in 
Belgium were negative and overshooting, ranging from -0.93 to 1.75. This seems to suggest 
market imperfections, lack of oversight and monitoring of banking sector activities by the 
regulatory authorities and an indication of less effective monetary policy. 
Furthermore, the overshoots of between 2.36 to 3.32 in the lending market in Cameroon is 
evidence of the fact that banks are predominantly the only funding source for SMME and 
corporate enterprises indicating low levels of financial development. This means there is a 
low level of competition in the lending market from non-bank financial intermediaries. 
Consequently, the absence of an alternative source of finance for prospective investors in 
Cameroon may have compelled borrowers to accept a high rate on loans as demonstrated by 
the overshoots in Figure 5.3. 
On the other hand, Nigeria has active capital and money markets where prospective investors 
can access alternative sources of funds. This implies that investors can substitute bank loans 
for other funding sources, therefore the lending market faces tough competition. As 
established in Chapter Three, evidence clearly showed that pass-through in the lending 
market is higher in Nigeria than in Cameroon. This  seems to be evidence of competition 
between banks and non-bank financial intermediaries as well as of high levels of financial 
development compared to Cameroon. It is also worth mentioning that pass-through analyses 
are also sensitive to the type of rate used as policy rate. Consequently, administered rates 
such as a discount rate used in the study may be influenced by political and other 
administrative hurdles when it comes to adjustment. As such, using the discount rate as a 
signal of monetary policy may lead to a more sluggish transmission mechanism than using 
the money market rate (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 194:595). 
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Turning to the long run pass-through (Table A7 in the appendix) of the deposit rate, complete 
pass-through is observed for the first rolling window in Nigeria (1.0) and near complete from 
the second to the fouth rolling window (0.93, 0.96 and 0.94 respectively). Nevertheless, 
subsequent rolling windows had lower pass-through compared to the first four except for 
rolling window eight with a pass-through of 0.96. Meanwhile, the last three rolling windows 
has the lowest pass-through (0.50, 0.37 and 0.53 respectively) compared to the first nine 
rolling windows. Again the negative corresponding effects of 1994 to 1998 as well as 
2004/2005 discussed in Section 5.4.2.1 were felt in the deposit market. Nonetheless, the 
average long run pass-through of about 0.76 signifies the high level of competition existing 
between banks and non-bank financial intermediaries for deposits, giving rise to a high long 
run pass-through as shown in Figure 5.4. 
FIGURE 5.4: LONG RUN PASS-THROUGH – DEPOSIT RATE 
 
Source: Author’s Estimation 
Alternatively, the long run pass-through for the deposit rate is incomplete or sluggish for all 
the rolling windows with an average pass-through of 0.60 for the first five rolling windows in 
Cameroon (Table A8 in the appendix). But pass-through for subsequent rolling windows (six 
to eight) is much lower (0.18, 0.11 and 0.17 respectively) but trends in the same direction as 
the long run pass-through in Nigeria. No co-integration relationship existed in rolling 
windows 1998-2007 and 1999-2008, indicating that there are no long run pass-through 
coefficients for these windows. Similar low and incomplete pass-throughs in deposit rate 
have been documented by Jankee (2005) in Mauritius using asymmetric error correction 
models, Khawaja and Khan (2008) in Pakistan, Acheampong (2005) in Ghana, and Sander 
and Kleimier (2006a) for the SACU countries, with only South Africa having a relatively 
high pass-through because of the high level of financial development. 
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A critical look at Figures 5.3 and 5.4 reveals that there is no relationship between the lending 
market in Nigeria and Cameroon but there seems to be a strong relationship between the 
deposit market in Nigeria and Cameroon. In addition, the empirical evidence ties in with the a 
priori expectation in Chapter Three. Pass-through is relatively higher in Nigeria than in 
Cameroon because of differences in the level of financial system development. 
As stated in Chapter Two, the degree of interest rate pass-through also depends largely on the 
type of exchange rate regime, with a flexible exchange rate predicted to have a higher pass-
through and fixed rates a lower degree of pass-through. The two countries under study 
operate different exchange rate systems and thus provide an opportunity to test the theoretical 
predictions. Gigineishvili (2011:8) analysed pass-through for over 70 countries with flexible 
and fixed exchange rate regimes and concluded that pass-through is higher in the long run but 
not in the short run for countries operating a flexible exchange rate regime. Taking a snapshot 
of the short and long run estimated parameters for Nigeria revealed this to be the case. On 
average, the short run pass-through for the lending and deposit rates is about 0.36 and 0.20 
respectively, whereas the long run on average for the lending and deposit rates is about 0.78 
and 0.76 respectively (Table 7 in the appendix). Consequently, we conclude that the high 
pass-through observed in Nigeria over the period of study compared to Cameroon is also 
because of its flexible exchange rate regime. 
5.4.2.3  Symmetric MAL of rolling windows in the ECM  
The mean adjustment lag (MAL) measures how long it takes the retail rates to adjust fully. 
This is of concern to monetary authorities because it gives an indication of the time lag. 
Hence, a low MAL indicates a quicker adjustment and hence effective monetary policies as 
shocks in the monetary policy are transmitted onto the retail rates within a short time frame. 
Conversely, a high value of MAL signifies a rigid adjustment and means it takes a longer 
period before the effects of monetary shocks impact fully onto retail rates. As a result, the 
specific objective of such a monetary policy may not be realised in time. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 
plots the MAL of the lending and deposit rates in months on the vertical axis and the rolling 
windows sub-periods on the horizontal axis for both countries. The MAL values are extracted 
from Tables A7 and A8 in the appendix. A declining slope indicates a faster adjustment and a 
positive slope implies sluggish adjustment. It is evident from Figure 5.5 that complete 
adjustment occurred within a year in both countries (both graphs oscillating between 0.74 to 
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10.97 months) except for the last rolling window in Cameroon which took about 13.5 months 
to adjust fully. Thus, a comparison of the two countries suggest that on average the mean 
adjustment lag is lower for lending market in Nigeria (about 4.9 months) while it takes on 
average about 7.23 months for the lending rate in Cameroon to adjust fully. 
FIGURE 5.5: MEAN ADJUSTMENT LAG – LENDING RATE 
 
Source: Author’s Estimation 
Figure 5.6 shows that the MAL for the deposit rates in Cameroon is slower than in Nigeria 
(the MAL curve for Cameroon being below that of Nigeria). That is, on average the mean 
adjustment lag is about 7 months in Nigeria and about 4 months in Cameroon. The lower 
mean adjustment lag in Cameroon (values between 2.3 to 7.4 months) suggests that the 
deposit rate adjusts fully and quickly in Cameroon. This could be as result of the recent 
increase in the number of foreign banks (including Nigerian banks) into the banking sector of 
Cameroon,  increasing the level of competition for deposits in the deposit market with the 
possibility of some banks opening foreign savings accounts for their clients to enable them 
earn higher returns on their deposits. 
FIGURE 5.6: MEAN ADJUSTMENT LAG – DEPOSIT RATE 
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Source: Author’s Estimation 
One interesting observation common between Nigeria and Cameroon is that short and long 
run pass-through as well as the mean adjustment lag bears some resemblance in the deposit 
markets of the two countries. Hence, one can argue that there is evidence to suggest that the 
deposit markets in the two countries have some resemblance. 
5.4.2.4  Asymmetric MAL of rolling windows in the ECM 
Unlike the mean adjustment lag, the asymmetric mean adjstment lag seeks to measure the 
speed of adjustment back to equilibrium when the retail rates (lending and deposit) are below 
or above their equilibrium levels. The coefficients of the positive and negative residuals are 
estimated using Equation 4.10 given in Chapter Four. The framework of Scholnick (1996) is 
then applied to test for asymmetry using the Wald test with )1(2 distribution, by imposing a 
restriction that the coefficients of the positive and negative residuals are equal ( 21   ), that 
is, testing the null hypothesis of no asymmetry versus asymmetry. If the P-value of the Wald 
test is significant (small P-value), it indicates that there is evidence of asymmetric adjustment 
and if the P-value is insigificant (large P-value), then we say the adjustment process is 
symmetrical. Full details of positive (ML+) and negative (ML-) residuals for the lending and 
deposit rates for both countries are presented in Tables A9 and A10 in the appendix. 
Figures 5.7, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10 plot the ML+ and ML- coefficients for the lending and deposit 
rates for Nigeria and Cameroon respectively. The vertical axes measures the the speed of 
adjustment back to equilibrium when the lending and deposit rates are below or above their 
mean equilibrium level (ML+ and ML-) and the horizontal axes the rolling windows sub-
periods. The values of ML+ and ML- are obtained from Tables A9 and A10 in the appendix. 
In the case of Nigeria, the empirical evidence from Wald test (Table A9 in the appendix) 
regarding asymmetric and symmetric mechanism is mixed. For instance, in six rolling 
windows out of  twelve, the null hypothesis of no asymmetry could not be rejected and in the 
other six rolling windows, the null hypothesis was rejected. Asymmetric adjustment is found 
in first three rolling windows (1990-1999, 1991-2000 and 1992-2001) and the direction of 
rigidity is downward, coroborating Scholnick’s (1996) collusive pricing hypothesis. That is, 
commercial banks is Nigeria are reluctant to decrease the lending rate for fear of breakdown 
in the collusive arrangement in response to a reduction in the policy rate, therefore banks 
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consider the cost of breakdown before adjusting prices. Furthermore, asymmetric adjustment 
is again confirmed in the last three rolling windows (1999–2008, 2000-2009 and 2001-2010) 
and the adjustment rigidity is now upward supporting Scholnick’s (1996) customer reaction 
hypothesis. This implies that commercial banks are slow to increase the lending rate in 
response to an increase in the policy rate for fear of negative customer reaction such as 
default on loan repayments. In such a circumstance, banks provide implicit insurance to its 
customers against a credit shock by absorbing part of the monetary policy shocks in an effort 
to smooth out interest rate payments on loans. This situation is common in retail banking to 
build and maintain long term relationships with long term customers receiving  low rates on 
loans through an implicit “risk sharing” agreement (Fried and Howitt, 1980; Lowe and 
Rohling, 1992) as discussed in Section 2.3.1.3 of Chapter Two. The spike in rolling window 
ten (1999-2008) means that the lending rate will decline faster when above its equilibrium in 
response to a cut in the policy rate (upward rigidity). 
With regard to Cameroon, out of the ten rolling windows, co-integration was established in 
nine (see Table 5.3) and empirical evidence from the Wald test (Table A10 in the appendix) 
indicated that the null hypothesis of no asymmetry could not be rejected in all the nine 
windows. Thus, the pass-through of lending rate is Cameroon is symmetrical. 
FIGURE 5.7: ASYMMETRIC ADJUSTMENT OF ROLLING WINDOWS – LENDING RATE 
IN NIGERIA 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
The break between 1993-2002 and 1995-2004 in Figure 5.8 represents the rolling window 
where no co-integration was established and in such a situation no ML+ and ML- can be 
estimated. 
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FIGURE 5.8: ASYMMETRIC ADJUSTMENT OF ROLLING WINDOWS – LENDING RATE 
IN CAMEROON 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 plot the positive and negative residuals of deposit rates in Nigeria and 
Cameroon. Unlike the lending rate, the empirical evidence regarding symmetric and 
asymmetric adjustment in the deposit markets is clear cut. In the case of Nigeria, the 
empirical evidence from the Wald test (Table A9 in the appendix) revealed that the null 
hypothesis of no asymmetry could not be rejected in ten out of the twelve windows, that is, 
the pass-through mechanism in the deposit market in Nigeria is symmetric. 
FIGURE 5.9: ASYMMETRIC ADJUSTMENT OF ROLLING WINDOWS – DEPOSIT RATE 
IN NIGERIA 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
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FIGURE 5.10: ASYMMETRIC ADJUSTMENT OF ROLLING WINDOWS – DEPOSIT RATE 
IN CAMEROON 
 
Source: Author’s estimation 
In the case of Cameroon, seven out of the ten rolling windows indicated the presence of co-
integration (Table 5.3). However, analyses showed that the co-integration relationship 
established in rolling window eight (1997-2006) is weak because the error correction term is 
not statistically significant even at 10% level. Meanwhile, for 1998-2007 and 1999-2008 
rolling windows, no co-integration existed at all between the policy and deposit rates. Thus, 
out of the seven windows that detected co-integration, six out of the seven rejected the null 
hypothesis of no asymmetry (Table A10 in the appendix), thereby confirming evidence of 
asymmetric pass-through in the deposit market in Cameroon. The direction of adjustments 
rigidity is stronger downward, corroborating Hannan and Berger’s (1991) customer reaction 
hypothesis, that is, if commercial banks perceive negative reaction to come from customers 
because of a reduction in the rates paid on deposits, then they will be slow to reduce rates 
paid on deposits in response to an increase in the policy rate. Scholnick (1996) also found 
asymmetric pass-through for the deposit markets in Singapore and Malaysia. 
5.5 TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICY IMPULSES 
To investigate whether there are impulse transmissions between the two countries, the policy 
rates were interchanged and the lending and deposit rates equations were estimated. With the 
increasing internationalisation of banks and integration of global financial markets, 
knowledge of cross-border transmission of monetary shocks across the two countries can 
assist bankers on portfolio diversification. The next section presents the results of these 
analyses. 
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5.5.1 Monetary policy impulses from Cameroon 
To investigate whether there is pass-through of monetary policy impulses from Cameroon to 
Nigeria, the study used the policy rate of Cameroon as the independent variable in the lending 
and deposit rates equations. Results are reported in Table A11 in the appendix. Testing for 
co-integration between the lending rate in Nigeria and Cameroon policy rate using the four 
techniques discussed earlier confirmed the presence of a long run relationship. Only the Co-
integration Durbin Watson test failed to reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration but the 
other techniques rejected the null hypothesis (see Table A11 in the appendix). The estimated 
short run pass-through is negative and overshoots (-1.38) whereas the long run pass-through 
is complete (0.98). This seems to suggest strong interdependence of monetary policy between 
the two countries. However, estimates from the error correction model (ECTt-1) showed that 
such a relationship is weak as the t-statistics of the error correction model are statistically 
insignificant. Thus, for a stable long run relationship to exist the error correction term must 
be statistically significant (negative coefficient and significant t-statistics). 
For the deposit rate equation, only the Error Correction-base model rejected the null 
hypothesis of no co-integration between the deposit rate in Nigeria and the policy rate in 
Cameroon. The remaining three failed to reject the null hypothesis. However, as stated in 
Section 4.3.1, we accept the presence of co-integration between the interest rate series. Again 
the short run pass-through is negative and overshoots (-1.06) whereas the long run pass-
through is full (1.02), suggesting the presence of impulse transmission from Cameroon to 
Nigeria. Nevertheless, such a relationship of impulse transmission is again weak because the 
error correction term is statistically insignificant. Hence, in both the lending and deposit rates 
equations the empirical evidence is weak concerning the possibility of impulse transmission 
from Cameroon to Nigeria. 
5.5.2 Monetary policy impulses from Nigeria 
In order to investigate whether there is pass-through of monetary policy shocks from Nigeria 
to Cameroon, we repeat the above process but now use the policy rate in Nigeria as the 
independent variable in the lending as well as in the deposit rates equations (see Table A11 in 
the appendix). The Johansen, Co-integration Durbin Watson and Error Correction-base tests 
all failed to reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration between the Nigerian policy rate 
and the lending rate in Cameroon. Only the Eagle-Granger test rejected the null hypothesis. 
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Thus, we rule in favour of the Error Correction-base test that there is no co-integration 
between the policy rate in Nigeria and the lending rate in Cameroon. 
However, analysis of the deposit rate equation seems to indicate the presence of a 
relationship. The co-integration test results from Johansen, the Eagle-Granger and Error 
Correction-base all rejected the null hypothesis of no co-integration and only the Co-
integration Durbin Watson failed to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, we conclude that there is 
a co-integration relationship between the Nigerian policy rate and the deposit rate of 
Cameroon. The estimated short run pass-through is very low (-0.5) and the long run pass-
through is also low (0.16). Contrary to the weak relationship found earlier, the policy rate of 
Nigeria seems to have some influence on the deposit rate of Cameroon. The coefficient of the 
error term (ECTt-1) is statistically significant at 1% level (see Table A11 in the appendix), 
suggesting a stable long run relationship. That is, about 3% of disequilibrium in the short run 
is reversed every month, implying that if there is a change in monetary policy in Nigeria, 
about 3% of the shock will be transmitted to the deposit market in Cameroon. These results 
are consistent with the earlier relationship established between the short and long run pass-
through, the mean adjustment lag and the asymmetric mean adjustment lag. Hence, the 
empirical evidence seems to suggest that monetary policy impulses from Nigeria are passed-
through only to the deposit market in Cameroon. 
5.6 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
The comparative analysis of pass-through between Nigeria and Cameroon revealed that there 
are great differences in the loan markets of the two countries but the deposit markets showed 
some degree of association. The pass-through estimated for the entire period for the deposit 
rates for both countries is incomplete in the short and long run. The short and long run pass-
through for Cameroon is very rigid (0.27 and 0.55 respectively) whereas the pass-through for 
the short and long run in Nigeria is a little higher but still rigid (0.50 and 0.70 respectively). 
Conversely, the short and long run pass-through for the lending rate in Nigeria is incomplete 
(0.71 and 0.72 respectively). No comparison between the lending rates of the two countries 
was made because the lending and policy rates in Cameroon were not co-integrated. 
The empirical evidence from the rolling windows analysis indicated that the long run pass-
through in the lending and deposit markets in Nigeria on average are similar, 0.78 and 0.76 
respectively. The long run pass-through is complete for the lending rate in the first rolling 
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window (1.01) and near complete (0.97, 0.95 and 0.94) in the second, third and fourth 
windows. Meanwhile, the short run pass-throughs are rigid and incomplete (0.36 and 0.22 on 
average for the lending and deposit rates). No meaningful analysis is possible with the 
lending rate in Cameroon as pass-through is characterised by overshooting except of rolling 
window six (1995-2004) with a long run pass-through of 0.95. Nevertheless, overshooting in 
the loan market signifies a situation where banks charged a high-risk premium to cover the 
cost of non-performing. Conversely, long run pass-through for the deposit rate is rigid and 
incomplete (0.43 on average) and the short run is much lower 0.21. Again, the long run pass-
through for the deposit rate in Nigeria on average is higher (0.76) compared to 0.43 on 
average in Cameroon but the short run pass-throughs in the two markets are almost the same 
(0.22 and 0.21 on average for Nigeria and Cameroon respectively). 
Overall, evidence from the entire sample and rolling window analysis suggests that monetary 
policy in Cameroon and CEMAC region as a whole is ineffective. This is perhaps one of the 
reasons why BEAC is unable to sterilise the excess liquidity in the region. Alternatively, the 
long run pass-through of 0.72 and 0.71 for the lending and deposit rates for the entire sample, 
as well as an average of 0.78 and 0.76 for the rolling window, suggests that monetary policy 
is highly effective in Nigeria compared to Cameroon. 
The mean adjustment lag (MAL) is shorter on average (about 4.9 months) in the lending 
market in Nigeria compared to about 7.23 months in Cameroon. In Cameroon, MAL is 
shorter for the deposit rate (about 3.7 months) compared to about 8.3 months in Nigeria on 
average.  The empirical evidence regarding symmetric and asymmetric pass-through in the 
lending market is mixed in Nigeria. That is, six rolling windows confirmed evidence of 
asymmetric adjustment, with three windows (1990-1999, 1991-2000 and 1992-2001) 
indicating downward rigidity in the lending rate hence, supporting Scholnick’s (1996) 
collusive pricing arrangement hypothesis. This seems to suggest some evidence of 
oligopolistic behaviour in the Nigerian banking industry. The other three windows (1999-
2008, 2000-2009 and 2001-2010) suggested that the lending rate is rigid upward, 
corroborating Scholnick’s (1996) customer reaction hypothesis and suggesting evidence of 
competition. On the other hand, the pass-through mechanism in the lending market in 
Cameroon is symmetrical. 
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With regard to the deposit rate in Nigeria, evidence indicates that the deposit rate adjusts 
symmetrically to increases or decreases in the policy interest rate of the Central Bank. On the 
other hand, evidence from the Wald test confirmed asymmetric adjustment in the deposit rate 
in Cameroon. The adjustment rigidity is in the downward direction, which corroborates 
Hannan and Berger’s (1991) customer reaction hypothesis. 
Evidence from the interchange of the policy rate however indicated that the policy rate in 
Nigeria exerts some small influence on the deposit market in Cameroon and no influence 
from the policy rate of Cameroon on the deposit market in Nigeria. This could possibly be 
because of Nigerian banks gaining entrance into the banking sector of Cameroon in recent 
years. The lending markets of the two countries are independent of each other as evidence 
revealed no impulse transmission between the two countries. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 SUMMARY FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
The centrepiece of this study is to give a comparative analysis of interest rate pass-through 
between Cameroon and Nigeria: a study that digs deep into how the monetary policy actions 
of the Central Bank are transmitted to the real sector. Monetary authorities can only judge the 
impact of their actions if they have a good knowledge of the various ways through which the 
monetary policy shocks are transmitted to the real sector. In addition, since banks are 
conveyers of the monetary policy shocks through their intermediation and other related 
functions, information about the forces that drive bank’s behaviour and market reaction to 
changes in the Central Bank actions is crucial to strengthen monetary policy effectiveness. 
Accordingly, the study briefly discussed the various channels of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism, and reviewed four theories of interest rate rigidities as well as other 
factors affecting commercial banks interest rate stickiness. 
A broad survey of literature from the European Union, USA, emerging markets, Asian 
countries and Sub-Saharan Africa revealed that pass-through differs greatly across countries 
and markets regardless of the econometric technique used in the estimation process. These 
marked differences in pass-through have recently attracted considerable research attention, 
especially in the Euro zone Area, and this focus is gradually spreading out to other regions 
such as the African continent though such studies are still scant. Amongst the factors 
identified in the surveyed literature, the structure and the level of development of the 
financial markets stand out as major causes of the observed differences in the pass-through 
across countries and markets. Thus, countries with developed financial markets such as 
capital and money markets tend to have a high pass-through while countries with 
underdeveloped financial markets exhibit low pass-through. Furthermore, the factors that 
affect the degree of pass-through are not static but vary overtime and tend to disappear with 
the development of the financial system. Pass-through analysis is sensitive to the choice of 
interest rate used as the policy rate. 
Trend analysis of the financial sector indicators of Cameroon and Nigeria indicates a high 
level of financial sector development in Nigeria in terms of the size, depth, competition and 
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efficiency compared to Cameroon. In addition, commercial banks dominate the financial 
sector of the two countries, with Cameroon’s financial market dominated by foreign banks. 
Results from the whole sample revealed that the short and long run pass-through are 
incomplete in Nigeria for both the lending and deposit rates. The short and long run pass-
through in the lending market are similar (0.71 and 0.72 respectively) whereas the short run is 
lower (0.50) than the long run (0.70) in the deposit market. The lending and policy rates in 
Cameroon failed to co-integrate, hence only the short run was estimated and it appears to be 
slightly high (about 0.70) but is incomplete. The short and long run pass-through in the 
deposit market is low and incomplete (0.27 and 0.55 respectively). The lack of co-integration 
between the lending and policy rates could be as a result of the government’s repressive 
policies through fixing maximum lending  and minimum deposit rates which may not be in 
line with market determined rates. The test for asymmetric adjustment revealed that 
adjustments in the lending and deposit markets in Nigeria are symmetric, suggesting some 
degree of efficiency and a well-functioning monetary policy, although pass-through in the 
two markets is incomplete. Conversely, pass-through of monetary policy in Cameroon is 
asymmetric in the deposit market signifying market imperfections, inefficiencies and a less 
effective monetary policy. 
The empirical evidence from the rolling window analysis of Nigeria and Cameroon indicates 
that the lending markets differ markedly whereas the deposit markets bear some resemblance. 
The long run pass-through for lending rate is complete for the first and second rolling 
windows (1.01 and 0.97) and near complete for rolling windows three and four (0.95 and 
0.94). This certainly reflects the impact of the various reforms undertaken in the late 1980s 
and 1990s, such as the establishment of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1988 to 
protect the banking sector against bank runs and to install public trust in the Nigerian banking 
system. The passing of the Central Bank Act of 1991 empowered the Central Bank to design 
and implement monetary and financial policies. The introduction of prudential guidelines in 
1990 aimed at ensuring a sound banking system, deregulation of the interest rates in 1992 and 
the introduction of universal banking in 2001 helped to level the playing ground for retail and 
wholesale banks to interact (Iganiga, 2010:68-69). The deposit market experienced the same 
positive impact and the long run pass-through was also complete for the first window (1.00) 
and near complete in the second to fourth rolling windows (0.93, 0.96 and 0.94). 
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However, the long run pass-through for the lending and deposit rates dropped suddenly from 
0.94 to 0.64 and 0.71 in rolling window five for the lending and deposit rates respectively and 
since has not reached the level of the first four windows in both markets. The period from 
1994-1998 and through to 2006 was characterised  by major events such as the bank failures 
of 1994-1998 which eventually led to the 2004/2005 banking sector consolidation as well as 
the introduction of the monetary policy rate in 2006. Available evidence showed that the 
banking sector consolidation of 2004/2005 is highly associated with a decline in pass-through 
in both the lending and deposit rates. The full effect of this reform is captured by rolling 
windows eleven and twelve corresponding to the long run pass-through of 0.61 and 0.52 for 
lending rate and 0.37 and 0.53 for the deposit rate. The short run pass-through for these 
periods in both markets is equally very low, less than 0.10. In summary, the long run pass-
through for the lending and deposit rates ranged from 1.01 to 0.52 and 1.00 to 0.53 
respectively. Sanusi (2010) also found a very low pass-through of the monetary policy rate to 
retail lending and deposit rates but a high pass-through of the monetary policy to money 
market rates post consolidation. The evidence corroborates Cottarelli and Kourelis’s (1994) 
observation that policies that reduce the size of the banking sector through mergers and 
acquisitions may impede pass-through. 
With regard to long run pass-through for the lending rate in Cameroon for the various rolling 
windows, estimates are difficult to interpret (from low of -0.72 to overshoots of 3.32) 
whereas the short run pass-through is incomplete and ranged from 0.47 to 0.65 for the first 
six windows. Thereafter, the short run pass-through subsequently overshoots from 1.92 to 
2.48 in rolling windows seven to ten. The periods of low long run pass-through correspond to 
the first and second phases of the financial reforms (first four windows) dominated by poor 
credit quality of commercial banks to the private sector and the 50% devaluation of the CFA 
franc against the French franc in 1994. Finally, the 2004 non-bank financial reforms saw long 
run pass-through improve to 0.95 but after this period, pass-through overshoots suggesting 
inefficiencies and market imperfections in the credit market. The short and long run pass-
through in the deposit market is very low and incomplete ranging from 0.4 to 0.35 and 0.11 to 
0.65 respectively. Generally, the empirical evidence suggest that the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes implemented so far are yet to reposition the financial sector to perform its 
function of intermediation and risk transformation effectively. 
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Overall, evidence showed that pass-through is higher in Nigeria in both markets than in 
Cameroon. This may be as a result of a high degree of competition between banks and non-
bank financial intermediaries and the adoption of a flexible exchange rate system as opposed 
to the fixed exchange rate and a low level of competition in Cameroon banking sector. 
The mean adjustment lag (MAL) showed that it takes on average about 4.9 months for 
lending rates to adjust fully in Nigeria and about 7.23 months in Cameroon. However, the 
mean adjustment lag is shorter for the deposit rate in Cameroon (about 3.7 months) compared 
to 8.3 months in Nigeria on average. The empirical evidence from the Wald test for 
asymmetric adjustment in the lending rate is mixed. Asymmetric adjustment is confirmed in 
six rolling windows, with three windows (1990-1999, 1991-2000 and 1992-2001) indicating 
a downward rigidity, supporting Scholnick’s (1996) collusive pricing arrangement between 
banks. The other three windows (1999-2008, 2000-2009 and 2001-2010) indicated that the 
lending rate is rigid in the upward direction, corroborating Scholnick’s (1996) customer 
reaction hypothesis. On the other hand, tests of asymmetric adjustment for the lending rate in 
Cameroon suggest that the lending rate adjustment is symmetric. This seems to be conflicting 
given the no co-integration of the lending and policy rates for the entire sample and the low 
pass-through and overshooting observed in the rolling window analysis. 
However, evidence from the Wald test confirmed that the deposit rate adjustment in Nigeria 
is symmetric. This is consistent with the evidence from the entire sample. Meanwhile, in 
Cameroon, asymmetric adjustment is confirmed in the deposit rate and the direction of 
adjustment rigidity is downward, supporting Hannan and Berger’s (1991) customer reaction 
hypothesis. This also is consistent with the asymmetric test result for the entire sample. 
Finally, analysis of the impulse transmission indicated that the policy rate in Nigeria exerts 
some small influence on the deposit market in Cameroon and no influence from the policy 
rate of Cameroon on the deposit market in Nigeria. The small influence could possibly be 
because of Nigerian banks gaining entrance into the banking sector of Cameroon in recent 
years. 
6.2 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
The overall assessment of the degree of pass-through between Nigeria and Cameroon shows 
a lower pass-through in Cameroon than in Nigeria in the lending and deposit markets. In 
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addition, evidence suggests that the Structural Adjustment Programme implemented by the 
Cameroonian authorities is yet to reposition commercial banks to effectively perform their 
intermediation role and to promote growth in country. Thus, to ensure that commercial banks 
play a crucial role in intermediation and thus boosting economic growth, the Cameroon 
government needs to tackle the following. 
Firstly, the government should completely free the credit and deposit markets. Although the 
loan market was liberalised in June 2008, the minimum constraint on deposits is still 
applicable. The low rate paid on deposits may act as a disincentive for people to save and 
could lead to money being transferred from the formal to informal financial sectors such as 
credit unions and solidarity saving groups. This can make it difficult for the Central Bank to 
determine exactly the amount of money in circulation as most of the money hardly enters the 
formal financial sectors. 
Furthermore, the governments and the monetary authorities should encourage the use of 
technology in the banking sector such as internet and cell phone banking and Automated 
Teller machines (ATM), which are almost, absent amongst some commercial banks in 
Cameroon, as well as increase the range of financial products offered to customers. The 
increased use of technology increases the scope of the financial sector development which 
has a positive impact on the pass-through of the monetary policy. 
Secondly, the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon in partnership with their respective 
Central Banks should create a financial database for consumer credit to facilitate the task of 
commercial banks to access the creditworthiness of potential borrowers. This will reduce the 
amount of non-performing loans as well as improving the credit quality of banks, which in 
turn increases banks’ role of financial intermediation. The increase in the number of non-
performing loans increases the risk premium, making credit expensive, and as a result banks 
will end up with excess reserves which impact negatively on pass-through. 
Thirdly, the Cameroon government in partnership with the Central Bank should intensify the 
effort to activate the Douala Stock Exchange and speed up the development of money and 
bond markets. The development of these markets will provide alternative sources of funding 
to investors as well as investing to depositors, thereby increasing the level of competition 
between banks and non-banks. Subsequently, the increase in competition will ensure that the 
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lending and deposit rates track movements in the discount rate of the Central Bank, 
increasing monetary policy transmission and hence increase pass-through. 
In addition, through the money market, the Central Bank can make the discount rate effective 
by creating artificial liquidity shortages in the money market thereby making commercial 
banks indebted to the Central Bank on a daily basis. That is, banks with surplus funds at the 
end of the trading day will lend to banks in red at the interbank rate to help deficit banks to 
comply with their reserve requirements at the Central Bank. This will effectively mop up 
excess liquidity within the banking sector. Furthermore, the Cameroon government should 
start to issue securities and the Central Bank should create a market in securities by issuing 
securities for its own portfolio to manage the excess liquidity of the government and banking 
sector. 
Finally, as noted by Sanusi (2010) and confirmed by the present study, the pass-through of 
monetary policy after the Nigerian banking sector consolidation has actually declined due to 
inefficiencies in the retail markets. As a remedy, the Central Bank of Nigeria should intensify 
its effort to boost competition within the retail sector of the market in order to dismantle the 
oligopolistic tendencies developing in the banking industry as well as enhancing monetary 
policy effectiveness. It is important to note that the above recommendations are focused only 
on the financial sectors as identified by the study. Attention should be given to 
macroeconomic variables as well as the legal structure to ensure a proper functioning of the 
financial sector. 
6.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
As stated in Chapter Two, pass-through is also affected by a host of factors and the study did 
not model all these factors. Thus, a potential area of research is to model the effect of credit 
quality, bank concentration, openness and development of the financial sector, excess 
liquidity and exchange rate regimes on the pass-through of monetary policy. 
Secondly, the study also noted that pass-through analysis is sensitive to the choice of rate 
used as the policy rate and a discount rate adjustment may be subject to political 
considerations when it comes to adjustment. Thus, future studies can explore this further by 
using more retail rates such as various rates on lending and deposits as well as using more 
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wholesale rates such as money market and discount rates in a comparative analysis 
framework. 
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Appendix. 
Table A1: Summary of empirical interest rate pass-through studies 
Study Countries Year Variables Used Estimation 
Method(s) 
Pass-through Speed of 
Adjustment 
Asymmetric Adjustment Remark(s) 
Policy Rate Market 
Interest 
Rates 
Short-run 
(Immediate) 
Long-run Present Increase 
Decrease 
 
Liu  et al. 
(2008) 
New Zealand 1994M8-
2004M12 
Official 
cash rate 
(OCR). 
Overnight 
interbank 
rate 
Lending,  
and deposit 
rates 
Philips-
Lorentan and 
SECM 
(structural 
error 
correction), 
ARDL 
Incomplete. 
0.2, 0.24, 
0.44 for 
floating, 
base 
lending and 
time 
deposit 
respectively 
Almost complete. 
0.81 for 2 years 
bond to the 2-year 
fixed mortgage; 5-
year bond and 5-
year fixed 
mortgages (0.91) 
Faster for 
floating rate 
about 0.55 
Yes  Overall retail rates 
adjust asymmetrically 
Long-term PT of retail 
rates varies across financial 
products. Short-term rates 
show higher degree of PT 
and faster adjustment 
speed than long-term rates. 
Increased transparency has 
lowered market volatility 
and hence enhance MP 
effectiveness. 
Liu et al., 
(2011) 
New Zealand 1989M1-
2009M5 
Official 
cash rate 
(OCR), 
overnight 
interbank 
rate 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
Engle-
Granger 
ECM 
Higher for 
mortgage 
than for 
base 
business 
lending  
Average higher 
for mortgages 
(1.2) than base 
lending rates (1.0) 
MAL for 
mortgage is 
1.7months and 
3.3 months for 
base lending 
rates 
Yes for 
mortgage 
but not 
for 
business 
lending 
Faster when mortgage 
rates are below 
equilibrium 
Adjustment of business 
lending rates in response to 
cost of funds is slower than 
that of floating mortgages 
in both short and long run. 
Aziakpono 
and Wilson 
(2010) 
South Africa 
(SA) 
1980-
2007 
Bank rate Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
ECM and 
asymmetric 
ECM 
Incomplete 
and varies 
across the 
market 
interest 
rates 
LR 0.59-0.86; 
rates. T-bill 
(0.65),  MMR 
(0.68) and gov’t 
bond rate declined 
from 0.41-0.04 
Varies overtime 
and the lending 
rates has the 
highest speed 
Yes Banks are more rigid 
to adjust lending rate 
upwards but fast to 
adjust deposit rates 
downwards. 
Evidence suggests that 
monetary policy is more 
effective in an era of  
liberal financial policy 
compared to less liberal era 
as indicated by high PT 
Aziakpono
et 
al. (2007) 
South Africa 1973M1-
2004M8 
Discount or 
repo rate 
Lending 
rates and 
NCD 
EG 
cointegration
,ECM, and 
Asymmetric 
error 
correction 
model  
Lending 
rates (0.28-
1.1) and 
deposit 
rates (0.76-
1.1) 
Complete. 
Lending rates 
(0.90-1.2); deposit 
rates (0.85-1.1) 
MAL for 
lending rates 
(0.25-2.2) and 
deposits (0.01-
1.7) months 
Weak 
evidence  
Evidence supports 
faster downward 
adjustment when 
market rates are above 
equilibrium than 
upward adjustment 
when they are below.  
PT is faster during era of 
more market oriented 
monetary policy regimes, 
suggesting that market 
oriented regime will be 
more effective than less 
market oriented policies. 
Sander and 
Kleimeier 
(2006a) 
SACU 
[CMA(SA, 
Lesotho, 
Namibia, 
Swaziland), 
Botswana] 
1991M1- 
2005M5 
T-Bill and 
discount 
rates 
Prime 
lending and 
deposit 
rates 
(TAR), (M-
TAR) models 
SR 
stickiness 
for deposit 
rates 
Complete PT for 
SA loan rates. 
Namibia has the 
lowest  PT for 
deposits 0.58; 
0.49 national and 
SA t-bill 
respectively 
Deposit rates 
take about 3 
months to adjust 
to long run 
equilibrium 
Yes Deposit rates adjust in 
the downward 
direction faster than 
upward. An indication 
of imperfect 
competition. 
CMA Banking markets 
show some degree of 
integration with the SA t-
bill rates playing an 
important role to drive the 
national policy and market 
and bank interest rates. 
IRPT in CMA is rather 
homogenous for the 
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lending rate but not perfect 
and less homogenous for 
deposit rate. 
Karagiannis 
et al. (2011) 
Southern-
eastern 
Europe (SEE) 
1999-
2007 
Central 
Bank and 
money 
market rates 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
GET and 
ECM 
Not 
reported 
Not reported Symmetric for 
Greece  
Mixed Asymmetry present in 
Bulgaria and Slovenia 
whereas Greece 
supports symmetry 
Evidence is mixed with 
regards symmetry 
hypothesis and monetary 
policy transmission. 
Karagiannis 
et al. (2010) 
Europe and 
USA 
1994-
2007 for 
USA, and 
1998- 
2003-EU  
Discount   
rate, federal 
fund rate, 
Central 
Bank rate 
and MMR 
Deposit and 
lending 
rates 
Disaggregate
d GETS 
Incomplete EU complete 
(0.97) and 
incomplete for US 
(0.67). 
The speed of 
adjustment 
depend on the 
type of rates 
used as the 
policy rate 
Mixed  Asymmetry found for 
loan rates in the Euro 
Area 
Empirical evidence for the 
two banking systems is 
mixed in relation to PT and 
completeness.  
Egert et al. 
(2007) 
 
5-Central and 
Eastern 
European and 
3 Euro Area 
Countries  
1994M1 
to 
2005M12 
Individual 
country’s 
policy rate 
Deposit and 
lending 
rates 
Dynamic 
OLS, ARDL, 
EG, VAR 
Incomplete Complete for 
lending  (1.05) 
and deposit rates 
(1.01) in Czech 
only 
PT is low 
overnight 
deposits (0.73) 
Yes Asymmetry found 
between retail and 
market rates 
depending on the 
direction of policy. 
PT in CEE-5on average is 
similar and are more 
comparable with those in 
Spain and is higher than in 
the core EU countries.  
Wang et al. 
(2009) 
US and Asia 1994-
2004 
Money 
market rates 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
TAR, 
MTAR, EC-
EGARCH(1,
1)-M 
 US deposit 
markets (0.99); 
lending (0.86). 
High only for 
US deposit 
markets 
Yes Asian 
countries 
lending 
and 
deposit 
rates 
Lending rates adjust 
faster when the policy 
rate is rising. Deposits 
are rigid in the 
upward direction. 
PT is complete only for US 
deposit markets. All other 
markets have incomplete 
PT (0.10-0.86) deposits 
and (0.23-0.63) for lending 
rates. 
Kwapil and 
Scharler 
(2010) 
USA and EU 
Area 
1995-
2003 
Money 
market rates 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
EG and 
ARDL 
Incomplete US: DR (0.74-
1.01); LR (0.57-
0.73). EU: DR 
(0.32-0.58) and 
LR  (0.48-0.73) 
Sluggish 
adjustment for 
the Euro Area 
in the deposit 
markets 
No  Evidence of 
symmetric adjustment 
on USA and in the 
Euro Area. 
US deposit markets is 
more efficient than the 
Euro Area. The lending 
rates in the two markets 
seem to adjust almost the 
same. 
Moazzami US and 
Canada 
1969-
1995 
Money 
market rates 
and 
Treasury 
Bill rates 
Lending 
rates 
Error 
Correction 
Model 
(ECM) 
Canada 
0.66 and 
USA 0.34 
Complete for 
USA 
Speed and 
magnitude of 
adjustment 
depend on the 
type of retail  
rate used as the 
policy rate  
 
NA NA 
 
LR multipliers are equal to 
unity for US irrespective of 
the type of money market 
rates used. For Canada, LR 
multipliers are unity when 
policy rate is the T-B and 
less than unity when 
overnight is used. 
Hofmann 
and Mizen 
(2004) 
UK 1985M-
2001 
Base rates 13 deposits 
and 
mortgages 
rates 
Nonlinear 
least squares 
(NLLS) 
Incomplete Complete LRPT 
for deposit and 
incomplete for 
mortgage rates 
Between 5-9% 
of 
disequilibrium 
is corrected per 
month for 
deposits and 15 
-28% 
disequilibrium 
is corrected for 
NA NA 
 
The speed of adjustment of 
retail rates to base rates is 
faster when the gap 
between the two widens 
and adjustment is slow 
when the base rate is 
moving in the direction to 
close the gap. The main 
driver of PT are expected 
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mortgage per 
month 
change when the gap 
between the base and retail 
rates is growing in absolute 
size. 
Mojon 
(2000) 
Six EU 
countries 
1979-
1999 
Money 
market rate 
17 deposit 
and 15 
credit rates 
ECM and 
cointegration 
Complete 
for credit 
(0.73-0.97) 
than 
mortgage 
(0.27-39) 
LR (0.53-0.68) for 
credit. Deposits 
(0.18-0.43). 
saving/sight 
deposit (00-0.28) 
Faster for credit 
than for deposit 
rates 
Observed 
within 
each 
market 
segment 
NA 
 
PT varies across countries 
and across market. High 
competition from other 
sources of finance increase 
PT. High volatility of 
MMR reduces PT. 
Toolsma et 
al. (2002) 
EU 1980M1-
2000M1 
Policy rate 
of each 
country, 
interbank 
rates 
Lending 
rate 
Fully 
modified 
OLS and 
rolling 
windows 
ECM 
Not 
reported 
Complete in most 
countries and 
varies from 0.90-
1.03 
Has become 
relative stable 
overtime in 
most countries 
except the 
Netherlands 
NA NA 
 
Major differences exist in 
PT amongst countries, 
evidence of weak 
convergence of monetary 
policy transmission. 
Sander and 
Kleimeier 
(2004) 
EU 1993M1-
2003M10 
 Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
Unifying 
VAR and 
cointegration 
Incomplete 
for both 
methods 
0.69-0.73 (cost of 
fund), 0.6-7 
(monetary 
approach). 
incomplete 
Faster for 
mortgages, 
consumer loans, 
short loans to 
enterprises 
 Present 
in deposit 
rates  
Mortgage adjust 
symmetrical  
Faster downwards for 
time deposit 
SRPT has become 
homogenous across EU 
(integration). EU has 
undergone structural 
changes but does not 
coincide with single 
currency in EU. 
Sander and 
Kleimeier 
(2002) 
EU 1985M1-
1998M12 
Money 
market rate 
Lending 
rates 
ECM, TAR, 
Band-TAR, 
M-TAR 
Incomplete  
(0.7) 
LR is complete 
and ranged from 
0.866-1.179 but 
not for all 
countries 
Varies across 
countries 
Yes NA Speed of adjustment varies 
across countries and the 
nature is heterogeneous, 
differences in PT can be 
explained by differences in 
financial structures.   
Sander and 
Kleimier 
(2006b) 
 EU and 
CEECs 
1993M1-
2003M12
-CEECs 
and 
1996M1-
2003M6-
Euro 
zone 
One-month 
money 
market rate 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
Unifying 
VAR and 
ECM 
Higher for 
corporate 
loan 
markets 
Complete for 
CEECs, 0.91 for 
short term 
corporate loan, 
1.07 for long term 
corporate loans 
Homogenous 
PT in CEECs. 
PT in CEECs 
on average is 
faster (0.91; 
1.07) SR and 
LR corporate 
loan than in EU 
(0.6;0.69) for 
SR and LR  
No  NA 
 
Little evidence of 
convergence either towards 
an aggregate EU zone PT 
or towards a role model. 
Still early to talk about 
convergence. SR multiplier 
has fallen while LR 
multiplier has increased. 
Marotta 
(2009) 
EU 1993M1-
2003M9 
Interbank 
rate 
Lending 
rate 
ARDL and 
ECM 
NA Decline from 0.9 
to 0.7 except for 
France. PT values 
remain wide from 
0.59-1.25 to 0.6-
1.1 with a cluster 
around 0.7. 
Speed of 
adjustment has 
increased rising 
from 80% to 
about 100% 
within a quarter. 
NA NA 
 
Speed of adjustment 
increases in most countries 
except for Portugal from 
0.34 to 0.57 excluding 
Germany. 
Marotta EU  1993M1- Money Lending ARDL and NA Fallen from 0.9- Varies from NA NA PT is faster using the MIR 
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(2007) 2003M9 
And 
2003M1-
2007M3 
market rate rate ECM 0.7 except for 
France. 
harmonised data 
(MIR):0.9 for 
small loans,0.97 
for large loans 
0.59-1.25 to 
0.6-1.1 with a 
cluster around 
0.7. using MIR 
LRPT ranges 
from 0.77-1.02 
and 0.82-1.14 
data compared to 
unharmonised. Most EU 
countries undergone some 
structural changes in 
preparation for the  single 
monetary policy. 
De Bondt 
(2005) 
Euro area 1996M1 
– 
2001M5 
EONIA( the 
euro 
overnight 
index 
average) 
Deposit and 
loan rates 
ECM,VECM 
and VAR 
models 
Incomplete 
about 50% 
for deposit 
and lending 
rates 
Complete 100% 
for lending rates 
Complete only 
for official 
interest rate to 
market interest 
rates up to 3 
months maturity 
NA NA 
 
Faster retail bank interest 
rate pass-through in the 
euro area since the 
introduction of the euro in 
1999. 
De Bondt 
(2002) 
EU 1996M1-
2001M5 
EONIA( the 
euro 
overnight 
index 
average 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
ECM 
framework 
Incomplete 
0.5 
Complete  
especially for 
lending rates 
Overnight 
deposits and 
deposits 
redeemable (3 
months) are the 
most sticky in 
EU.LRPT of 0.4 
NA NA 
 
PT varies across retail rates 
in Euro area. Increase 
competition and interest 
rate elasticity, decrease 
switching and information 
asymmetry has increased 
PT since 1999. 
Leuvensteijn 
et al. (2008) 
EU 1992-
2004 and 
1994M1-
2006M3 
Money 
market rate 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
ECM and 
Boone 
indicator 
Faster in 
markets 
where 
competition 
is high 
Faster for 
mortgage, loans to 
enterprises and 
time deposits 
Bank interest 
rates spreads on  
mortgage, 
consumer and 
short term loans 
to enterprises is 
lower in highly 
competitive 
markets 
NA NA 
 
Stronger competition in the 
loan markets lowers banks’ 
loan rates. Country specific 
LR and SRPT differ 
greatly. Competition have 
a tendency to contain bank 
loans in line with other 
market rates. 
Sorensen 
and 
Werner 
(2006) 
EU 1999-
2004 
Market rate 
for each 
country 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
Dynamic 
Seemly 
Unrelated 
(DSUR) 
models 
Incomplete 
but not 
reported 
 Mortgages 1.17; 
consumer loans 
0.38; short term 
loans to 
enterprises 0.71; 
long term loans to 
enterprises 0.71; 
current account 
0.15;time deposit 
0.84. NB averages 
LTPT 
Corporate loans 
adjust faster, 
followed by 
mortgages. 
Consumer and 
current accounts 
are very sticky.  
NA NA 
 
Strong evidence of market 
segmentation and lack of 
integration in euro area. 
Difficult to see a clear 
trend when comparing PT 
across countries. Main 
issue is maturity matches 
and dataset used 
(harmonised and 
unharmonised). 
Hulsewig 
et al. 
(2009) 
EU 1990-
2002 
Money 
market rate 
Lending 
rates 
New 
Keynesian 
DSGE, VAR 
Incomplete 
0.54 
Incomplete 0.41 Slow and 
incomplete 
NA NA Prices changes by firms 
greatly affect the 
movement in lending rates. 
Fitzpatrick
and Reilly 
(2001) 
Ireland 1980-
2001 
One month 
money 
market rate 
(MMR) 
Lending 
rates 
ECM incomplete Incomplete  and 
varies from 0.92 
for prime rate to 
0.54 for consumer 
Varies greatly 
across lending 
rates 
NA NA Accounting for structural 
changes improves the 
adjustment speed as well 
as PT. 
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loans 
Baugnet et 
al. (2007) 
Belgium 2003M1-
2006M9 
Money 
market rates 
Deposit and 
lending 
rates 
Partial 
adjustment 
model 
Complete 
on average 
for 
loans;0.95 
for NBFI 
and 0.75  
households 
Short term loans 
0.83 (mortgages) 
and 0.78 loans to 
NBFI; long terms 
loans 0.6 
(mortgages); 0.8 
NBFI 
On average 0.95 
for loans 
categories to 
NBFI and 0.75 
for loans to 
households 
NA NA Belgian commercial banks 
adjust retail rates in 
reaction to changes in 
money market rate 
relatively fast but 
incomplete. Less liquid 
banks adjust retail rates 
faster. 
De Graeve 
et al. 
(2004) 
Belgium 1993M1-
2002M12 
Money 
market rates 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
ECM and 
ARDL 
Incomplete; 
0.4 for 
consumer 
credit, 
loans 0.8 
Complete for 
mortgage 0.92 and 
investment loans 
1.01 
More complete 
for firm and 
consumer loans 
with longer 
maturities 
NA NA The launch of EU has 
resulted in less competitive 
pricing  in the banking 
sector noticeable for 
consumer products.  
De Graeve 
et al. 
(2007) 
Belgium 1993M1-
2002M12 
Money 
market rates 
Deposit and 
lending 
rates 
Panel 
cointegration 
and ECM 
Incomplete. 
0.19-0.98-
lending; 
0.02-0.95-
deposit 
rates 
Incomplete. 
Ranges from 0.66-
0.99-lending; 
0.53-0.98-deposit 
rates 
Almost 
complete for 
corporate loan 
(0.94); 0.91 
consumer loans 
No 
evidence 
NA Corporate loans are more 
complete (SRPT of  0.77) 
compared to consumer 
loans (LRPT of 0.65). 
Demand and savings 
deposits are the stickiest. 
Weth 
(2002) 
Germany 1993M4-
2000M12 
Money 
market rates 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
ECM and 
ARDL 
0.36 for 
current 
account and 
0.58 for 
credits 
Ranges from 0.52-
0.91 for corporate 
lending 
Mortgages 
adjust almost 
complete from 
0.78-0.91 
NA NA Large banks and banks 
with few savings deposits 
adjust lending rates faster 
because their scope of 
setting interest rates is 
limited. 
Horath et 
al. (2004) 
Hungry 1997M1-
2004M4 
Money 
market rate 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
TAR and 
ECM 
Incomplete. 
0.56 
corporate 
loans and 
0.32 
corporate 
deposits 
Corporate loans 
(0.98); corporate 
deposits (0.87) 
Consumer 
credits adjust 
slow and 
incomplete 
signalling low 
interest rate 
elasticity. 
Yes Faster upwards 
adjustment for 
household deposits to 
changes in MMR 
The degree and speed of 
adjustment on both 
Corporate deposits and 
loans show stronger 
transmission than the 
corresponding interest 
rates on household loans. 
Aydin 
(2007) 
Turkey 2001M6 
-2005M5 
Money 
market rate 
Lending 
rate 
Panel 
cointegration 
and ECM 
Corporate 
loan=0.22, 
housing 
loan =-
0.16,cash 
=-0.22 and 
automobile 
loan =-0.64  
Corporate=0.63, 
housing = 1.59, 
cash = 1.07 and 
automobile loan 
=1.08 
Adjustment for 
corporate loan 
=1.19, housing 
=2.90, cash = 
1.67 and 
automobile 
loans = 0.84 
NA NA SRPT estimates are 
insignificant except for 
cash and automobile loans. 
Long runs PT are very high 
for all types of loans when 
the credit market is 
functioning effectively. 
Ozdemir 
(2009) 
Turkey 2001M1-
2007M6 
Money 
market 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
Symmetric 
and 
asymmetric 
ECM 
LR = 0.35 
DR = 0.12 
LR=1.19 and  
DR =1.05 
Lending and 
deposit rates 
adjust 
downward 
slowly  
No Evidence of 
symmetry in lending 
and deposit rates is 
supported 
Evidence shows that 
Turkish banks adjust fully 
their retail rates in reaction 
to innovations in money 
market rates. 
Amarasekara Sri Lanka 1990M6- Call money Lending Polynomial LR = 0.18 LR = 0.51 Only prime No NA PT of changes in MMR to 
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(2009) 2004M4 market and 
policy 
interest 
rates 
and deposit 
rates 
distributed 
lag and 
cointergation 
DR very 
low (0.006-
0.046) 
lending show a 
marginal PT of 
0.51 and other 
rates are sticky 
retail rates of commercial 
banks in Sri Lanka is 
incomplete and sticky. 
Chong 
(2010) 
Hong Kong 1982M8-
2007M8 
Money 
market rate 
Deposit 
rates 
EG , ECM 
and TAR 
models 
NA Regulated period: 
DR ranged from 
0.53-0.76 and 
deregulated 
complete but not 
for all rates (0.68-
0.98) 
ML in the 
regulated era is 
2.7 months DR 
is above 
equilibrium and 
ML is 
11.5months in 
deregulated era 
Yes in 
both 
periods 
Upward rigidity in 
saving and time 
deposits during 
regulated and 
downward rigidity in 
6-month time deposit 
only 
Evidence shows that the 
removal of interest rate 
rules has linked deposit 
rates closely with market 
interest rates. Deregulation 
has increased consumer 
welfare due to increased 
competition in deposit 
markets. 
Khawaja 
and Khan 
(2008) 
Pakistan 1991M6-
2008M6 
Treasury 
bill rate 
Deposit and 
lending 
rates 
Transfer 
function 
approach 
Incomplete LR= 0.43; DR = 
0.16 incomplete 
About 83% of 
changes in 6-
month t-bill is 
passed to 6 
months KIBOR 
in the first 
month 
Yes for 
lending 
and 
deposit 
rates 
More rigid for deposit 
rates since it is not 
pegged to any rates 
PT of LR is much faster 
than DR because of the 
pegging of corporate rate 
to the KIBOR rates. Low 
PT for DR is due to 
insensitivity to interest 
rates changes by 
depositors. 
Karagiannis 
et al. (2009) 
Brazil, 
Russia, India 
and China 
(BRIC) 
Brazil: 
1998M1-
2007M8;
Russia 
1998M1-
2007M9 
and 
1998M3-
2007M7-
China 
Central 
Bank and 
money 
market rates 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
GET and 
ECM 
Not 
reported 
Brazil (DR=0.96, 
LR =); 
Russia (DR=0.61, 
LR=0.40);  
India ( LR=1.21); 
 China ( LR=0.53, 
DR=1.42) 
NA Yes  Loan rates adjust 
Upward faster and 
deposits also adjust 
downward faster. 
Empirical results are mixed 
regarding the transmission 
of monetary policy shocks 
and the degree of PT in 
Brazil, India and Russia. 
Great variation also exists 
in the three economies. No 
meaningful results were 
obtained with the GETS 
methodology in China 
Jankee 
(2005) 
Mauritius 1988Q1-
2003Q3 
Interbank 
Money 
market rate 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
Johansen 
cointegration
,TAR, M-
TAR 
LR=0.24 
DR=0.41 
Not reported ECM model 
LR = -0.601 
DR= -0.641 
Only for 
lending 
rate 
Lending rate  adjust 
faster to decreases  in 
the margins (about 
80% )  
PT is faster for DR 
compared to LR. 
Asymmetry found only for 
lending rate. 
Acheampong 
(2005) 
Ghana 1994M9-
2004M2 
Money 
market rate 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
Cointegratio
n,symmetric 
and 
asymmetric 
ECM 
LR=0.26, 
DR=0.22 
LR=0.55, 
DR=0.69 
NA No  NA Monetary policy 
transmission through the 
interest rate channel is 
week (low SR and LRPT). 
Samba and 
Yan 
92010) 
CEMAC 1990M1-
2007M12 
Discount 
rate 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
ARDL LR=0.67 
DR=0.37 
LR=6.21 
DR=0.34 
LR= -0.00216 
DR= -0.036 
Yes for 
both 
markets  
NA Incomplete long run PT for 
deposits but lending rate 
overshoot in the long run.  
Sanusi 
(2010) 
Nigeria 2002M1-
2010M4 
Interbank 
money 
market rate 
Lending 
and deposit 
rates 
Structural 
VAR 
(SVAR) 
PT 3 and 6 
months 
DR=0.09’ 
LR =0.01 
Not reported 3 and 6 months 
deposits 
adjustment 
takes 6-7months 
NA NA PT of lending and deposit 
decline after the banking 
sector consolidations but 
PT of monetary policy to 
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and 12 moths 
for prime LR 
money market rates 
actually increased. 
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Table A2: Unit roots test – entire sample 
Sample period: 1990-2010     Sample period: 1990M1-2008M6 
Nigeria         
 
Cameroon       
CPR         
 
CPR       
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -1.58 
 
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -1.32 
Intercept & trend -2.41 
 
Intercept & trend -3.26c 
1st Diff 
Intercept -15.35a 
 
1st Diff 
Intercept -11.04a 
Intercept & trend -15.34a 
 
Intercept & trend -11.02a 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.98 
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 1.67 
Intercept & trend 0.23 
 
Intercept & trend 0.15c 
1st Diff Intercept 0.05
a 
 
1st Diff Intercept 0.04
a 
Intercept & trend 0.03a 
 
Intercept & trend 0.04a 
LR         
 
LR       
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -2.46 
 
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -1.66 
Intercept & trend -3.06 
 
Intercept & trend -1.89 
1st Diff 
Intercept -19.93a 
 
1st Diff 
Intercept -14.62a 
Intercept & trend -19.89a 
 
Intercept & trend -14.70a 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.89 
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.43b 
Intercept & trend 0.08a 
 
Intercept & trend 0.39 
1st Diff Intercept 0.04
a 
 
1st Diff Intercept 0.22
a 
Intercept & trend 0.04a 
 
Intercept & trend 0.04a 
DR         
 
DR       
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -2.47 
 
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -1.53 
Intercept & trend -3.89 
 
Intercept & trend -2.04 
1st Diff 
Intercept -8.06a 
 
1st Diff 
Intercept -15.35a 
Intercept & trend -8.04a 
 
Intercept & trend -15.33a 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 0.79 
 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept 1.51 
Intercept & trend 0.13 
 
Intercept & trend 0.27 
1st Diff Intercept 0.05
a 
 
1st Diff Intercept 0.08
a 
Intercept & trend 0.05a   Intercept & trend 0.05a 
Note: a=significant at 1%; b=significant at 5% and c=significant at 10%       
ADF (H: 0 ~ Unit Root) Critical Values: 1% (-3.464643), 5% (-2.876515), 10% (-2.574831) 
  
KPSS (H: 0 ~ Stationarity) Critical Values: 1% (0.739), 5% (0.463), 10% (0.347) 
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Table A3: Summary of unit roots test of rolling window analysis for Nigeria 
 
    1990-1999 1991-2000 1992-2001 1993-2002 1994-2003 1995-2004 1996-2005 1997-2006 1998-2007 1999-2008 2000-2009 2001-2010 
Nigeria     W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 
CPR                             
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -2.0906 -2.0379 -1.9172 -2.2892 -1.4109 -2.064 -1.3023 -0.8942 -0.7289 -0.6981 -0.2575 -0.2862 
Intercept & trend -2.0415 -2.1211 -1.842 -2.3404 -2.304 -2.0623 -1.1008 -1.1683 -2.0740 -3.4357c -2.2234 -3.6741b 
1st Diff 
Intercept  -10.3807a -10.3002a -10.4106a -10.2763a -8.9513a -8.9513a -9.0946a -7.8730a -9.6053a -9.9821a -11.0938a -10.9202a 
Intercept & trend -10.3539a -10.2638a -10.3980a -10.2825a -8.9481a -8.9563a -9.1651a -8.0448a -9.7518a -9.9905a -11.1075a -10.9454a 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept  0.2992c 0.2000c 0.2079a 0.2140b 0.7845 0.5395c 0.2758a 0.2861a 0.6801c 1.0743 1.1620 1.1978 
Intercept & trend 0.1068b 0.1297b 0.1890c 0.2005c 0.0909a 0.1677c 0.2398 0.2411 0.2230 0.1520c 0.1183c 0.0429a 
1st Diff 
Intercept  0.0674a 0.0578a 0.0860a 0.1336a 0.0975a 0.1036a 0.1652a 0.2505a 0.2372a 0.1636a 0.1064a 0.1326a 
Intercept & trend 0.0520a 0.0570a 0.0460a 0.0662a 0.0730a 0.0580a 0.0510a 0.0381a 0.0431a 0.0692a 0.0417a 0.0836a 
LR                             
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -2.5709c -2.5325c -1.8912 -2.7021c -1.6433 -1.5583 -1.3654 -1.2794 -1.0818 -1.0383 -1.3578 -1.1985 
Intercept & trend -2.8706 -2.8222 -1.8913 -2.6680 -1.7885 -1.5020 -1.2713 -1.3598 -1.9790 -2.9267 -1.8592 -2.1282 
1st Diff 
Intercept  -13.400a -13.6176a -13.6260a -13.4955a -10.9321a -10.8972a -10.8725a 11.1825a -10.7057a -14.6337a -14.7635a -14.6054a 
Intercept & trend -13.3469a -13.5612a -13.5805a -13.4644c -10.8912a -10.8658a 10.8660a -11.2783a 10.8260a -14.6896a -14.7076a -14.5456a 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept  -0.5355c 0.4029c 0.4191b 0.2717b 0.5457c 0.3975b 0.2780a 0.3015a 0.5137c 0.8963 0.9374 0.9022 
Intercept & trend 0.1021b 0.1143c 0.2129c 0.2578 0.1637c 0.1516b 0.2318 0.2900 0.2594 0.1875c 0.1300c 0.2238 
1st Diff 
Intercept  0.0754a 0.0982a 0.1271a 0.1375a 0.1330b 0.1488a 0.1826a 0.2060a 0.3536b 0.2328a 0.1181a 0.0680a 
Intercept & trend 0.0714a 0.0971a 0.1087a 0.1046a 0.1353b 0.1266b 0.1165b 0.0847a 0.0959a 0.1107a 0.1088a 0.0715a 
DR                             
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -2.0485 -1.9058 -2.0873 -2.4343 -1.6151 -2.2441 -2.0533 -1.8937 -1.7317 -1.8388 -1.6806 -1.3709 
Intercept & trend -2.5326 -2.5920 -1.9827 -2.3364 -1.8734 -2.5016 -2.0734 -1.6438 -1.9920 -2.2340 -1.8245 -2.8544 
1st Diff 
Intercept  -5.2032a -4.9010a -13.7990a -13.9314a -13.8723a -13.5929a -13.3324a -14.3590a -14.9386a -15.0161a -15.4888a -14.2818a 
Intercept & trend -5.1949a -4.8826a -13.8063a -13.9621a -13.8261a -13.5375a -13.2857a 14.4461a -14.9763a -14.9662a -15.4203a -14.5014a 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept  0.7808 0.6615c 0.5137 0.2859b 0.3658b 0.4325c 0.3570b 0.3201a 0.2934a 0.4312c 0.3881c 0.6892c 
Intercept & trend 0.0923a 0.1174c 0.2180 0.2464 0.1652c 0.1154b 0.1520c 0.2604 0.2304 0.1457b 0.1263b 0.0963a 
1st Diff  
Intercept  0.0727a 0.0914a 0.1439a 0.0954a 0.0694a 0.0674a 0.1039a 0.1433a 0.1638a 0.0977a 0.0686a 0.1816a 
Intercept & trend 0.0632a 0.0864a 0.0763a 0.0463a 0.0530a 0.0664a 0.0900a 0.0435a 0.1638a 0.0840a 0.0683a 0.0932a 
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Table A4: Summary results of unit roots test of rolling window analysis for Cameroon 
      1990-1999 1991-2000 1992-2001 1993-2002 1994-2003 1995-2004 1996-2005 1997-2006 1998-2007 1999-2008 
Cameroon     W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 
CPR                         
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -1.4324 -1.5055 -1.4807 -2.2159 -5.22424a -0.8234 -1.4278 -0.5087 -0.7784 -0.5654 
Intercept & trend -2.6811 -2.6832 -2.7526 -3.6089a -5.88431a -4.6638a -4.0608a -3.5546b -3.6460b -3.4432c 
1st Diff 
Intercept  -7.9431a -7.8799a -7.8770a -7.5610a - -10.5781a -10.7805a -11.2009a -11.1320a -10.7609a 
Intercept & trend -7.9283a -7.8460a -7.8770a -7.5769a - -10.5535a -10.7613a -11.1580a -11.0844a -10.7145a 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept  0.8993 1.0147 1.0126 0.9695 1.0445 1.2335 1.3037 1.2846 1.2789 1.1940 
Intercept & trend 0.1537c 0.1169b 0.1726c 0.2224 0.1677c 0.0576a 0.0723a 0.1490c 0.0589a 0.0935a 
1st Diff 
Intercept  0.0747a 0.0471a 0.0449a 0.0889a 0.3476b 0.1520a 0.0648a 0.0302a 0.0306a 0.0712a 
Intercept & trend 0.0535a 0.0470a 0.0460a 0.0293a 0.1201b 0.1006c 0.0488a 0.0203a 0.0305a 0.0711a 
LR                         
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -1.6059 -1.2809 -1.5848 -1.6072 -1.5440 -1.9718 -0.5650 -0.2535 -0.6495 -0.9789 
Intercept & trend -2.3056 -2.3076 -1.4262 -1.3586 -1.5747 -2.4720 -2.2193 -2.3894 -2.5775 -2.4102 
1st Diff 
Intercept  -10.6935a -10.6202a -10.6405a -10.6376a -11.3152a -10.7774a -10.9071a -10.9898a -10.9898a -10.7137a 
Intercept & trend -10.6504a -10.5814a -10.6536a -10.6624a -11.3044a -10.9424a -10.8952a -11.0044a -10.9488a -10.6670a 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept  0.9164 0.9143 0.8162 0.4551b 0.2846a 0.3612b 1.0965 1.1603 1.1750 1.1065 
Intercept & trend 0.1319b 0.1280b 0.1594c 0.2334 0.2758 0.2437 0.1576a 0.1027c 0.0730a 0.0868a 
1st Diff 
Intercept  0.0499a 0.0750a 0.1535a 0.1600a 0.1274a 0.3035a 0.1019a 0.1137a 0.0609a 0.0539a 
Intercept & trend 0.0508a 0.0662a 0.0980a 0.0657a 0.0652a 0.0765a 0.0614a 0.0531a 0.0541a 0.0513a 
DR                         
ADF 
Level 
Intercept -1.0698 -1.0965 -1.3102 -1.7617 -5.0911a -2.2915 6.0611 -6.1885a 0.1020 -0.1090 
Intercept & trend -1.9943 -1.8873 -1.6756 -1.6337 -4.2173a -1.5012 -5.6448a -6.3588a -1.2758 -1.5690 
1st Diff 
Intercept  -11.2308a -11.2102a -11.2102a -11.2313a - -11.5692a -14.9295a - -10.9385a -10.6608a 
Intercept & trend -11.1826a -11.1629a -11.1799a -11.2663a - -11.7977a -14.8896a - -11.0826a -10.7328a 
KPSS 
Level 
Intercept  1.0672 1.0402 0.9713 0.8291 0.6701c 0.7272c 0.6087b 0.5652c 0.7709 0.8586 
Intercept & trend 0.1200c 0.1287b 0.1930c 0.2406 0.2258 0.2445 0.1686c 0.1897c 0.2532 0.2489 
1st Diff  
Intercept  0.0688a 0.0816a 0.0942a 0.1426a 0.5842c 0.0937a 0.0934a 0.1751a 0.3097a 0.2444a 
Intercept & trend 0.0691a 0.0800a 0.0694a 0.0473a 0.1641c 0.0479a 0.1111a 0.1647c 0.0752a 0.0834a 
Note: a=significant at 1%; b=significant at 5% and c=significant at 10%                 
ADF (H: 0 ~ Unit Root) Critical Values: 1% (-3.464643), 5% (-2.876515), 10% (-2.574831) 
       KPSS (H: 0 ~ Stationarity) Critical Values: 1% (0.739), 5% (0.463), 10% (0.347)                 
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Table A5: Summary of pass-through for entire sample 
Summary of IRPT for Nigeria and Cameroon whole sample               
  Sample period Co-integration tests     Long run PT Short run PT ECTt-1 ML 
  From To JJ EG CRDW ECM      Coeff t-stats  Coeff t-stats Coeff t-stat   
Nigeria                           
Lending rate 1990M1 2010M12 No Yes Yes Yes 0.72 21.84 0.71 9.55 -0.13 -3.55 -2.46 
Deposit rate 1990M1 2010M12 No Yes No Yes 0.70 17.07 0.50 6.91 -0.08 -2.80 -6.35 
Cameroon                           
Lending rate 1990M1 2008M6 No No No No 
  
0.70 5.76 
  
  
Deposit rate 1990M1 2008M6 Yes Yes No Yes 0.55 44.26 0.27 7.29 -0.11 -4.01 -6.49 
 
 
Table A6: Summary of Asymmetric Pass-through for entire sample 
    Asymmetric error correction terms             Summary     
  Sample Period ECT+t-1 ECT
-
t-1 Wald Test   Mean Lag   PT Adjustment Hypothesis   
Countries From To Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat F-stat PV ML+ ML- mechanism rigidity     
Nigeria                             
Lending rate 1990M1 2010M12 -0.169 -2.98 -0.06 -0.82 0.93 0.34 -1.87 -5.10 symmetric downward collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit rate 1990M1 2010M12 -0.143 -2.53 -0.02 -0.34 1.73 0.19 -3.42 -26.71 symmetric downward customer reaction 
Cameroon                             
Lending rate 1990M1 2008M6 no co-integration was found between lending and policy rate in Cameroon 
    
  
Deposit rate 1990M1 2008M6 -0.211 -4.55 0.022 0.390 7.158 0.008 -3.42 32.87 asymmetric downward customer reaction 
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Table A7: SR, LR and MAL for rolling windows – Nigeria 
Summary of IRPT of rolling windows for Nigeria             
  
Rolling 
windows Intercept Long run PT Short run PT ECTt-1 ML 
Interest rates From To Coeff. t-stat Coef t-stats Coef t-stat Coef t-stat   
Lending rate 1990 1999 5.49 6.00 1.01 18.34 0.87 8.95 -0.20 -3.14 0.74 
Lending rate 1991 2000 5.89 6.42 0.97 17.36 0.82 8.44 -0.20 -3.12 1.02 
Lending rate 1992 2001 6.23 6.83 0.95 17.50 0.80 8.24 -0.20 -3.24 1.05 
Lending rate 1993 2002 6.26 7.72 0.94 19.68 0.96 10.54 -0.19 -2.88 0.44 
Lending rate 1994 2003 10.66 12.39 0.64 11.81 0.13 1.23 -0.14 -3.20 6.37 
Lending rate 1995 2004 9.52 10.77 0.70 12.64 0.13 1.23 -0.14 -3.30 6.03 
Lending rate 1996 2005 8.09 9.69 0.78 14.84 0.14 1.34 -0.16 -3.52 5.32 
Lending rate 1997 2006 6.46 7.85 0.87 16.71 0.10 1.11 -0.16 -3.58 5.37 
Lending rate 1998 2007 9.30 13.66 0.70 16.02 0.09 1.17 -0.11 -3.02 7.81 
Lending rate 1999 2008 8.98 14.11 0.72 17.30 0.11 0.93 -0.18 -3.30 4.75 
Lending rate 2000 2009 11.05 17.97 0.61 14.28 0.07 0.57 -0.10 -1.85 9.64 
Lending rate 2001 2010 12.51 22.17 0.52 12.41 0.05 0.35 -0.09 -2.09 10.03 
Deposit rate 1990 1999 -1.77 -1.52 1.00 14.40 0.63 7.39 -0.09 -2.03 3.99 
Deposit rate 1991 2000 -1.20 -1.05 0.93 13.39 0.57 6.94 -0.08 -1.90 5.18 
Deposit rate 1992 2001 -1.84 -1.60 0.96 13.97 0.53 5.82 -0.09 -1.96 4.84 
Deposit rate 1993 2002 -1.88 -1.81 0.94 15.36 0.60 6.21 -0.17 -2.68 2.55 
Deposit rate 1994 2003 1.69 1.23 0.71 8.14 -0.04 -0.23 -0.09 -2.06 11.31 
Deposit rate 1995 2004 0.83 0.57 0.76 8.42 -0.05 -0.25 -0.11 -2.47 9.02 
Deposit rate 1996 2005 -1.07 -0.80 0.86 10.21 -0.03 -0.18 -0.14 -2.80 7.31 
Deposit rate 1997 2006 -2.85 -2.30 0.96 12.32 0.00 -0.03 -0.14 -2.84 6.87 
Deposit rate 1998 2007 2.86 3.18 0.63 10.94 0.02 0.16 -0.14 -2.65 6.94 
Deposit rate 1999 2008 5.21 6.32 0.50 9.33 0.05 0.36 -0.12 -2.29 7.88 
Deposit rate 2000 2009 7.59 9.94 0.37 7.02 0.05 0.35 -0.09 -1.83 10.97 
Deposit rate 2001 2010 5.47 7.90 0.53 10.32 0.03 0.16 -0.10 -2.15 9.84 
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Table A8: SR, LR and MAL for rolling windows – Cameroon 
Summary of IRPT of rolling windows for Cameroon             
  
Rolling 
windows Intercept Long run PT Short run PT ECTt-1 ML 
Interest rates From To Coeff. t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat   
Lending rate 1990 1999 25.90 26.90 -0.72 -7.20 0.60 4.11 -0.07 -2.45 6.58 
Lending rate 1991 2000 26.35 32.63 -0.73 -8.46 0.47 3.33 -0.07 -2.49 8.04 
Lending rate 1992 2001 25.81 31.98 -0.67 -7.48 0.55 3.39 -0.07 -2.15 7.05 
Lending rate 1993 2002 23.86 26.95 -0.47 -4.52 0.59 3.35 -0.06 -1.98 7.79 
Lending rate 1994 2003 NA NA NA NA 0.50 2.07 NA NA NA 
Lending rate 1995 2004 13.33 6.95 0.95 3.53 0.65 1.78 -0.06 -2.07 7.81 
Lending rate 1996 2005 4.01 5.02 2.36 20.43 1.39 4.93 -0.09 -2.57 5.68 
Lending rate 1997 2006 0.02 0.02 2.97 30.07 1.92 6.04 -0.11 -2.64 8.86 
Lending rate 1998 2007 -1.38 -2.29 3.19 33.80 2.01 6.25 -0.11 -2.67 9.37 
Lending rate 1999 2008 -2.20 -3.48 3.32 32.65 2.48 7.10 -0.11 -2.62 13.53 
Deposit rate 1990 1999 0.35 1.58 0.65 28.19 0.27 5.31 -0.17 -3.92 4.06 
Deposit rate 1991 2000 0.49 3.32 0.62 39.22 0.31 6.23 -0.27 -4.68 2.49 
Deposit rate 1992 2001 0.72 5.36 0.60 39.82 0.31 6.24 -0.29 -4.91 2.27 
Deposit rate 1993 2002 0.94 7.01 0.57 36.22 0.35 6.59 -0.24 -4.20 2.63 
Deposit rate 1994 2003 1.18 7.86 0.55 28.82 0.31 4.31 -0.25 -4.33 2.89 
Deposit rate 1995 2004 3.84 30.44 0.18 9.97 0.04 0.87 -0.13 -2.52 7.37 
Deposit rate 1996 2005 4.25 42.36 0.11 7.88 0.11 1.66 -0.22 -3.47 4.19 
Deposit rate 1997 2006 3.78 27.66 0.17 8.50 0.13 2.94 -0.02 -0.63 48.03 
Deposit rate 1998 2007 NA NA NA NA 0.13 3.03 NA NA NA 
Deposit rate 1999 2008 NA NA NA NA 0.16 3.35 NA NA NA 
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Table A9: Asymmetric error correction and ML of rolling windows – Nigeria 
Asymmetric error correction terms and the mean adjustment lags of rolling windows for Nigeria              
    Asymmetric error correction terms             Summary     
  
Rolling 
windows ECT+t-1     
ECT-t-
1 Wald Test   
Mean 
Lag   PT Adjustment Hypothesis   
Interest rates From To Coeff t-stat coeff t-stat F-stat PV ML+ ML- 
mechanis
m rigidity     
Lending rate 1990 1999 -0.3745 -3.05 -0.06 -0.57 2.73 0.10 0.40 2.47 asymmetric downward collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending rate 1991 2000 -0.3648 -3.34 -0.02 -0.17 3.56 0.06 0.55 10.61 asymmetric downward collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending rate 1992 2001 -0.3954 -3.53 -0.02 -0.20 4.20 0.04 0.56 9.94 asymmetric downward collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending rate 1993 2002 -0.3653 -2.83 -0.05 -0.51 2.54 0.11 0.32 2.19 symmetric downward collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending rate 1994 2003 -0.1315 -1.45 -0.14 -1.78 0.05 0.82 7.38 5.78 symmetric upward customer reaction 
Lending rate 1995 2004 -0.1334 -1.57 -0.15 -1.82 0.01 0.90 6.44 5.70 symmetric upward customer reaction 
Lending rate 1996 2005 -0.1671 -2.08 -0.15 -1.80 0.02 0.89 5.01 5.66 symmetric downward collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending rate 1997 2006 -0.2109 -2.71 -0.11 -1.49 0.61 0.44 4.09 7.58 symmetric downward collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending rate 1998 2007 -0.145 -2.11 -0.08 -1.01 0.29 0.59 6.14 11.37 symmetric downward collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending rate 1999 2008 0.00627 0.07 -0.36 -3.85 5.52 0.02 142.73 2.46 asymmetric upward customer reaction 
Lending rate 2000 2009 0.03974 0.47 -0.27 -2.69 4.09 0.04 23.34 3.38 asymmetric upward customer reaction 
Lending rate 2001 2010 0.03809 0.47 -0.26 -2.71 3.79 0.05 24.94 3.72 asymmetric upward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1990 1999 -0.3181 -2.46 0.03 0.41 3.55 0.06 0.98 10.07 asymmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1991 2000 -0.264 -2.13 0.04 0.51 2.51 0.11 1.40 8.22 symmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1992 2001 -0.2415 -1.86 0.02 0.23 1.51 0.22 1.72 16.71 symmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1993 2002 -0.3176 -2.49 0.04 0.40 2.83 0.09 1.11 7.98 asymmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1994 2003 -0.2342 -2.07 0.02 0.21 1.88 0.17 4.23 50.14 symmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1995 2004 -0.2612 -2.43 0.01 0.11 2.27 0.13 3.79 96.76 symmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1996 2005 -0.2553 -2.49 -0.03 -0.28 1.69 0.19 3.82 35.76 symmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1997 2006 -0.2351 -2.55 -0.04 -0.47 1.43 0.23 4.06 21.27 symmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1998 2007 -0.1314 -1.37 -0.15 -1.27 0.01 0.92 7.37 6.46 symmetric upward collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit rate 1999 2008 -0.2393 -2.32 0.02 0.17 1.82 0.18 3.78 47.39 symmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 2000 2009 -0.1859 -2.08 0.03 0.31 1.74 0.19 5.02 29.90 symmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 2001 2010 -0.1318 -1.50 -0.06 -0.69 0.19 0.66 7.35 15.21 symmetric downward customer reaction 
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Table A10: Asymmetric error correction and MAL of rolling windows – Cameroon 
Asymmetric error correction terms and the mean adjustment lags of rolling windows for Cameroon              
    Asymmetric error correction terms             summary     
  Rolling windows ECT+t-1 ECT
-
t-1 Wald Test Mean Lag PT Adjustment Hypothesis   
Interest rates From To Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat F-stat PV ML+ ML- Mechanism Rigidity     
Lending rate 1990 1999 -0.02 -0.23 -0.10 -1.99 0.44 0.51 23.65 4.62 symmetric upward customer reaction 
Lending rate 1991 2000 -0.04 -0.41 -0.09 -1.93 0.16 0.69 15.02 6.65 symmetric upward customer reaction 
Lending rate 1992 2001 0.00 -0.03 -0.10 -1.72 0.31 0.58 112.03 5.02 symmetric upward customer reaction 
Lending rate 1993 2002 0.06 0.43 -0.12 -1.49 0.69 0.41 6.73 3.66 symmetric upward customer reaction 
Lending rate 1994 2003 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA   
Lending rate 1995 2004 0.00 0.04 -0.09 -1.66 0.49 0.48 145.86 5.29 symmetric upward customer reaction 
Lending rate 1996 2005 -0.14 -2.20 -0.03 -0.43 0.94 0.33 3.52 16.70 symmetric downward collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending rate 1997 2006 -0.20 -2.24 0.01 0.09 1.29 0.26 5.00 102.38 symmetric downward collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending rate 1998 2007 -0.22 -2.21 0.02 0.17 1.38 0.24 4.92 53.59 symmetric downward collusive pricing arrangement 
Lending rate 1999 2008 -0.21 -2.15 -0.01 -0.13 1.21 0.27 113.79 7.33 symmetric upward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1990 1999 -0.25 -3.78 -0.02 -0.23 2.35 0.12 2.91 29.46 symmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1991 2000 -0.48 -5.39 0.07 0.53 9.25 0.00 1.46 10.72 asymmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1992 2001 -0.46 -5.21 0.00 -0.02 6.18 0.01 1.51 317.11 asymmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1993 2002 -0.37 -4.26 -0.02 -0.19 3.73 0.05 1.79 27.30 asymmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1994 2003 -0.42 -4.79 0.01 0.08 6.41 0.01 1.82 84.67 asymmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1995 2004 -0.27 -2.68 0.05 0.39 2.66 0.10 3.46 20.63 asymmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1996 2005 -0.33 -3.55 0.02 0.13 2.64 0.10 2.80 46.43 asymmetric downward customer reaction 
Deposit rate 1997 2006 -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 -0.55 0.03 0.86 116.66 36.41 symmetric upward collusive pricing arrangement 
Deposit rate 1998 2007 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA   
Deposit rate 1999 2008 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA   
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Table A11: Monetary policy impulses transmission between Cameroon and Nigeria 
  Monetary impulses in Cameroon transmitted to Nigeria retail rates           
Summary of IRPT for Impulses from Cameroon to Nigeria whole sample             
  Sample period Co-integration tests Long run PT Short run PT ECTt-1 
   From To JJ EG CRDW ECM Coeff t-stats Coeff t-stats Coeff t-stats   
Nigeria (Cameroon policy rate and Nigerian retail rates)               
Lending rate 1990M1 2010M12 Yes Yes No Yes 0.98 12.13 -1.38 -4.49 -0.05 -1.74   
Deposit rate 1990M1 2010M12 No No No Yes 1.02 11.50 -1.06 -3.71 -0.05 -1.79   
Cameroon (Nigerian policy rate and Cameroon retail rates)               
Lending rate 1990M1 2008M6 No Yes No No no co-integration was found between Nigerian policy rate and lending rate in Cameroon 
Deposit rate 1990M1 2008M6 Yes Yes No Yes 0.16 7.50 -0.05 -4.68 -0.03 -2.80   
Nigeria policy rate has some influence on deposit rate in Cameroon.                 
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Figure A1: Short and Long Run Pass-through – Lending rate Figure A2: Short and Long Run Pass-through – Deposit Rate 
  
Figure A3: Short and Long Run Pass-through – Lending Rate Figure A4: Short and Long run Pass-through – Deposit rate 
  
 
